SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.---Leave to appeal was granted in both these matters under Article 212(3) of the Constitution to examine whether against a departmental punishment under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules other than that of dismissal, removal from service or compulsory retirement, an appeal under section 4 of the Balochistan Service Tribunals Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was competent before the Service Tribunal.
2. In Civil Appeal No,4-0 of 1987, the respondent, a civil servant joined service as Subordinate Engineer on 15-1-1959 and was regularly appointed as a Sub-Divisional Officer on 21-4-1975. He was charged for miscondct and proceeded against under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules. He was found guilty of misconduct and by an order dated 12-12-1983 reduced in rank. He appealed to the Service Tribunal and a preliminary objection was taken with regard to the competence of the appeal itself which was negatived by the Service Tribunal by its impugned judgment, dated 17th of March, 1986. The appeal was thereafter ordered to be heard on merits. We are told that the respondent has expired in the meanwhile.
3. In Civil Appeal No,5-K of 1989, the respondent, Abdul Rashid had risen from a Patwari to the post of Naib-Tehsildar and was at the relevant time employed on Settlement duties. He was charged of misconduct on the following grounds:- "(1) Failure to demarcate the boundary of Quetta/Kalat Districts before taking the Survey work of Mowaziat of Sub-Tehsil Dasht.
(2) Failed to read out entries made in Chita-ful Shajranasab and Wajibularz before the public/zamindars and non-appendence of signatures upon the documents.
(3) Incorrect preparation of record of rights/Khatooni.
(4) Overlooked the rights of Provincial Government and mis-compliance of Board of Revenue directives.
(5) Failed to prepare Chita field Book according to laid down procedure."
4. An enquiry was held and Enquiry Officer finding him guilty of some of the charges recommmended that major penalty may be imposed on him ,under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules. The competent authority by an order, dated the 26th of February, 1987 upheld the findings of the Enquiry Officer and ordered his removal from service with immediate effect. On departmental appeal the Board of Revenue by an order dated 27-2-1987 modified the punishment to one of reduction in rank. An appeal was taken to the Service Tribunal. The Tribunal examined the merits of the departmental action and held as hereunder:-- "In such situation we were constrained to enquire from learned Advocate-General as to which of instructions contained in Settlement Manual were not complied with by appellant. Learned Advocate-General frankly conceded that there was no violation of instructions but practice was not followed. We then asked representative of the department who was also present before us to show us instructions or any material in that respect, but he had no reply to give us It seems that his findings on the point are based on surmises. However, Enquiry Officer found the same to be human error. Regarding allegation No,2 he observed that NaibTehsildar did not get signatures of ZamindaRs, However, instructions in that respect were not placed before us so that it could be said to be negligence on part of appellant which may warrant his removal from service or reduction in rank. Even otherwise Enquiry Officer did not make any comment in respect of point 3. Thus, he could not have reached to such conclusion for the same. Obviously findings of Enquiry Officer are contradictory to his conclusions arrived at."
' The result was that the Service appeal was allowed, the order of his reduction in rank was set aside and the Tribunal ordered that he shall be deemed to be in continuous service as Naib- Tehsildar and he shall be entitled to all benefits to which he would have been entitled if those two orders punishing him on the basis of the departmental enquiry had not been passed. Not on merits but on the legal question of the competence of the appeal before the Service Tribunal, leave to appeal was granted.
5. The learned counsel representing the Government and the departmental authority in the two appeals, has drawn our attention to the similar provisions contained in section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act of the Federation, of the Punjab Government and of the Balochistan Government with a view to demonstrate that in the other two laws the object of the proviso was to reserve the final adjudication in case of minor penalty before a Tribunal other than the Service Tribunal which was to decide questions with regard to terms and conditions of service including departmental, action resulting in dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement in Balochistan. The intention of the law was to make the departmental authorities the final Judge in the matter of minor penalty and the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal was altogether excluded without providing any substitutive Tribunal for exclusively dealing with those cases. According to the learned counsel, the draftsman has committed an error in using the word `quantum' and relating it to departmental punishment.
Actually, what was intended was to exclude the appeal to the Service Tribunal even in determining the question of guilt or otherwise where punishment imposed was not what is specified in the proviso. The learned counsel also relied on Mujeeb Ullah Aijaz v. D.G., Telephone and Telegraph Deptt., Islamabad and 2 others PLD 1980 Quetta 58 and Abdul Kabir v. D.I.-G. Police, Peshawar Range and another 1983 PLC (C.S.) 90.
6. Article 212 of the Constitution provides as hereunder:- "(1) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, the appropriate Legislature may by Act provide for the establishment of one or more Administrative Courts or Tribunals to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in respect of---
(a) matters relating to the terms and conditions of persons who are or have been in the service of Pakistan, including disciplinary matters;
(b) matters relating to claims arising from tortious acts of Government, or any person in the service of Pakistan, or of any local or other authority empowered by law to levy any tax or cess and any servant of such authority acting in the discharge of his duties as such servant; or
(c) matters relating to the acquisition, administration and disposal of any property which is deemed to be enemy property under any law.
(2) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, where any Administrative Court or Tribunal is established under clause (1), no other Court shall grant an injunction, make any order or entertain any proceedings in respect of any matter to which the jurisdiction of such Administrative Court or Tribunal extends and all proceedings in respect of any such matter which may be pending before such other Court immediately before the establishment of the Administrative Court or Tribunal, other than an appeal pending before the Supreme Court, shall abate on such establishment: ' Provided that the provisions of this clause shall not apply to an Administrative Court or Tribunal established under an Act of a Provincial Assembly unless, at the request of that Assembly made in the form of a resolution, Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) by law extends the provisions to such a Court or Tribunal.
(3)
7. If the contentions made by the learned counsel for the Government prevail then while against major punishments the appeals will lie to the Tribunal, relief against imposition of minor punishments would still be available in the Constitutional jurisdiction. This does not appear to be the expressed object of Article 212 of the Constitution reproduced above.
8. One cannot readily attribute a fault or an omission to the draftsman and this is particularly so where the language of the law presents no difficulty in interpreting the law or applying it to a given case. Any adjudication, even a departmental one under the Efficiency & Discipline Rules in the first stage requires a determination of guilt or innocence of the individual. In the second stage, there is the determination of an appropriate relief to be granted or consequential order to be passed following the determination of guilt or innocence. Where a person is adjudged guilty in the second stage the determination has to take place of the nature of the punishment and the extent of the punishment. In matters concerning civil liability the determination has to be made of the responsibility or liability in the first stage for the act or omission alleged, and in the second the nature and the extent of the relief to be afforded. The language of the provision makes it clear that 'no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal against an order or decision of the departmental authority determining quantum of punishment or penalty imposed on a civil servant...'. The word `quantum' has a very definite meaning and in Ballentine's Law Dictionary we find it defined thus:-- "Quantity or amount. So much. How much."
It is the quantum of punishment which has been excluded from the purview of the Service Tribunal where the punishment happens to be minor. As regards the first stage namely, the determination of the guilt or otherwise, there is no bar to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The object of the legislation was clearly that once the guilt is found established or is admitted, the assessment of the departmental punishment will not be open to examine by the Tribunal where the punishent happens to be minor. In cases where major penalty of the specified nature has been imposed, both the aspects of the adjudication namely, the determination of the guilt or innocence and the determination of the quantum of the punishment can be examined by the Service Tribunal uninhibited by any constraints whatsoever. This appears to be also a reasonable interpretation because there may be cases where the entire proceedings may be without jurisdiction and void ab initio notwithstanding the leniency of the punishment imposed.
9. We find that the Tribunal's view is correct and the appeals before the Tribunal were competent.
Both the appeals are, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.