1. ' SALEEM AKHTAR, J.--- Appellant filed a complaint under section 506/323/504/34, P.P.C. Against the respondents Nos.2 to 6. It was alleged that on 5-3-1989 the appellant parked his car by the road side at 10-00 p.m. At Shah Waliullah Road. From the other side some persons including Ghulam Muhammad Chishti respondent No,2 came in a Pajero jeep and asked the appellant to remove his car from there. The appellant told them that there is a sufficient space from which his jeep can pass on which respondent No,2 started abusing the appellant and respondents Nos.3, 4, 5 and 6 started beating him with fists and kicks. Respondent No,2 took out revolver and threatened the appellant to kill and also slapped. He also abused him and insulted him in the presence of his friends and relatives on the road. The people present there saved the situation. It has been alleged that the appellant went to the police station to lodge F.I.R. But as respondent No,2 who was previously an M.N.A. And an influential person, the report was not taken down verbatim and only non-cognizance report was recorded. The appellant filed an application to S.H.O. Mentioning the real facts and requested to register the case, but the S.H.O. Refused to register any case against the accused person. He then filed complaint in the Court of A.C.M. No,3 Baghdadi Karachi (South).
2. The learned Magistrate recorded the statement of the appellant under section 200, Cr.P.C. And referred the case to S.H.O. For inquiry. On 8-4-1989 the S.H.O. Submitted his report and the learned Magistrate ordered that from the inquiry it appears that offence falls under sections 323 and 504 of P.P.C. And issued bailable warrants of the respondents Nos. 2 to 6. The case was fixed on 26-4-1989.
3. On that date the appellant was present but process was returned unserved and the case was adjourned to 6-5-1989. On this day the Court was closed due to holiday and the case was taken up on 9-5-1989. On 24-51989, 6-6-1989 and 22-6-1989 the case was adjourned as process remained unnerved. The hearing was fixed on 10-7-1989. On this date when the matter was called the appellant was absent. The learned Magistrate recorded the statement of one Muhammad Saleem a peon of the Court. He stated that he had called the appellant three times at the door of the Court but he was absent. The learned trial Court acquitted the accused under section 247, Cr.P.C.
4. ' The Advocate for the appellant has not appeared. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the State on 3-4-1990 and adjourned to 5th April when arguments of the Advocates for the respondents were heard. Mr. Hayat Qureshi learned counsel for the State contended that the trial Court should not have passed the order of acquittal early in the morning and particularly as the respondent has made a complaint that the impugned order was passed before 9-00 a.m. But mere statement is not sufficient. From the impugned order and the order sheet it seems that the case was called by the learned trial Court. As the appellant was not present, the statement of the peon was recorded and the learned trial Court acquitted the accused by observing that no intimation has been received from the appellant and the offence is non-cognizable and compoundable. Under section 247, Cr.P.C. If the summons has been issued on complaint and on the date of hearing fixed for appearance of the accused or any other date of hearing, the complainant does not appear then the Magistrate is empowered to acquit the accused unless there are reasons which may compel the hearing to be postponed to some other date. This provision is, however, not applicable to cognizable or non-compoundable offences. The object of this provision is to prevent the abuse of the process by the complainant in prosecuting the matter in a dilatory manner. Furthermore, if the complainant is not interested in the case either because the matter has been compromised or that he does not want to proceed with the case or remains absent for any other reason, the Magistrate is empowered to acquit the accused.
5. ' Mr. Hayat Qureshi, the learned counsel contended that the proceedings were at the initial stage and the accused had not been served till then, therefore, the learned trial Court should have adjourned the case. The Court starts at a fixed time and if any party does not appear in time he takes the risk of an adverse order being passed against him. In this case the only ground advanced is that the case was called before 9-00 a.m. This we are not inclined to believe. The Advocate for the appellant was not present otherwise he could have made some statement in this regard. This shows that the appellant has lost interest in these proceedings. Even in this appeal no appearance has been made on two dates of hearing on which we have heard it. It is a rule of prudence that at initial stage the Court may be reluctant to exercise its power under section 247, Cr.P.C. But where the case involves trivial matters relating to minor offence, the High Court would not be inclined to interfere on acquittal appeal. Reference can be made to State v. Ram Chand AIR 1963 Punj.
8. In State v. Sot Ram Das AIR 1959 Punj. 497 the accused respondent was found in possession of bundle of poppy-heads weighing 20 Seers which was tied in a cloth. After three months when the sealed bundle was opened it was found to contain poppy husk and poppy-heads. The trial Court acquitted the accused as possession of poppy husk was not an offence and poppy heads were not in excess of the prohibited limit. In acquittal appeal it was observed as follows:-- "(5) But this apart, this is not a fit case in which this Court should set aside the order of acquittal. As suggested by the counsel for the State the Opium Orders have now been suitably amended and made very much more stringent than what existed on 17-4-1957. In order to set aside an acquittal there must be very substantial and compelling reasons justifying reversal of the impugned order which should be shown to be clearly erroneous, because the presumption of innocence of the accused has been further reinforced by his acquittal. This Court is, generally speaking, also slow in setting aside orders of acquittal in petty cases where no question of principle is involved. On the facts and circumstances, therefore, I do not think this is a fit case in which we should set aside the order of acquittal and convict the accused-respondent."
6. The case does not involve any substantial question of law. It relates to petty matters involving case of a non-cognizable and compoundable nature. In the facts and circumstances of the case the learned trial Court has justifiably passed the impugned order. It would not be correct to contend that such an order could not have been passed or that it is perverse and arbitrary order.
7. ' We dismiss the appeal.