This is a petition under section 50 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 for the interpretation of the order dated 31-1-74 of Labour Court No. 3, Lyallpur.
2. The services of the petitioners, were terminated by the respondent. The petitioners, thereupon, filed a petition under section 25-A of I R. O., 1969, for their re-instatement before Junior Labour Court (II), Lyallpur, which accepted the petition and ordered their re-instatement but did not allow them back benefits. Aggrieved by that order the petitioners went up in appeal before Labour Court No. 3, Lyallpur, which passed the following order: "Under these circumstances I accept the appeal of the appellant. They are hereby re-instated.
Their previous services will be counted but no order is passed as to the wages of the period for which they did not work."
3. Under section 50 of I. R. O., 1969 this Tribunal is required to interpret an award or settlement, if any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any of its provisions.
4. Now the point for determination is as to whether the aforementioned order of the Labour Court is an award or a settlement. It is obviously not a settlement. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however, contended that it is an award. Award is defined under section 2(ii) of I. R. O., 1969, which reads as follows: "Award "Award means the determination by a Labour Court, arbitrator or appellate Tribunal of any industrial dispute or any matter relating there to and includes an interim award."
5. The Industrial Relations Ordinance does not define the word "decision" except of course negatively as that which is other than an award. In the entire Ordinance, only that order of Labour Court is described as an award which is given by the Labour Court after adjudication of an industrial dispute, under section 32 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, strictly speaking, therefore, an award is that which follows adjudication of an industrial dispute under section 32 only. Under section 43 of the Ordinance an industrial dispute is deemed to exist only if raised in the prescribed manner by Collective,, Bargaining Agent or- by an employer and that an application by an individual --working under section 25-A even in relation to a matter falling within the definition of industrial dispute will not be, by virtue of section 43, deemed to be an industrial dispute for it has not been raised by Collective Bargainin8 Agent or an employer.
6. In view of the above I find no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners.
The instant petition, therefore, is not competent and is, accordingly, dismissed as such.