1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.-The petitioner, who has appeared in person, was employed by the respondent as a Boxing Coach in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in letter No. PESC/2081 dated 31-3-65 on a salary of Rs. 500 per month.
2. The post was initially created for a period of five years; but, on the 29th June 1966, the services of the petitioner were terminated by the respon--dent-Board on three months' notice with effect from 28-9-66 on the plea that the post had been abolished. The petitioner filed a suit in forma pauperis for damages alleging that the termination of his services before the expiry of the stipulated period was in breach of the contract. He claimed salary for the entire unexpired term at the rate of Rs. 500 per month. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that, under paragraph 4 of the letter of appointment itself, either side was at liberty to terminate the contract with three months' prior notice, and since this is exactly what had been done by the respondent-Board, the petitioner had no cause for complaint.
3. The mere fact that a post was created for a particular period was no guarantee that the person appointed in the first instance would continue for the entire period. In any event, since the post had been abolished, the petitioner could not insist that the Board should still continue to employ him in a post which did not exist.
4. The petitioner appealed from this decision again as a pauper, but the learned Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal and sent a copy of the judgment to the Collector for realisation of the court-fees. From this judgment, the petitioner came to the High Court in second appeal and again applied to appeal in forma pauperis. Unfortunately, the application was barred by time. The prayer for the condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act was taken into consideration, but the Court held that the delay had not been satisfactorily explained. On that occasion the petitioner undertook to pay the requisite court-fee within a month. He failed to do so and again applied for extension of time. This was also refused by the High Court and the memorandum of appeal was rejected as being unstamped.
5. The petitioner now seeks special leave to appeal, and it was first sought to be contended by him that since he had been allowed to file the suit as a pauper and to go up in first appeal as a pauper, no further application for filing the second appeal as a pauper was necessary and that he should have been allowed, as a matter of course, to appeal as a pauper. There is no substance in this contention, for, under Order XLIV of the Code of Civil Procedure, one has to present an application alongwith the memorandum of appeal for permission to appeal as a pauper and such an application has to be made under Article 170 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act within thirty days. The petitioner did make such an application, but the same was after the expiry of the period of the said thirty days. He also filed an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for the condonation of the delay on the ground of illness. This was supported by a medical certificate and three affidavits, one filed by the petitioner himself and the others by two of his friends. The medical certificate only showed that the petitioner was advised rest till 1-2-72. The High Court, therefore, held that there was no satisfactory explanation for the period 2-2-72 to 7-2-72 when the application was actually filed. The affidavits were not considered reliable on the ground that such affidavits were of a nature which can be easily procured. In any event, these affidavits should have been filed when the matter first came up for hearing on the 20th of March 1972, and not after that date.
6. The petitioner has relied on the case of Kamlruddin Malik v. Smt. Bishupriya Chowdhurari (A R 1929 Cal. 240) to support his contention that, in exercising the discretion to condon delay, the Court should take a lenient view so that the remedy for the enforcement of a right is not defeated on technical grounds.
7. We are, however, not bound by this decision, because, the consistent view of this Court has been that in a civil matter the lapse of time confers a valuable right on the other side, and unless each day's delay is satisfactorily explained, the other side should not be deprived of this valuable right.