' The material facts culminating in this appeal filed under section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, briefly, are that premises bearing C.S.No,969, Ward 'B', Shahi Bazar, Rohri is the property of Mst.Azra Qureshi, having purchased the same through registered sale-deed on 24-6- 1984. The respondent who is the husband of said Mst.Azra Qureshi and landlord of the above premises served the appellant with a notice under section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, calling upon him to pay the arrears of rent and monthly rent due at the rate of Rs,140 p.m. There was exchange of notices and it is the case of the respondent that the appellant paid rent up to June, 1984 in lump sum and then defaulted in making payment. The respondent who is an Advocate by profession also required the said premises for his office. On 29-10-1985 the respondent filed an application under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, in the Court of Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Sukkur, seeking the ejectment of the appellant on the aforesaid grounds. The appellant resisted his eviction. According to him the respondent had promised to sell the disputed premises to him after having received a sum of Rs,7,000 in advance.
The default in payment of rent and personal requirement of the respondent were also disputed.
The parties went to trial on the following issues:-
(i) Whether there exists relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties?
(2) Whether opponent committed default in payment of rent since June, 1984?
(iii) Whether applicant requires the premises for his personal bona fide use in good faith?
2 The respondent tendered his evidence through affidavit-in-evidence (P.W.1), while the appellant tendered evidence through his affidvit-in-evidence (D.W.1), and those of Bhimandas (D.W.2), and Arjandas (D.W.3).
3. On the assessm ent of evidence both oral as well as documentary, the learned Rent Controller decided all the issues against the appellant and consequently directed his ejectment from the demised premises within a period of 60 days. This order dated 18-6-1987 is the subject-matter of the present appeal.
4. I have heard Mr.Muhammad Hanif Mangi, learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent in person. I have also gone through the record of this case carefully.
5. Admittedly the disputed premises belongs to Mst.Azra Qureshi wife of the respondent. The respondent claims to be the landlord of the premises and a landlord need not be the owner of the premises. Section 2(f) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, defines 'landlord' in the following words:- ' -Landlord' means the owner of the premises and includes a person who is for the time being authorised or entitled to receive rent in respect of such premises."
The definition of 'landlord' is wide enough to include a person who is for the time being authorised to receive rent. The authorization need not be in writing. Admittedly the respondent is the husband of Mst.Azra Qureshi, the owner of the premises and there is nothing on record to even faintly suggest that he has not been authorised by his wife to collect rent. In Mst.Kalsoom Akhtar and 8 others v. Muhammad Yaqub, reported in PLD 1976 Kar. 992, the definition of landlord was examined by M.A.Rashid, J.(as he then was), who was pleased to observe:- "The learned counsel for the appellant has laid great stress on the point that the respondent- landlord has failed to prove his title over the property and has contended that admittedly the phi under the but belongs to the Karachi Municipal Corporation and, therefore, the respondent- landlord does not have any title over the property and as such he is devoid of the character of a landlord. This argument flows from an erroneous assumption that a landlord has, of necessity, to be the owner of the premises in question. Section 2(c) declares a person to be the landlord who for the time being is entitled to receive rent. It does not insist that the condition of ownership of the building or rented land should be fulfilled before a person could be the landlord of the premises in dispute."
6. This position was not seriously disputed by the appellant himself. The contents of his affidavit-in- evidence are self-explanatory. In these circumstances the case of Manzoor Ahmed v. Nazir Ahmed Khan, reported in 1984 CLC 819 cited on behalf of appellant is not relevant.
7. The issue of default in payment of rent need not detain me long. The respondent as his own witness (P.W.-1) has testified that the appellant has failed to pay rent to him from July, 1984. This position is virtually admitted by the appellant, which is evident from the following extracts of his cross-examination:-- "It is correct that I received the notices which were replied by me. It is correct that rent was not deposited after receipt of notice. It is neither paid to applicant nor it was sent through money orders."
8. In order to cover up the default the appellant raised number of pleas but eventually confined the same to the following:- (i)That the respondent had accepted a sum of Rs,7,000 from him on behalf of previous owner, viz., Mst.Batool Begum, as advance of the sale consideration, but he backed out. (Para 2 of reply of notice dated 16-51985, Annexure 'H'.).
(ii) That the respondent had accepted a sum of Rs,7,000 from him on behalf of present owner, viz., Mst.Azra Qureshi, as advance of the sale consideration against a receipt, but resiled from his commitment (Paras. Nos.6, 7 and 8 of the affidavit-in-evidence of Gopaldas).
(iii) That the arrears of rent could he adjusted out of Rs,7,000 lying with the respondent (Para. 3 of reply of notice dated 16-5-1985, Annexure 'H').
9. The point at S.No,(i) was abandoned by the appellant in his affidavit-in- evidence and consequently no further discussion is necessary.
10. The point at S.No,(ii) is seriously agitated on behalf of appellant. Besides appellant Gopaldas (D.W.-1), there is evidence of Bhimandas (D.W.-2), and Arjandas (D.W.-3) on record and they speak of execution of an undated receipt by respondent, the original of which was not placed on record.
This aspect of the case was examined by the learned Rent Controller, who finally came to the following conclusion:- "As a Rent Controller I need not to go to in deep and sit over to oral agreement as a Civil Court because rights of the parties will be highly effected if a suit for specific performed is ever filed by the opponent. However, from the face of the evidence it is clear that opponent has not been able to prove the execution of the receipt. Oral agreement requires strict oral evidence but there are fatal contradictions in the evidence. Opponent Gopaldas has stated in his affidavit vide para No,7 that he paid Rs,7,000 in presence of witnesses Arjandas and Muhammad Anis. Witness Muhammad Anis has not been examined. However, Arjandas has been examined but in cross he denied the presence of Muhammad Anis.
"Amount was paid 5 years hack. None was present there. In addition to it opponent was not able to give the time and day when he paid the amount. It is also strange That receipt does not hear the date, and signatures of the witnesses. After the denial of the signature of the applicant all this evidence became fatal and made to say that there was no such oral agreement."
' I fully endorse the view taken by the learned Rent Controller.
11. Ground 16 of the memorandum of this appeal further shows that the appellant has filed a suit for specific performance of contract against the respondent. In this view of the matter, the plea of adjustment raised at S.No,(iii) could not be available to appellant. Even otherwise both these pleas are destructive to each other.
12. The effect of agreement of sale was examined in Khwaja Ammar Hussain v. Muhammad Shabbiruddin Khan, reported in PLD 1986 Kar. 74, and it was held that such contract would not create any interest in or charge on such property and the tenant of premises would continue to he tenant unless and until relationship was determined by agreement, by decree of Court or by operation of law. So, even if it is accepted for arguments sake that an agreement of sale was in existence, still the appellant was hound to pay rent. Since the appellant failed to pay rent from July, 1984, the finding of learned Rent Controller on issue No,2 is not open to exception.
13. The respondent is a practising Advocate. He has testified that the disputed premise is required by him for the purpose of his office. The appellant has controverted this fact by stating that the respondent owns number of properties including a cinema house. There is, however, nothing on record to substantiate it. The admissions made by the appellant in this behalf are relevant and are reproduced below to understand the correct position.
"I do not know where the office of Mr.Riaz . I cannot say whether it is in a room of the residential house. I have seen the house of Riaz. I do not know whether Riaz has some other shop. I do not know whether Mr.Riaz requires the premises for his personal bona fide use to run the office. It is correct that the applicant is the Advocate."
' The statement of respondent on this issue appears to be consistent and to some extent it gets support from the appellant himself. The case of Sabu Mal v. Kikaram alias Hemandas, reported in 1973 SCMR 185, is, therefore, not relevant.
14. A point which was touched upon by learned counsel for appellant during the arguments may now he dealt with. Admittedly Mst.Azra Qureshi wife of respondent has expired during the pendency of this appeal. An appellate Court can take note of subsequent events that might occur during the pendency of the matter provided no prejudice is caused to the other side. The status of respondent as a landlord is, however, not effected due to the death of his wife. On the other hand he now becomes a co-owner. The death of Mst.Azra Qureshi is, therefore, not going to effect the merits of this case.
15. Having regard to the above factual and legal position, I find no force in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. Two months' time is, however, allowed to appellant to vacate the demised premises.