DORAB PATEL, J.----This is a reference under section 20 of the Divorce Act, 1869. The petitioner and the respondent are first cousins and Christians by birth. They had married on 12th April 1970, but a few months later, the petitioner filed a petition under the Divorce Act against the respondent in the District Court, Karachi. The petitioner sought on this petition a declaration that her marriage with the respondent was null and void and also a decree for divorce or for judicial separation. As the reliefs sought are difficult to combine, I would refer here to three grounds on which this strange petition was based. The first was that as the petitioner and her husband were first cousins, according to the Christian faith they were "within the prohibited degree of natural as well as legal consanguinity." The second ground was that the petitioner had been "persuaded, threatened, forced, coerced and induced fraudulently and deceitfully---------..To" enter into the marriage by the respondent. The third and last ground was that the petitioner had never lived with the respondent. The respondent contested the petition. He admitted in his written statement that he and the peti--tioner were first cousins, but he denied that they were within the prohibited degrees of marriage. He also accepted that the petitioner had lived with him for 10 days and he denied as absolutely false the allegations that he had illegally induced the petitioner to marry him.
2. The petitioner examined herself in support of her claim. She merely said in her evidence that her marriage was invalid because she and the respondent were within the prohibited degrees and that they had not lived together after the marriage. Thus she dropped completely her allegation against the respondent that he had induced her to marry him by fraud, coercion and duress. She also examined two witnesses who both claimed to be priests. The first was her uncle, one Harnamdas Nanda. He said iii evidence that both the petitioner and the respondent were the children of his real brothers and that the family was Hindu converts to Christianity. He then said: "Our personal law of Hinduism continues in our marriage even after conversion." 'The witness also claimed that although he had been a priest for 20 years, he had not solemnized "the marriage of cousins who were converted to Christianity from Hinduism". Finally he said "Even, in matters of inheritance we observe the personal law of Hinduism". The other witness examined by the petitioner was one Paul alias Belaran" who bad solemnized the, petitioner's marriage. He claimed that at the time of the solemnisation of this marriage he did not know that the petitioner and the respondent were first cousins and he further said "It. Is not the custom amongst Christians that the first cousins who have been converted from Hinduism to marry each other. According to the New Testament the cousins converted from Hinduism could not marry with each other," He also said in cross-examination that "according to the Christian religion marriage between first cousins is illegal." The respondent examined himself in support of this case. He said that his grand-father had been converted to Christianity, and since then his family had beer observing Christian customs. He also said that before the solemnization of his marriage with the petitioner he had asked priest Belaram whether he could marry the petitioner, as she was his first cousin, and Belaram had said that he could marry her "according to Christianity". Finally, he said that his wife had lived with him for 10 days after the marriage.
3. The learned District Judge was impressed by the petitioner's evidence and he thus accepted her claim that she had never lived with the res--pondent. He further held on the evidence of the two priests Belaram and Nanda that marriage between first cousins was prohibited by Christianity, and he also held that Hindu converts to Christianity continued to be governed by the Hindu law of prohibited degrees of consanguinity even after they had abandoned Hinduism. Unfortunately, and 1 have to say this with great regret, the learned District Judge did not care to give any reasons for the sweeping conclusions thus reached by him. Be that as it may, he passed a decree for nullity, which has come up for confirmation before us under section 20 of the Divorce Act. I will first examine the trial Court's finding that the petitioner had never lived with the respondent. First of all, the burden of this plea was on the petitioner. Secondly, the respondent produced three letters (Exhs. 11, 12 and 13) written by the petitioner, and the last letter (Exh. 13) is by the petitioner to her mother. Its opening words are "one week has passed that t have separated from you and you have greatly suffered during this period due to us." It is clear from the letter that these words had reference to the petitioner's marriage and therefore they are completely inconsistent with her claim in evidence that she had "returned home on the very day of marriage." Further, this letter and the other letters were produced by the respondent without any objection by the petitioner, who did not attempt even to have the hand-writing on the letters referred to a handwriting expert. In these circumstances I am satisfied that these letters were written by her. Now, even the trial Court has observed that they are love letters, therefore it is not possible to believe the petitioner's evidence that she had returned to her parents on the very day of her marriage. In any case, as that was her plea, she should have examined her parents, but she did not, and the respondent emphatically asserted that the petitioner had been with him for ten days. In these circumstances it is clear that the petitioner's plea is not fit to be believed, and I can only express my regret at the cursory appreciation of the evidence by the trial Court.
4. I would also refer here to another circumstance which has impressed me very poorly but which had escaped the attention of the trial Court. The petitioner's case in her petition was that she had been fraudulently and dishonestly induced by the respondent to go through the ceremony of marriage with him, and I have quoted earlier the relevant allegations against the respondent. But as the petitioner was totally silent on this aspect of the case in her evidence, and as these allegations are completely inconsistent with her own letters (Exhs. 11, 12 and 13) I am satisfied that the allegations in the petition were false to the petitioner's knowledge and were a gross abuse of the process of the Court. And I am not surprised that Mr. Motiur Rehman was reluctant to assist us on this aspect of the case, and went on repeating that he would press for confirmation of the decree of the trial Court only on one ground, that Hindu converts to Christianity continued to be governed by the Hindu Law of prohibited degrees even after their conversion to Christianity.
5. The position thus taken by learned counsel is (not) justified because there is absolutely no evidence to support this prayer for divorce or p4dicial separation. However as it is our duty under section 20 of the Divorce Act to examine the judgment of the District Judge, I would examine his entire reasoning for the decree referred to us for confirmation and I would first set out the relevant provisions of the Divorce Act. Section 18 reads as follows: "Any husband or wife may present a petition to the District Court or to the High Court, praying that his or her marriage may be declared null and void."
Section 19 states: "Such decree may be made on any of the following grounds: ---
(1) that the respondent was impotent at the time of the marriage and at the time of the institution of the suit ;
(2) that the parties are within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity (whether natural or legal) or affinity;
(3) that either party was a lunatic or idiot at the time of the marriage
(4) that the former husband or wife of either party was living at the time of the marriage, and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force.
Nothing in this section shall affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to make decrees of nullity of marriage on the ground that the consent of either party was obtained by force or fraud."
Finally section 20 prescribes that every decree of nullity made by a District Judge shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court. Therefore the question before us is whether the petitioner has proved her case under section 19 and it is only subsection (2) of this section, which is relevant.
6. I observed earlier that the District Judge passed the decree for nullity on the ground that Hindu converts to Christianity continued to be governed by the Hindu Law of prohibited degrees and on the ground that first cousins came within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity of Christianity.
The second ground, if correct, would clearly fall under subsection (2) of section 19, but the finding of the learned District Judge is based solely on the opinion of the priest Belaram according to whose evidence a marriage between first cousins was prohibited in Christianity. Now the witness was cross-examined on this opinion and as he claimed to base it on the New Testament, he should have been asked to identify the relevant passage in the New Testament, at least if the Court wished to rely on his opinion. But if the Court was not aware of its powers under section 165 of the Evidence Act, it should have exerted itself to verify the position from the New Testament, and if it could not do even that, it should either have directed the learned counsel to cite the text--books and the case-law; or refrained from giving a finding so recklessly. Instead, without even an effort to ascertain the saw, the learned District Judge gave a finding the effect of which must be to render hundreds of marriages void, with consequences disastrous to the issue of such marriages. And here I have to point out some thing very obvious. Christianity, like every great religion, has many sects. Now there is no clear evidence about the sect to which the petitioner and the respondent belonged, but the learned District Judge was only called upon to give a decision on rile of prohibited degrees in the matter of marriages- of first cousins with regard to the particular sect to which the parties belonged, yet he gave a decision that alt Christians were prohibited from marrying first cousins.
7. We were shocked and appalled both by the conclusion" thus reached and by the manner in which the learned District Judge had reached it, and we pointed out to Mr. Motiur Rehman that the Divorce Act was enacted in 1869 and that Charistianity was perhaps older in the sub--continent than in Europe, therefore we observed that clear evidence was required about the sect of Christianity to which the parties belonged. Learned counsel's reply was that the parties belonged to the Church of England and that the case had proceeded in the trial Court on this basis. Now there is evidence to show that the parties were Protestants, but there are many sects amongst Protestants also, and we had no means of knowing whether the rules about consanguinity and prohibited degrees were identical amongst all Protestant sects. Disturbed as we were by this and other aspects'' of the case, we gave notice to Mr. Raymond, a senior Advocate of the Christian community, to assist us. However, reverting to the point under discussion, if the parties in the instant case belong to the Church of England- as submitted, then the matter is very simple.
According to Rayden on Divorce (8th Edn.), p. 82 I have examined: "The prohibited degrees, which had been set out in .Reformation statutes (a), were expressed in a table set forth by authority in 1953; the table is annexed to the Book of Common Prayer. In modern times alterations were made with reference to marriage with u deceased wife's sister and a deceased brother's widow and to the marriage of persons with their nephew or niece by marriage (b). The prohibited degrees of relationship and the statutory exceptions are now consolidated in- the Marriage Acts, 1949 to 1960 (c)."
I have examined the United Kingdom Marriages Act of 1949 and it does not contain any prohibition on the marriage' of first cousins, therefore Belaram's opinion about the rule of prohibited degrees in Christianity is not correct and it has misguided the learned District Judge, but I will revert again to the question of this witness's veracity.
8. But the only other ground for decreeing the petitioner's claim was the finding of the learned District Judge that Hindu converts to Christianity continue to be governed, even after their conversion to Christianity, by the Hindu law of prohibited degrees of consanguinity. The proposition thus laid down is sweeping, if not revolutionary, yet it is not supported by any reasoning or case- law. I will presently examine the law on this point, but I will presently examine the law on this point, but I would point out here that the learned District Judge has based his conclusion on the evidence of the two priests examined by the petitioner, Belaram and the petitioner's uncle Nanda. The question before the Court was of the rights of the Christian community therefore I am constrained to express my very great regret that a Court should decide the rights of an entire community on the opinion of two unknown priests. But it is not merely that the witnesses were unknown. Their evidence does not inspire confidence. I have examined Belaram's evidence, and, as, I have shown, his opinion about the rule of prohibited degrees is contrary to the 'view of the Church of England after the Reformation. And, according' to Mr. Motiur Rehman, the petitioner and the respondent belong to the Church of England, therefore if learned counsel's statement from the bar be correct, there cannot be any doubt that the witness had tried to misguide the Court. But even if learned counsel's statement is not correct, does it alter the position Y We enquired from Mr. Raymond about the rule of prohibited degrees in Christianity, and, speaking as a Roman Catholic, he . Repudiated the suggestion that Christianity prohibited marriages between first cousins. Mr. Raymond also referred us to a passage in Mulla's Hindu Law which I shall presently consider. But as I would not condemn a witness on the basis of a statement from the bar in subsequent proceedings, I would recall here that the witness had made a categorical and unqualified assertion about the rule of prohibited degree amongst all Christians. Now Christianity. Being very old, is divided into many sects, but the Protestants affiliated to the Church of England are one of the principal sects in this country, therefore, if Belaram was really a priest of 20 years standing, as he claimed to be, he must have known the position taken by the Church of England for the last four centuries and more, and, even if, as a Christian he did not agree with that position, he must have known of it; therefore in view of his sweeping assertion about all Christians, he should have informed the Court that a very important sect of Christians did not share the opinion expressed by him, and by his silence I regret to say that he deliberately misguided the Court. But the evidence of the other priest Nanda inspires even less confidence. Not only did Nanda say that there could be no marriage between first cousins in Christianity, but he also said "Even in inheritance we observe the personal law of Hinduism." This statement is- not true because ever since the Succession Act of 1865, all Christians, including converts to Christianity, have been governed by the Succession Act, as was pointed out by the Privy Council more than forty years ago in Kamawati v. Digbijai Singh (AIR 1922 P C 14). But as Nanda claimed 20 years' experience as a priest, did he really not know that Christians, including Hindu converts to Christianity, had ceased to be governed by Hindu law for more than 100 years? I cannot believe this, but if he was really so ignorant, his evidence should not have been accepted on the ground of his ignorance in any view of the matter, his evidence does not inspire confidence; and I am astonished that the learned District .Fudge relied on it. But there is no other evidence to support the sweeping findings of the learned District Judge that Christianity forbids marriage amongst first cousins and that Hindu converts to Christianity continue to be governed by the Hindu law of prohibited degrees even after their renunciation of Hinduism.
9. Therefore when arguments began before us in this case on 18-6-1973, we had observed that the findings of the learned District Judge wer4 neither supported by law nor by evidence. Mr. Motiur Rehman's reply was that he would press for the confirmation of the trial Court's decree only on one ground, that Hindu converts to Christianity were entitled, presumably by custom, to retain the Hindu law of prohibited degrees, despite their conversion to a religion with a very different rule of prohibited degrees. This objection had not even been pleaded, but the question was of the rights and customs of the Christian community, and we were reluctant to let the rights of a community be decided by default, therefore Mr. Motiur Rehman sought our leave to produce evidence about the alleged custom of Hindu converts to Christianity. But before evidence could be recorded, we had given notice to Mr. Raymond, and Mr. Raymond submitted that in view of section 17 of the Divorce Act we could not record evidence, but that we could only remand the case to the District Court for recording evidence oft any question on which we considered further evidence tte0v'5saty.
Mr. Motiur Rehman therefore immediately dropped his application and submitted that the case should be remanded for evidence.
10. I am not able to accept Mr. Raymond's submission on the effect of section 17. No doubt this section imposes a restriction on this Court's power to record evidence, but this section is not relevant, because it relates to cases "for confirmation of a decree for dissolution of marriage." But the reference before us is under section 20 of the Divorce Act for confirmation of a decree for nullity, and this section does not contain any restriction on this Court's powers. Additionally as 1 have shown earlier, section 19 expressly prescribes that nothing in it "shall effect the jurisdiction of the High Court to make decrees for nullity of marriage on the ground that the consent of either party was obtained by force or fraud". Therefore I am satisfied that we have ample power to record evidence, but the question is whether any case has been made out for invoking our discretion to record evidence. The question of invoking our discretion can arise only if the submission about the alleged custom of Hindu converts to Christianity is legally tenable, and as section 19 set out the grounds on which a decree for nullity may be made, I will now examine that section.
11. Section 19, which I have quoted earlier, states that a decree for nullity may be made on the ground that "the parties are within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity (whether natural or legal) or afrmity". This is the only part of the section which is relevant, and Mr. Motiur Rehman relied on the word "natural" which qualifies consanguinity. But consanguinity may be the result of a legitimate relationship of the result of an illegitimate relationship, and according to Rayden on Divorce (8th Edition, p. 83), the word natural is intended to cover the latter relationship. That is also Rattigan's view in his Commentary on Divorce (1938 Edition--- p. 298), and as I agree with it, I would hold that section 19 does not lend any support to Mr. Motiur Rahman's submission. But the section is silent on the question of how the prohibited degrees are to be ascertained. How then are the prohibited degrees to be ascertained? It must be borne in mind that a petition under this Act can be filed if even one of the spouses is a Christian, and as this Act also applies to all marriages contracted under the Special Marriages Act ride section 17 of that Act, it is clear that it applies to a variety of situations. Now, the bar of prohibited degrees of consanguinity relates to a party's capacity to contract a marriage, therefore it can be determined only by reference to the personal law of the parties, which means, in our context, their religious law. I may also point out here that the term personal law of the parties is to be found in section 88 of the Special Marriages Act, 1872, but it has neither been defined in the section, nor in this Act, therefore it must be given its ordinary meaning, and that has been considered by the Bombay High Court in Saldanha v. Saldanha (AIR 1930 Boni, 105) and Blackwell, J. Observed that "the words `the personal law applicable to either of the parties' in section 88 clearly refer to the personal law of the religious community to which either of the parties belong". In my humble opinion; these observations state the correct meaning of the term "personal law of the parties" both generally and in section 88, and I would illustrate it by a couple of examples. The personal- law of a Hindu is the Hindu law, and the personal law of a Christian is the law governing Christians. However, even as between Hindus or as between Christians, the personal laws may not be the same, because, for instance, the rules of the Dayabhaga school are somewhat different from those of the Mitakshara school. Similarly, as the case of Lopez will show, there may be differences between the sects of Christianity. But whatever be the sect of Christianity, it has its own rules of prohibited degrees of consanguinity therefore I do not see how these rules can be modified or altered or supplemented by the rules of an alien religion, and there is nothing whatever' in section 19 to support Mr. Motiur Rahman argument. On the contrary Mr. Raymond referred us to Mulla's observation in section 7 of his Hindu Law (9th Edition) that "the Hindu law does not apply . . . . . To the Hindu converts to Christianity". Now although the Divorce Act has been in force more than 100 years, I am not aware bf any decision in which Mulla's observations have been criticised, much less rejected. We therefore repeatedly asked Mr. Motiur Rehman to cite some authority in support of his submission, but he merely said that his submission was supported by section 88 of the Christian Marriage Act and by the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Lopez case.
12. Section 88 of the Christian Marriage Act reads as follows: --- "Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to validate any marriage which the personal law applicable to either of the parties forbids him or her to enter into."
Mr. Motiur Rehman submitted that the capacity to contract a marriage was governed by this section, and this submission is supported by the marginal note to the section, which states "Non- validation of marriages within prohibited degrees." This marginal note has been criticised as misguiding by the Bombay High Court in Saldanha's case. However even if we assume for the sake of argument that the marginal note is correct, I do not see how it can help the petitioner. After all, even if the section invalidates marriages within the prohibited degrees, the prohibited degrees referred to are the prohibited degrees of the personal law applicable to the parties. But the section does not define the term personal law, and, for the reasons given by Blackwell, J. In Saklanha's case, I respectfully agree with his view that the personal law of a party is the law of the religion to which that party belongs. And as the petitioner is a Christian, her personal law is the law applicable to the sect of Charistianity to which she belongs. But her claim is that as a convert to Christianity she is entitled to carry into the Christian religion the law by which her ancestors had been governed when they were Hindus. The submission appears to be contrary to the very concept of conversion to a new religion, and Mr. Motiur Rehman conceded that if the petitioner had been a Muslim, she could not have claimed the right to follow the Hindu law of her ancestors on a point governed by Muslim law. But as Christianity has its own rules of prohibited degrees, how can a convert from Hinduism to Christianity be permitted the right to follow the customs of the religion renounced by him? I am aware that religious practices may be modified by custom, but the burden of proving that such a modification is Permitted by the religion affected by the alleged custom and the burden of 5 proving that the practices of a religion have been modified by a custom fall very heavily on the party relying on the alleged custom. Therefore, the burden of the petitioner's extraordinary plea was very heavily on her. Not only is the evidence produced by her not fit to be described as evidence, but her submission appears to be contrary to Christian law as observed by Mulla.
13. Finally, Mr. Motiur Rehman submitted that this submission was supported by a judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Lopez v. Lopez (I L R 12 Cal. 706) and as learned counsel appeared to have based his entire case on this judgment, we examined it, but it does not lend any support whatsoever to learned counsel's submission. The facts in that case were that the petitioner had married his deceased wife's sister and as such a marriage fell within the prohibited degrees of the table to the Book of Common Prayer, the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court granted a decree for nullity on the ground that the marriage was void. But the parties were Roman Catholics, therefore their contention was that they were not governed by the English law of prohibited degrees but by the rules of prohibited degrees of the Roman Catholic Church. And the further contention was that the Roman Catholic Church permitted a marriage between a man and his deceased wife's sister provided a dispensation had been obtained from the ecclesiastical authority, therefore the decree of nullity was challenged on these grounds, and the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside that decree. In setting it aside the learned Judges pointed out that the personal law of the Roman Catholics was not the law of the Church or England but of the Roman Catholic Church. They then observed at page 731: "The result is that in our opinion the prohibited degrees for the parties to this marriage were not the degrees prohibited by the law of England, but those prohibited by the customary law of the class to which they belong, that is to say, the law of the Roman. Catholic Church as applied in this country."
I am in respectful agreement with these observations which coincide with my own views on the subject, but all that was held in this judgment was that the personal law of Roman Catholics was not the law of the Protesant Church of England, but of the Roman Catholic Church of Rome. I do not see how this proposition can conceivably support the submission that converts to Christianity can import into Christianity the rules and practices of the religion which they had renounced in order to embrace Christianity. But in setting aside the decree of nullity the learned Judges of the Calcutta Higlx Court had also relied on a judgment of the Judicial Committee in Abraham v. Abraham (9 M I A, 199) therefore learned counsel referred us to the following observations in the Calcutta case at page 722: "It was held in Abraham v. Abraham that Hindus adopting Christianity do not necessarily change their laws of property, but may retain their old law, or adopt that of the class to which they attach themselves, or establish a customary law. And we think the same rule must be correct one as to laws of marriage. But their Lordships lay down the rule only as to "matters with which Christianity has no concern." And we do not suppose the law could permit native converts (if one can imagine their desiring such a thing) to choose for themselves some marriage law wholly repugnant to Christian ideas-converts from Hinduism, for instance, to retain their former right to marry more wives than one, or converts from Mahomedanism their former freedom of divorce."
These observations have to be read with the facts of the case and, in my humble opinion, they do not lend any support to learned counsel's submission, but as learned counsel said that he did not have the benefit of reading the Judicial Committee's decision, I have examined it.
14. The dispute in Abraham's case was about the estate of one Mathew Abraham who had died in 1842 in Madras. He and his brother were both converts to Christianity from Hinduism and they had, in Mathew Abraham's lifetime, carried on a business. After Mathew Abraham's death, the brother continued to carry on that business by himself for several years, therefore the widow of the deceased filed a suit against him. And his defence inter alia was that he and his deceased brother constituted a Hindu joint family and therefore the share of the deceased in that business had devolved upon him as a coparcener and that deceased's widow was only entitled to maintenance under Hindu law. Now, reliance was placed on Hindu law because the respondent and the deceased had been Hindus by birth, but it is to be remembered that Mathew Abraham had died long before the enactment of any statute to regulate succession, testate or intestate. In this legislative vacuum, obviously questions of succession could only be governed by custom, and the respondent's claim was that despite their conversion to Christianity he and his brother had continued to follow the law of their ancestors. Although the Judicial Committee held that the respondent had failed to prove that the deceased intended to be governed by the Hindu law of succession, Lord Kingsdown, who delivered the judgment of the Judicial Committee, observed at page 41: "Their Lordships, therefore, are of opinion that upon the con--version of a Hindu to Christianity the Hindu law ceases to have any continuing obligatory force upon the convert. He may renounce the old law by which he was bound, as he has renounced his old religion, or, if he thinks fit, he may abide by the old law, notwithstanding he has renounced the old religion."
These observations ceased to be good law after the enactment of the First Indian Succession Act of 1865. Nor can the principle contained in these observations be extended by analogy to the present case, because Christianity has its own rules of prohibited decrees of consanguinity but there is no such thing as a Christian law of succession. I am fortified in my opinion by the Judicial Committee's observations at page 243: "The profession of Christianity releases the convert from the tremmels of the Hindu law, but it does not of necessity involve any change of the rights or relations of the convert in matters with which Christianity has no concern, such as his rights and interests in, and his powers over property."
15. In the result, Lopez's case does not lend any support to the petitioner's extraordinary claim, and, on the contrary, in my humble opinion, the ratio of the case is fatal to her claim. And, on the other hand, the submission that the Christian rules of prohibited degrees of consanguinity can be altered by custom inspired by the religious law of another religion is contrary to reason and is not supported by any decision whatsoever, although the Divorce Act has been in force for more than one hundred years. Therefore I would accept as correct Mulla's statement of the law which I have quoted in para. 11, and this means that the trial Court's decree of nullity is illegal and cannot be confirmed. However, before 1 part with this judgment, 1 have to observe that Mr. Raymond drew our attention to the fact that the petitioner was a minor within the meaning of the Christian Marriage Act according to her certificate of marriage (Exh. 8), and as her marriage was solemnized under this Act, Mr. Raymond submitted that it would be void if the conditions prescribed for a marriage by this Act had not been complied with. Mr. Motiur Rehman thereupon immediately attempted to defend the decree of nullity on the ground that the petitioner's marriage was in breach of the emendatory provisions of the Christian Marriage Act, but learned counsel was not able to identify the provisions of that Act which had allegedly been violated. Nor is there any evidence on this question because these objections had not been raised by the petitioner in her petition. And they cannot be considered unless we give her leave to amend the petition. Mr. Motiur Rehman therefore made an oral request that the case should be remanded to the trial Court with permission to the parties to amend their pleadings. In my humble opinion, to allow this request would be a gross abuse of the process of the Courts in view of the circumstances discussed and the manner in which this objection which is only a possible objection has been raised. Therefore, I would reject the request as frivolous in the extreme, but the petitioner would be free to prosecute her remedies in law, if any. With these observations, the judgment of the learned District Judge is set aside and the decree of nullity is not confirmed. I thank Mr. Raymond for his assistance.
K. B. A.
Decree not confirmed.