DECISION This is an appeal filed jointly by 17 appellants against the single order of learned Sindh Labour Court No, VII, Sukkur, dated 1-3-1988, whereby he dismissed 17 grievance applications filed by the appellants under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C.
2. The brief facts leading to this appeal are that the appellants were employed by the respondents as work-charged employees on various dates. All the work-charged establishment were made permanent by the Sindh Government vide Notification No, KD/11(15) Exp./VIII/76, dated 21-2-1978, after completing three years continuous service. The appellants claim that they were made permanent by virtue of this notification, hut, were retired on 28-9-1983, without assigning any reason against which they filed appeals which are still pending. The Government of Sindh again issued another Notification dated 10-12-1986, extending pensionary benefits to the temporary work-charged establishment, who were made permanent under the year 1978 Notification and who completed 10 years service. The appellants claimed pension under this Notification and gave grievance notices to the respondent Government of Sindh on 7-3-1987, but, did not receive any reply and, therefore, filed the grievance petitions on 13-4-1987.
3. The learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No, VII, Sukkur came to the opinion that the aforesaid Notification of 1986 was applicable only to those employees who were still in service and the appellants being no more in service since 1983, their petitions were time-barred.
4. Mr. Shabbir Awan contends that in an application for decision under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. the contents of the grievance application have only to be looked into by the learned Presiding Officer.
For the purposes of limitation the date of cause of action is to be seen and according to the petitions the cause of action arose to the appellant on 10-12-1986, when under the Notification pensionary benefits were extended to the work-charged employees and if that date is taken as a relevant date then grievance notices as well as grievance petitions would be within time.
5. Mr. Abdul Rehman Shaikh contends that the appellants had not been retired but had been retrenched and they had not been made permanent. However, all these are questions of fact which can be decided only after the parties are allowed to lead evidence. Similarly contentions of Mr. Abdul Rehman Shaikh that under the aforesaid Notification the pensionary benefits were not extended to these workmen who were no more in service at the time when the Notification was issued, are questions of fact as well as interpretation of Notification and the parties can lead evidence to show whether the benefits under the Notification have been extended to the workmen who were retired earlier or not.
6. The provisions of Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. do not enable the learned Labour Court to cut short the procedure and decide mixed questions of fact and A law without allowing the parties their right and opportunity to lead evidence.
7. It is settled law that for the purpose of Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. the averments made by the applicants in their applications are to be looked into taking them to be correct for the purpose of the decision of application under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. As pointed above the appellants claimed that the cause of action arose from the aforesaid date of Notification of 1986 and from which date the grievance notice as well as the petition would be in time.
8. Mr. Abdul Rehman Shaikh has also raised objection that the appellants filed separate petitions but have filed joint appeal against the single order dismissing their 17 applications. There is no specific provision under the Labour Laws barring the joint appeal in such circumstances and, therefore, I do not think that for the purpose of the sake of this technical objection substantial justice should be denied to the appellants. For the above reasons appeal filed by the appellants is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The cases are remanded back to the learned Labour Court for decision according to law.