1. SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.--We propose to dispose of the above-noted two petitions by a common order as the points of law involved are identical. We may state here that Mr. Mohammad Ali, Advocate, holding brief for Mr. Majeed Jeelani, Advocate made a request for adjournment on the ground that the mother of the counsel had expired about 10 days back and as such he has not been able to come to the Court but we do not consider the above ground as sufficient for adjournment of the case and accordingly reject the request for adjournment. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length.
2. The above petitions are directed against the common order of Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 24-5-1987 by which the learned Tribunal allowed the appeal of respondent No, 2 and remanded the cases to IIIrd Labour Court, Karachi, for disposal according to law. The background of the cases my be stated as follows:- Respondent No,2 which is Collective Bargaining Agent of the petitioner's establishment served a grievance notice under section 25-A of the I.R.O. on 30th October, 1984, claiming that the festival holidays which have fallen on 30th of June, 1984, 8th September, 1984, and 6th of October, 1984, on occasions of EidulFitr, Eidul Azha and Ashoora respectively were all Fridays and in lieu thereof the workers should be given substituted holidays or the workmen be paid overtime wages for the above dates. It appears that the petitioner did not agree to the above demand of respondent No, 2 whereupon a grievance petition under section 25-A of the I.R.O. was filed before the IlIrd Labour Court at Karachi. The grievance petition was dismissed by the Labour Court on the ground that as the grievance raised by respondent No, 2 related to the individual grievances of workmen employed by the petitioner, respondent No, 2 was not competent to file the proceedings in its own name. The above decision of the Labour Court was challenged by respondent No, 2 before the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal which reversed the order of the Labour Court and held that the petition was maintainable and accordingly remanded the case to the Labour Court for disposal according to law. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above cases. It is contended by the learned counsel that a grievance petition could not be filed in the name of C.B.A. under section 25-A of the I.R.O., which provided the procedure for enforcement of the right of individual aggrieved workmen. The learned counsel in this connection referred to the Full Bench decision in the case of Karachi Pipe Mills Limited v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal PLD 1984 Karachi 503 wherein after comparing the provisions of section 34 and section 25-A of the I.R.O. it was held that whereas under section 34 of the I.R.O. a Collective Bargaining Agent or an employer is entitled to take the dispute concerning it to the Labour Court, section 25-A of the I.R.O. provides the remedy for enforcement of individual right of a workman in case of his grievance. After carefully reading section 25-A of the I.R.O. we are of the view, that although the provision contained in 25-A ibid authorises a Shop Steward or a Collective Bargaining Agent to bring the individual grievance of a Worker to the notice of his employer and also before the Labour Court, in respect of rights guaranteed under any law, or an award or a settlement for the time being in force, but such proceeding has to he filed on behalf of or in the name of the individual worker as envisaged in the section. We have, therefore, no difficulty in holding that the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal that the grievance petition under section 25-A of the I.R.O. filed by the C.BA. (respondent No, 2) before the IIIrd Labour Court was maintainable in law is not sustainable. However, as it is not disputed before us that the respondent No,2 could invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in respect of a matter which falls within the ambit of section 34 of the I.R.O., we are not inclined to interfere with the order of remand made by the learned Appellate Tribunal on this ground. We, therefore, direct respondent No,2 to treat the application filed by respondent No, 2 under section 25-A of the I.R.O. as one under section 34 of the I.R.O. and dispose of the same is accordance with the law without being influenced in any manner by the observation made by the Appellate Tribunal in the order of remand. There will be no order as to costs.