CH. HASAN NAWAZ (MEMBER).--We are concerned, in this judgment, with the disposal of an appeal under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 filed by the appellant to challenge the validity of the order of his premature retirement with effect from 6-10-1986 (A.N) from WAPDA service on attaining the age of 55 years, passed by the competent authority under Rule 3(b) of the Pakistan WAPDA Employees (Retirement) Rules, 1979.
2. These are the facts in the background: After having started his career as Sub-Engineer, in the year 1955 in Irrigation Department of the Government of Punjab, on 1-4-1959, he was transferred to WAPDA (respondent) alongwith other employees of the department, where he was subsequently promoted as Junior Engineer in the year 1966. On 1-9-1974, his services were placed at the disposal of M.C.P.L. on deputation where he was promoted as Project Engineer in the rank and status of a Senior Engineer.
3. In the year 1979, during his posting in the Drainage Division of M.C.P.L. at Peshawar, when he was incharge of the project of re-modelling of Budni Drain, a case under Section 409/420/469/471, P.P.C. read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was registered against him by the F.I.A. on 9-8-1980 on the allegation that he made bogus payment of Rs,21,500 to Qaiser Khan Contractor in collusion with co-accused Syed Sadiq Hussain, Assistant Project Engineer, in abuse of his official position, for a work which had not been accomplished on the site. Sanction for his prosecution in a Court of Law was also granted by the Government of Pakistan on 18-3-1982, whereafter he was suspended from service on 17-6-1982 on the direction of the Ministry of Interior.
4. On 5-7-1982, while still being under suspension, the appellant was repatriated to the respondent authority which refused to accept him, resulting in exchange of correspondence between the M.C.P.L. and the respondent authority. Ultimately, the appellant was accepted by the Authority after he was obliged to have recourse to the High Court with a Writ Petition which was accordingly disposed of on 23-4-1983. The period of his suspension was, however, extended from time to time by the competent authority from 3-4-1983 to 16-9-1986. Eventually, on 30-7-1986, he was reinstated in service as Junior Engineer in compliance with the Service Tribunal's direction issued on 19-7-1986 on a Miscellaneous Petition filed by him in his appeal (210(R)/1986) under Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 which he had instituted to assail the validity of his suspension from service for a period of more than four years. On reinstatement, his services were placed at the disposal of General Manager (Water North), Peshawar for absorption against an existing vacancy in the Design Office at Lahore. Shortly afterwards on 6-10-1986, he was prematurely retired from service, on attaining the age of 55 years under Rule 3(b) of the WAPDA Employees (Retirement)
Rules, 1979 which makes the following reading:- "Rule 3(b): Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the order or the letter of appointment of an employee or in the terms of his service or in any other rule applicable to him, the WAPDA employee, shall retire from service on such date after he has completed 25 years of service qualifying for pension/gratuity or other retirement benefits, or on completion of 55 years of his age, as the competent authority may in the public interest direct."
5. Prayer for setting aside the impugned order of premature retirement dated 6-10-1986, is based on the following grounds which were also canvassed during the course of arguments at the Bar:
(a) The WAPDA Employees (Retirement) Rules, 1979 are not intended to serve as substitute for a disciplinary action and the sole object of providing for premature retirement is that inefficient employees should no longer be a strain on the public funds. This is what exactly was meant to be conveyed by the expression, "public interest".
(b) The appellant remained on deputation with M.C.P.L. from 1-9-1974 to 30-7-1986 during which period the respondent authority had no occasion to watch his work and conduct and was not, therefore, in a position to form any opinion on whether his retention in service beyond 55 years would or would not be in the public interest. This being so, the impugned order is unjustified and arbitrary.
(c) The appellant had a blotless career as an Engineer with the respondent as also the M.C.P.L. and there was no basis for a finding that his premature retirement was in the public interest.
(d) The impugned order is mala fide, which is evident from the fact that the respondent authority was adamant to accept the appellant is service on repatriation and that it was done only after the institution of a Writ Petition before the High Court. The Retirement Rules were used only as an excuse to get rid of the appellant.
(e) The respondent authority was forced to reinstate the appellant in service in compliance with the Tribunal's order which caused an annoyance, ultimately resulting in the passage of the impugned order.
(f) WAPDA Employees (Retirement) Rules, 1979 amount to an excessive subordinate legislation and are ultra vires of Articles 25 and 27 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and are thus void by virtue of Article 8 of the Constitution.
(g) Neither the WAPDA Act nor the Retirement Rules exclude the opportunity of hearing before passing an order of premature retirement. The appellant was never given an opportunity to plead against passage of the impugned order which amounts to unheard condemnation.
6. The defence is that the appellant's case for retention in service on attaining the age of 55 years was scrutinized by the Board concerned alongwith other officers and that the order of his premature retirement was passed in lawful exercise of authority.
7. Before proceeding further, it seems to be necessary to deal with the contention that the appellant's retirement was ordered by the competent authority in the public interest and that the question whether it did serve such an interest, was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the competent authority. The argument was that the determination of this question must of necessity be left to the subjective satisfaction of respondent authority. Reliance in support was placed on the Supreme Court authority in the case of Lt.-Col. Farzand Ali and others PLD 1970 SC 98 where the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (4) of Article 178 of 1962 Constitution were under examination. The contention was that action under those provisions of the Constitution could only be taken in the public interest and since there are no words in the clause to show that the maker of the Constitution intended to leave this question merely to the subjective satisfaction of the authority, it must be inferred that the question as to whether action was taken in the public interest or not, was objectively determinable.
8. It may be mentioned that the Supeme Court's ruling in Lt.-Col. Farzand Ali's case was the result of four certified appeals, which arose out of the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan, whereby some 105 petitions filed under Article 98 (2) of the Constitution of 1962 by Government Servants to challenge the validity of respective orders of their retirement under Article 178 of the Constitution of 1962 were heard and dismissed.
9. While dealing with the aforementioned contention the Supreme Court held as follows: "Compulsory retirement which carries with it no stigma and no vindictiveness against the person concerned is different from removal from service or dismissal. There may be a variety of reasons which may impel a Government to compulsorily retire an officer on its having completed the period of service qualifying him for pension and Government alone is the best judge of these reasons. It is not possible for the Court to sit on judgment over the action of Government, if from materials disclosed it does not appear that the action taken was merely in colourable exercise of or in abuse of power. It must of necessity be left to be Government itself to decide as to whether retirement of the officer concerned was in public interest or not. The Government, it is said, has an absolute discretion to retire any of its officers at this stage. In the absence of any words in the statute omitting the discretion of the Government this must be so, for, it is difficult to lay down any yardstick by which "public interest" can be measured in this connection. There may well be circumstances apart from inefficiency or dishonesty which may be relevant for considering the suitability of an officer for being continued in public service. An over punctilious or over fastidious person may well in certain circumstances be just as unsuitable as a lax or careless officer having regard to the nature of his employment. But this is a matter which the employer alone can determine and therefore, it must of necessity be left to the subjective satisfaction of the employing authorities."
Relying on these observations, it was argued by the respondent's learned counsel that the impugned order of retirement in this case was the result of respondent's subjective satisfaction and that it was not within the competency of the Tribunal to go into the manner of how that satisfaction was brought about. It was contended that the respondent was the sole judge of whether the appellant's retirement from service was or was not in the public interest.
10. The argument on behalf of the appellant was that the determination of question regarding service or otherwise of "public interest" was justiciable and that its determination by the employer could not be conclusive. The appellant's learned counsel argued that subjective satisfaction of the employer can only be the result of objective determination of the question of whether an employee on retention in service would be useful and serve the public interest. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on some of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the same case.
Reference was made to where it was said that it is not possible for the Court to sit in judgment over the action of the Government if <u>from the materials disclosed it does not appear that the action taken was merely in colourable exercise or in abuse of power.</u> (The underline is mine).
11. We are inclined to hold that the learned counsel's contention is not without substance. It is clear from the observations made by the Supreme Court that determination of the question of public interest by the employer is not conclusive and that it has to be based on objective assessment of certain facts relevant to and having a bearing upon further usefulness of an employee in public service. We are aware of the observation that it is not possible for the Court to sit in judgment over the action of the Government, but this is clearly qualified by the statement that this would be so only <u>if from the materials disclosed, it does not appear that the action taken was merely in colourable exercise or in abuse of power.</u> This evidently allows the Court or a Tribunal to see whether the employer's action is in colourable exercise or abuse of power, which jurisdiction can be exercised only after an address to the material on the record. In other words, it can be seen whether subjective satisfaction of the employer is in abuse of the power or in colourable exercise of that power; which would leave it to the determination of the Court whether the material on the record justifies particular conclusion and if it was not the result of rank considerations.
12. The principle of justiciability of public interest" was recognized in cases of premature retirement by the Peshawar High Court in Mian Amanul Malk v. N.-W.F.P. through Chief Secretary cited at the bar as PLD 1981 Pesh. 1, where, after detailed examination of relevant case-law, it was held as follows: "We are of the opinion that the Tribunal can examine, if required so to do, if an order passed by a departmental authority retiring a person on completing 25 years service qualifying for pension is in 'public interest' or not because the Tribunal in this respect has to examine the matter in the same manner in which the other departmental authorities do. It cannot refuse jurisdiction by saying that it cannot interfere with the subjective satisfaction of departmental authority that the order is made in 'public interest'. In fact the Tribunal can examine all questions of fact as well as of law including questions of actions taken mala fide, lack of jurisdiction, and of the validity of orders.
The power of appeal by the Tribunal is far wider than the power normally exerciseable in the absence of a right of appeal by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction." In this case the petitioner who was an officer in Grade-17 was made to retire by the Governor of the Province in "public interest" in exercise of powers conferred by Section 13(1) of the N.-W.F.P., Civil Servants Act, 1973 on the assumption that he had completed 25 years of service qualifying for pension and other retirement benefits. He challenged the order of his retirement by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution read with Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1977.
13. While deciding Mian Amanul Malk's case, reliance was mainly placed on the Supreme Court ruling in the case of Muhammad Yamin Qureshi PLD 1980 SC 22 where the following observations were made: " A Tribunal established by law made under Article 212 has the exclusive jurisdiction and that jurisdiction is very wide. On the language of the relevant provisions of the Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973), also we are of the opinion that the Tribunal is not debarred from examining the propriety of an order of the Departmental authority because the law made in this behalf confers on the Tribunal powers to confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against and for the purpose of deciding an appeal it shall have the powers of a Civil Court that are vested in such Court under the Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908). The Tribunal is not a Court of extraordinary jurisdiction to make a judicial review of the administrative actions like the High Court exercising power under Article 199 of the Constitution. The powers of the High Court are very limited and it cannot go beyond the tight corners of the said Article and would not interfere with the order of an authority unless it is made without jurisdiction or without lawful authority. The High Court cannot interfere with the discretion exercised by any Government or Local Authority unless there are involved some violations of any provisions of the Constitution or of law or of the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal on the other hand, being a Court of Appeal, has wide power and can in appropriate cases examine the propriety of an order passed by a departmental authority, though ordinarily it would not interfere in the discretion of an authority which itself is more concerned with the questions of usefulness and competency of a civil servant."
14. The case of Muhammad Yamin Qureshi was the outcome of an order passed under Martial Law Regulation No,58, promulgated by General Muhammad Yahya Khan. The Supreme Court examined in detail the extent of the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal in matters relating to the terms and conditions of the persons in service of Pakisan. With a majority judgment the Tribunal refused to interfere on the ground that they had no jurisdiction in the matter for the reason that the action taken under M.L.R. No,58 had been validated by the 1973 Constitution. The member who dissented was of the opinion, relying upon Saeed Ahmad Khan's case PLD 1974 SC 157 that the Tribunal can interfere only with the acts, orders, or proceedings which had been done, made or taken without jurisdiction or were mala fide or in the nature of coram non judice. The Supreme Court ruled that the view taken by all the learned Members was erroneous and the Tribunal had full jurisdiction to entertain the appeal on questions of fact as well as law. The Supreme Court's decision in substance was that it had exclusive jurisdiction in matters regarding the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant, not only to interfere with the orders which are wrong on facts but also when they are void, mala fide, without jurisdiction, or in the nature of coram non judice. The Court accepted the position that scope of interference by Tribunal was not subject to the limitation spelled out by the Supreme Court in Saeed Ahmad Khan's case and that, that limitation was only to the extent of judicial review of administrative action by the High Court under Article No,199 of the Constitution.
15. A reference was also made in Muhammad Yamin Qureshi's case with favour to the view taken in Muhammad Aslam Bajwa v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1974 Lah. 545. The following observations are in point: "A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in the case of Muhammad Aslam Bajwa v. Federation of Pakistan. After alluding to the observations of the Supreme Court reproduced above, the learned Judges proceeded to state that it had been conceded before them by the learned Attorney-General for Pakistan that the impugned orders had become appealable under sections 4 and 6 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, where the scope of appeal according to the Central Government's own contention before them, was obviously very wide; and that this will have effect of taking these cases out of the purview of Article 269 and 269
(sic) of the Constitution. It was further observed that the bar of jurisdiction contained by these two Articles was only against Courts as distinct from Tribunals or other executive authorities. The learned Judges concluded their discussion on this point by saying that they endorsed this standpoint of the Central Government, and the cases will get reopened and the petitioners before them would be provided an opportunity of defending themselves before the Tribunal."
16. After detailed address to the Supreme Court's rulings in the cases of Saeed Ahmad Khan PLD 1974 SC 151 and Muhammad Yamin Qureshi PLD 1980 SC 22, the High Court of Peshawar came to the following conclusion: "The observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Saeed Ahmad Khan relate only to those cases where the High Court is exercising its extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction. Thus when the Tribunal examines the question of malice or mala fides on the part of a departmental authority, it can allow the aggrieved civil servant to allege mala fides in accordance with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure and to prove it by the affidavits or otherwise. There shall be no restriction on the powers of the Tribunal to examine the bona fides of the Government, for it has to decide the matter as a Court of appeal after finding out facts on which the conclusion of the departmental authority rests." It was noticed by the High Court that in Muhammad Yamin Qureshi's case, the Supreme Court endorsed the view that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is wide enough to determine the questions of law as well as of facts and there are no such limitations on its powers as are on the High Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article No,199 of the Constitution.
17. We are of the view that leaving the existence or otherwise of "public interest" to the subjective satisfaction or determination of the employer, would virtually result in ousting the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and would thus involve a negation of the Supreme Court's dictum in Muhammad Yamin Qureshi's case regarding the scope of Tribunal's powers. We can evidently ill-afford to allow that to happen.
18. Apart from what has been said in the preceding paragraphs, we hold the view that the competent authority should form an opinion that the compulsory retirement is in public interest.
The formulation of this opinion is a condition precedent to the exercise of powers and it should be so formed with reference to objective tests of public interest, though the decision itself may be subjective. Further, this opinion can be formed only with an application of mind to the facts of case, failing which the decision of premature retirement would obviously be arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice. PLC 1985 (C.S.) 368 can be cited as an authority in support.
19. There is another aspect of the matter. We regard it as essential for formation of a correct opinion regarding further usefulness in service of an employee that the competent authority should direct itself and attend to the matters which it is bound to consider and must exclude other considerations which are irrelevant and extraneous. Otherwise it cannot possibly be said that it is acting in a reasonable manner. Under the circumstances, a decision based on the recommendations of the Review Committee cannot reasonably be taken to have been made by the competent authority itself which has been entrusted with the responsibility of due application of mind 1985 PLC (C.S.) 368.
20. Since the decision to order premature retirement had of necessity to be based on some material to save it from possible exception of colourable exercise of powers, we asked the respondents to lay our hands on the reasons weighing with the competent authority or for that matter the Review Committee, in support of the impugned order. In spite of a direction to produce some material which could have given us an indication of those reasons, only a document was produced containing a list of officers who were recommended by the Committee for retirement.
This being so, it is not possible to find that the decision made by the competent authority resulting in the passage of the impugned order was not arbitrary and in abuse of powers.
21. It now remains to be seen whether the material relied upon by the respondent was sufficient to justify the conclusion that the appellant's retention in service on attainment of 55 years of age would not be in the public interest and whether the impugned order is not the result of abuse of power. It appears from the respondent's pleadings that what seems to have influenced them to the passage of the impugned order was the pendency of a criminal case under section 409/420/469/471, P.P.C. read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 registered by the F.IA. on 9-8-1980 against the appellant on the allegation that he made bogus payment of Rs,21,500 to a contractor for some work which had not actually been accomplished at the site. It requires a particular mention that nowhere in these pleadings has it been said that his service record was scrutinized and that he was prematurely retired from service on the basis of any such record. As we have already noticed, sanction for his prosecution was granted by the Government and he was suspended from service on 17-6-1982 on the direction of the Ministry of Interior. Further, the period of his suspension was extended from time to time and the last extension was ordered on 19-6-1986 uptil 16-9-1986. On 8-1-1984, he was charge-sheeted on the allegations which constituted the subject-matter of the criminal case and detailed inquiry was conducted in the matter. It may also be noticed that the respondent showed reluctance in taking the appellant in the fold of the organization, obviously because of the pendency of the aforementioned criminal case and that he was finally accepted and allowed to join only after he had filed a Writ Petition in the High Court. Another material fact is that his re-instatement in service, as already noticed, was the result of Service Tribunal's direction given on a Miscellaneous Petition in his appeal to challenge the validity of his prolonged suspension and was, therefore, obviously not without some disdain, which is apparent from the fact that soon after his reinstatement on 30-7-1986, he was prematuraly retired from service with the passage of impugned order on 6-10-1986. These facts are abundantly sufficient to establish that the primary consideration which influenced the respondent authority to the passage of the impugned order was the pendency of the aforementioned criminal case against him.
22. Reliable evidence is, however, available from the record to show that the allegations forming the subject-matter of the criminal case against him were false and baseless. After registration of the case, in consequence of an inquiry ordered by the General Manager of M.C.P.L., it was found that the information furnished to the F.I.A. was not based on facts. On the basis of this finding, a letter was addressed by the General Manager on 17-11-1980 to Abdul Hayee, General Manager (Finance) where it was said that it appears from the record that the allegation against the appellant was the result of some "mischief mongering". An Audit party had also objected to the payment of Rs,21,500, but the objection was settled on the basis of this inquiry report.
23. The record further shows that after the respondent had agreed to his repatriation, the appellant was charge-sheeted on 8-1-1984 on the same allegations as had been made against him in the criminal case. As a result of detailed inquiry it was found by Sh. Anwar Latif, Inquiry Officer in his report dated 15-8-1984 (Annexure-D) that the appellant was "totally innocent" and that the allegations levelled against him had not been established. It was observed in the report that he had been "dragged unnecessarily into this affair because of some personal motive by the prosecution witnesses". Even in the criminal case he was acquitted by the Special Judge concerned by judgment dated 1-12-1988. The result is that the ground on which the appellant was kept under suspension for a period of more than four years and which also contributed towards the respondent's reluctance to accept him in the fold of its organization, was never in existence. On the basis of the report of the Inquiry Officer and the judgment of the Special Judge, it will have to be held that the charge against him was absolutely false and baseless and something which influenced the Authority to the passage of the impugned order had never in fact been there right from the inception on 9-8-1980 when the criminal case was registered against him. As a matter of fact it will have to be held that he was punished first by suspension and then by premature retirement on the basis of allegations, which were palpably false. This being so, we do not find it possible to hold that the record provides us with any material to sustain and justify the conclusion that his premature retirement was in the public interest.
24. Although it had not been pleaded in the written statement by the respondent, it was contended by its learned counsel at the Bar that the appellant's record was taken into consideration while coming to the conclusion that his retention in service on completion of 55 years of age was not in the public interest. Certain documents placed on the record by the respondent bear out that the appellant's case was considered alongwith those of certain other Engineers by the Reviewing Committee concerned in its meeting held on 29-5-1986. In column No,8 of the prescribed pro forma against the appellant's name we find an observation of the Committee that he may be retired with effect from 7-10-1986. No reason, has, however, been mentioned in support of this opinion, although under the relevant instructions the Committee should have supported their conclusion with detailed reasons, which could have shown that they applied themselves to the relevant material and that the opinion was not arbitrary. This does not appear to have been done and we feel inclined to conclude that the Committee's opinion was not warranted by the facts of the case.
25. Certain other documents have been placed on record by the respondent in an attempt to show that the decision for the appellant's premature retirement was passed on consideration of his annual confidential reports. In the reports regarding the years 1980 and 1981, the appellant was rated as average in overall grading. In respect of the period from 1-1-1982 to 5-7-1982 he was rated as below average. It may be noticed that this was the period when the aforementioned criminal case had been registered against him and he was placed under suspension on 6-7-1982.
26. A reference may be made to the guidelines for considering cases of move-over of employees from BPS-16 to BPS-19 issued by the respondent on 1-1-1986. It was laid down as criteria for move- over that the reports of the officer concerned for the last five years are free from adverse remarks and are average to good for the case of move-over to Scales 17 and 18 of the Pay Scales. Reference may also be made with advantage to the guidelines for completion of the confidential reports issued by the Authority. The Chairman, WAPDA expressed himself in the following words: "I wish to make it clear that from the Authority's point of view, an "Average" report is not an adverse report and does not disqualify an officer from his future promotion. In any organization, "Average" officers constitute the majority and the "Good" or "Bad" stand out prominently amongst them. They come in the middle order and thus constitute the backbone of an organization. There is, therefore, no stigma attached to an "Average" report and we should not hesitate to grade up an officer as such if he only comes upto that grade."
It would thus be clear that average report could not be made a basis for an opinion that the appellant's retention in service would not be in the public interest.
27. It also appears from the documents placed on record by the respondent that certain adverse remarks in annual confidential reports in respect of the period from 1-1-1968 to 12-8-1968 and 1-1- 1975 to 2-10-1975 were also taken into consideration while coming to the conclusion that appellant was not fit to be retained in service. About the adverse remarks in the report regarding period from 1-1-1968 to 12-8-1968, however, there is no dispute that they were never conveyed to the appellant.
The report regarding the year 1975 is alleged by the respondent to have been conveyed, but no satisfactory proof in support of this claim has been made available to us. The letter covering these adverse remarks is no doubt shown to have been issued, but there is nothing on the record to show that this letter was mailed. It is not, therefore, possible to find that the adverse remarks were ever conveyed to the appellant. This being so, we do not find any hesitation in saying that the adverse remarks which had not been conveyed, could not constitute a basis for a finding that the appellant's retention in service would not serve any useful purpose.
28. Apart from this circumstance, there is satisfactory documentary proof of the fact that the appellant's work during the year 1975 was commended by the Army Authority which had had the occasion to watch his performance. In letter (Annexure-H) addressed by the Army Authority to the Managing Director of M.C.P.L. the following remarks are worth notice: "I would particularly like to mention here Mr. MA. Tanvir, your Assistant Field Engineer who extended total co-operation, took keen interest and displayed lot of enthusiasm and resourcefulness in keeping the project in motion."
29. We might as well make a mention of letter dated 18-9-1974 (Annexue-J) addressed again by the Army Authority to the Deputy General Engineer, M.C.P.L., Lahore where it was remarked that the appellant had shown extreme keenness and drive in execution of defence work, 'despite the heart attack he suffered in March, 1974 and that it was due to his personal interest, consciencious work and untiring stamina that he had once again accelerated the pace of work. It was further said that his performance stood out and deserved special mention. It is evident from letter dated 9-4-1975 that adverse remarks in his annual confidential report in respect of the year 1975 were by no means true reflection of his performance.
30. For the aforementioned reasons, an application to the material on record has brought us to the conclusion that there was no basis for a finding that the appellant had outlived his utility and that his retention in service on completion of 55 years of age, was no longer in public interest. This being so, the passage of impugned order for his premature retirement, was evidently in colourable exercise and abuse of power. It is, therefore, set aside in acceptance of the appeal. The appellant shall be reinstated in service with effect from 6-10-1986, with all consequential benefits. Under the