The petitioner through this Constitutional petition has prayed that the impugned order dated 14-3- 1990 of respondent No.1 may be declared illegal and without lawful authority.
2. The relevant facts are that the petitioner is running business of Wagon Travels Service from Lahore to various other cities. He applied for the sanction of halting points. The request was allowed and memo dated 19-2-1987 issued. The grievance of the petitioner is that respondent No.1 has now cancelled the halting points through impugned order dated 14-5-19X).
3. The petition was admitted to regular hearing and notices were issued to the respondents, who have appeared through Rana Muhammad Arshad Khan, Addl. Advocate-General and contested the writ petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the petition has argued that respondent No.1 has cancelled the halting points on the ground that the petitioner does not own a single vehicle and that he has Sublette do the halting points sanctioned in his name. In this behalf, the learned counsel has referred to Section 80 of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965. The argument in nutshell is that there is no such restriction. 1t is added that the provision is penal in nature, therefore, to be strictly construed. In this behalf, the learned counsel has referred to cases of E.A.
Evans v. Muhammad Ashraf (PLD 1964 SC 536), Muhammad Ali v. State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi and another (1973 SCMR 140) and Brig. (Retd.) F.B.Ali and another v. The State (PLD 1975 SC 506).
4. On the other hand, the learned Add]. Advocate-General has argued that the petitioner is not a bona fide transporter as he does not own or possess even a single vehicle, therefore, the halting points were legally cancelled. The learned Addl. Advocate-General in support of the impugned order has referred to Rule 263 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Rules.
5. 1 have given my anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Before proceeding any further it is worthwhile to refer to section 80 of Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965 and Motor Vehicles Rules, 19X)9 relied on by the parties. The same read as under:-- Section 80 Parking places and halting stations.---Government or any authority authorised in this behalf by Government may, in consultation with the local authority having jurisdiction in the area concerned, determine places at which motor vehicles may stand either indefinitely or for a specified period of time, and may determine the places at which public service vehicles may stop for a longer time than is necessary for taking up and setting down of passengers."
Rules 263 "(1) Orders permitting a place to be used as stand of Class D shall be in Form Stand D and shall specify clearly the area which may be used.
(2) Save with the special permission of the Regional Transport Authority no such order shall be made unless the person or company applying to use the place as a stand holds permits, being permits in the name of the person or company making the application, for not less than eight transport vehicles."
6. The perusal of Rule 26(2) as reproduced above shows that the rule deals with the Company stands. The categories of stands have been provided for in Rule 253. It is clear from section 80 and rule 26:1(2) that the scope of both the' provisions is different. A Section 80 deals with the parking places and halting points while rule 263 relied by the learned Addl. Advocate-General deal with the issuance of permission in respect of Class (D) stands. The point becomes clear if reference to Rule 242 is made. All these provisions are contained in Chapter VIII, which deals with halting of motor vehicles in public places; control of stands. The first comes Rule 240, which prohibits halting of stage carriage in the urban areas. While rule 241 gives a power to the District Magistrate to sanction bus stops to take up or set down passengers. It seems that respondents No.1 to 4 are using term halting point instead of bus stands while Rule 263 (2) relied by the learned Addl. Advocate-General deals with stands. It is clear from Rule 242 that every stage carriage begins and ends its trip at a stand. These are the points where a trip originates and ends. The categories of the stands have been detailed in Rule 253 while 263 only deals with sanction of `clc. (D) stands'. On the other hand the term `bus stop stand' is used for halting pints in a urban area sanctioned for taking up and setting down the passengers. The definition becomes clear from sub-rule (2) of rule 241, which prescribes that no stage carriage shall halt at a bus stand for a period longer than necessary to taking such passengers as are waiting when the vehicle arrives and to set down such passengers as wish to alight. In common parlance the stands are places where the vehicles are parked before and after trip while the bus stops/stands are points in between the two stands, which are approved to take up or set down passengers.
7.The learned Addl. Advocate-General has failed to refer to any provision of Ordinance, 1965 or Rules, 1909 laying down a condition that the halting points can only be sanctioned in favour of the transporters, who own or possess given number of vehicles. The term halting point has not been defined in the Act or the E Rules anywhere. It seems that the term has been coined by respondents Nos.1 to 4 for making the provisions for the stops by the Flying Coaches. In order to avoid congestion at one point the various transporters are allocated different points to be used as bus stop exclusively by them.
8. The provision is of penal nature because it prohibits any transporter from parking its vehicle even for a short while at a point other than the points specifically sanctioned for this purspose. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the judgment of honourable Supreme Court in the case of the case of Muhammad Ali v. State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi (1973 SCMR 140 and (F.B. Ali v. The State (PLD 1975 SC 506) to argue that the provisions of penal nature are to be construed strictly and in case of ambiguity or doubt arising from the construction, the benefit must go to the subject.
The result is that the impugned order dated 14-3-1990 passed by the respondent is declared illegal, therefore, set aside. However, there is no order as to costs.