' MUHAMMAD ISHAQ KHAN, J.--Through this Constitutional Petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 the petitioner, M/s. Haroonur Rashid Textile Mills Limited (formerly M/s. Nishat Sarhad Textile Mills Ltd.) through Mr. Abdur Rashid, General Manager c/o Pak Corn Products, Dalazak Road, Peshawar, has called in question order dated 14-5-1989 of respondent No,1, Presiding Officer Labour Court, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar, whereby appeal of the petitioner bearing No,78 of 1988 was dismissed and Appeal No,79 of 1988 was accepted against the order dated 10-11-1988 passed by respondent No,2, the Authority under Payment of Wages Act, N.- W.F.P., Peshawar.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that M/s. Nishat Sarhad Textile Mills Limited, presently named as Haroon-ur-Rashid Textile Mills Limited was closed vide order dated 3-9-1976 passed by the Labour Court. This closure was the result of an agreement dated 24-8-1976 between the Management and the Workers to the effect that the workers shall be paid terminal dues by 10-9- 1976 in presence of a representative of the Labour Directorate N.-W.F.P. On one or the other pretext the dues were not paid to the workers (respondents No,3 to 717 in this petition), therefore, respondent No,2 on acceptance of the Petition of the Workers under sections 15 and 16 of Payment of Wages Act, directed the Management of the Petitioner vide order dated 23-10-1986 to make payment of delayed wages to the workers. Alongwith the aforesaid application the workers had also filed an application for condonation of delay caused in filing the claim. The Management of the Petitioner, filed their written reply on 17-11-1986 raising preliminary objections and denying the allegations of the petitioner. On 2312-1986 respondent No,2 wrote a detailed order whereby it accepted the application of the workers for condonation of delay and fixed the case for evidence.
After recording the evidence pro and contra, respondent No,2 partly accepted the claim of 218 workers on 10-11-1988. Both the parties feeling aggrieved filed cross appeals, viz. Appeal No,78 of 1988 by the Management and Appeal No,79 of 1988 by the Workers, which were disposed of by single judgment of respondent No,1 dated 14-5-1989.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the petition under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act could be filed within a period of 3 years from the date when the Payment of Wages became due under the law but in the present case the so-called claim for payment of wages related to the period prior to 3-9-1976, as such the petition could have been filed within 3 years of the said date. He further contended that each applicant (now respondents) had a distinct cause of action, therefore, every individual had to satify the Authority/Court regarding delay of each day in filing the said petition which has not been done in the instant case, therefore, respondents No,1 and 2 had no jurisdiction to condone the delay without being satisfied by the respondents. The learned counsel also argued that the finding of respondent No,2 that previous proceedings afforded sufficient cause for condonation of delay, is against the law and without lawful authority and that both the respondents have failed to take into consideration the mandatory provisions governing condonation of delay. He submitted that the petitioners were able to prove on record that 472 workers were paid off to their entire satisfaction and that not a single worker from amongst the said 472 workers appeared in Court to challenge this averment and claiming non-payment of dues. Therefore, there was no jurisdiction vested in respondent No,1 to accept the cross-appeal of the said respondents. The learned counsel also submitted that respondent No,2 had failed to discuss oral and documentary evidence available on record, therefore, the order passed by respondent No,2 is perverse and without lawful authority. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in fact the petition under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act was filed by an unauthorised person, namely Abdul Ghafoor, through a manipulated and bogus power of attorney. As a matter of fact a large number of workers have left the locality and at present are not available, therefore, respondents No,1 and 2 were required by law to go into this vital question and ascertain as to the genuineness of the petition and the claim of the said applicants (now respondents).
4. We have also heard the learned counsel for the respondents at length and have gone through the impugned orders.
5. Under the law a claim under section 15 read with section 16 of the Payment of Wages Act could be filed even after 3 years provided the claimant satisfies the Authority for the delay and in the instant case the record shows that the Authority, respondent No,2, was satisfied about the genuineness of delay and A the same was rightly condoned. The Authority was vested with the powers under the Payment of Wages Act to condone the delay which it has properly exercised. It was for the petitioner to prove that the said condonation of delay was not based on sufficient grounds which he has failed to do. In a case reported in 1984 SCM R 1311 it has been observed as under:-- "(b) Payment of Wages Act (IV of 1936)-- Ss.15(2) & 17 - Order of Authority refusing to entertain application under S.15(2) on ground of its being barred by time and order condoning delay for sufficient cause--Held, not appealable under S.17."
' There are also authorities of the superior Courts which have declared that the question of limitation, previously decided by an Authority, could not be re-agitated in appeal because previous findings had attained finality, therefore, appellate Court would not be competent to go into such plea of limitation. In the instant case respondent No,2 has decided the question of limitation which decision was rightly upheld by respondent No,1, therefore, both the orders to our view are not open to be re-agitated through this Constitutional Petition.
6. It is on record that vide order dated 3-9-1976 passed by the Labour Court, the Management (Petitioner herein) was bound to make payment of terminal benefits to the workers, respondents 3 to 717, under the supervision of the representative of the Labour Directorate with the status of Assistant Director Labour. As such, it was for the petitioner to have produced such an officer of the Labour Directorate to prove the factum of payment of terminal dues to some of the respondents which he has miserably failed. Abdur Rashid, the solitary witness, appeared on behalf of the management. Had the management made payment of the terminal dues to 472 workers, in compliance with the orders of the Authority? He could have produced the Officer of the Labour Directorate in proof thereof. Therefore, the claim of 218 workers was rightly decreed by respondent No,2 and likewise the remaining workers were also entitled to receive their terminal benefits in accordance with the agreement between the parties.
7. As, admittedly the disputed questions of facts are involved in the case in hand, therefore, this Court while exercising its extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction will not be able to help the petitioner. The question as to whether 161 workers were dismissed from service is a question of fact because the respondents herein had denied the factum of dismissal of said 161 workers, therefore, in view of what has been observed above, this petition being devoid of any merits, deserves dismissal and we order accordingly. Nor order as to costs.