' On 5th January, 1989 M/s. Middle East Bank Limited, a banking company, filed a suit (Suit No,114 of 1989) for recovery of Rs,16,300.42 against Zubair Ahmed Khan Afghani, its former employee before the Banking Tribunal for Sindh at Karachi. The amount claimed comprised of loan of Rs,9,812.96 on account of transport and personal loan of Rs,6,487.46. The defendant in the suit filed his written statement generally denying the averments in the plaint. The Tribunal on the basis of the pleadings of the parties settled certain issues and thereafter the plaintiffs filed an application under Order VI, rule 17, Civil Procedure Code containing a prayer that they be permitted to add an extra para in the plaint. Such a necessity arose as they later on found that the Defendant had cleared the personal loan and was granted such another fresh loan on 6-5-1987 amounting to Rs,8,925. The statement of such facts according to them needed addition of a new para in the plaint.
2. The defendant opposed the proposed amendment as according to him, a new case based on a new cause of action was being introduced in the case.
3. The Tribunal after hearing the parties rejected the above application on 20-4-1989 as according to them the Plaintiffs were in fact trying to introduce an absolutely new material in the suit and setting up a new case against the defendant based on a separate cause of action.
4. Being aggrieved by the order mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the plaintiffs have filed this application under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The office has raised an objection about the maintainability of present revision application being against an order passed by the Banking Tribunal for Sindh at Karachi. The matter was placed for consideration of such office objection and for admission.
5. Mr.Inamul Hague, learned counsel for the applicant mainly contended that according to provision made in section 9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, a decree passed under the Ordinance by the Banking Tribunal is appealable to the High Court and, therefore, the Tribunal is subordinate to the High Court for all purposes. He further contended that as his application was filed under Order VI rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code, the decision of the Tribunal will be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by way of revision.
In support of his above contentions, he relied on cases reported in PLD 1949 Lah. 301, PLD 1970 Dacca 693 and PLD 1966 Lah.
850.
6. In order to appreciate the contentions raised herein, it is necessary to examine the provisions of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984. It was enacted to provide a special machinery for recovery of finance provided by certain Banking Companies under a system of interest free finances.
Section 4 of the said Ordinance enables the Federal Government to establish by a notification certain Banking Tribunals for the purpose. Such Banking Tribunals conferred both the civil and criminal jurisdiction under section 5 of the said Ordinance while, its section 6 prescribed a special procedure to be followed by such Tribunals for deciding cases of recovery of interest free finance provided by the Banking Companies. Section 9 of the said Ordinance makes a provision for appeals against the decrees passed by such Tribunal while the Ordinance does not make any provision for filing of revision or review applications. Section 10 of the said Ordinance grants finality to the orders passed by the Tribunals. No proceedings or any orders that may be passed by the Tribunals can be questioned by any Court or Authority.
7. The first case referred to by the learned counsel reported in PLD 1949 Lah. 301 itself lays down the fundamental rule that when a right is created by Statute which also prescribes the procedure for the enforcement of such right the party complaining of any infringement of such right can only seek such remedy as provided by that Statute.
' It was held in the second case, PLD 1970 Dacca 693 that the provision must be made in the Act to the effect that the orders of certain officers are subject to scrutiny by a High Court. It is only then that a High Court can exercise powers under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.
' Third case reported in PLD 1966 Lah. 850, related to the question of the ouster of jurisdiction of superior Courts under the Constitution and not under the Code of Civil Procedure.
' All the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant do not support the contentions raised by him.
8. By now it is a settled provision of law that the power of review and revision is a substantive right which can only be created by a Statute and such power cannot be exercised without conferment of such jurisdiction by the Statute itself. It is also a settled law by now that such power can only be exercised by a Court, Tribunal or Authority when such power is granted to such a Court, Tribunal or Authority by the very Statute that created the same. I am fortified by my such view by the cases reported in PLD 1980 Lah. 414 (Mistri Abdul Ghafoor v. Mst.Mairaj Begum) and PLD 1970 SC 1 (Hussain Bux v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi).
9. In view of the foregoing reasons in absence of any provision for revision in the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, I am inclined to hold that a revision application under section 115, C.P.C. Is not competent against any order passed by Banking Tribunal functioning there under and orders other than those against which an appeal can be filed under section 9 of the said Ordinance are completely immune from any scrutiny by die High Court as provided by section 10 of the said Ordinance. The office objection is, therefore, upheld and this revision application is dismissed in limine.