1. ' Dr. Asif Hussain Jafri (hereinafter to be referred as Complainant) addressed three applications to the learned Chief Justice of Sindh High Court making complaint against his own Advocate Mr. K.B.
2. Bhutto (hereinafter to be referred as alleged contemner) alleging categorically that his counsel Mr. Bhutto gave consent in F.RA. No, 992/83 improperly and without authorisation from Complainant and in the result Rent Appeal was allowed by a short consent order and the case was remanded to the Rent Controller for fresh proceedings, which was against the interest of Complainant for the reason that Complainant as landlord had succeeded in getting eviction on the ground of default and appeal was filed by the tenant, which was allowed in the manner stated above. Complaint as such was sent by learned Chief Justice to my learned brother Mamoon Kazi, J., who had disposed of the appeal mentioned above and his Lordship after hearing Complainant issued notice to Mr. Bhutto to show-cause why suitable action under the law should not be taken against him. My learned brother further observed in subsequent order that he himself would not like to try the case as such it should be placed before the learned Chief Justice for passing orders that may be deemed fit. This matter was then marked to me by learned Chief Justice to be dealt with according to law. I issued notices to the parties and A.-A.G. Sindh and then framed charge under sections 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976 to which alleged contemner pleaded not guilty. I directed the office to register the case and fix it for further to law.
3. ' Factual background of this case briefly stated is that Complainant is landlord of premises which he rented out to his tenant Khawaja Tariq Siddique as per agreement dated 1-9-1972. Complainant filed Rent Case No, 4775/1979 against tenant for eviction on the grounds of default and personal need in the Court of Xth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi. Ultimately eviction was granted vide order dated 3-11-1983 on the ground of default only and issue of personal need was found against Complainant/landlord for the reason that he failed to examine himself as a witness.
4. Against eviction tenant filed appeal in the High Court as F.RA. No, 992/1983 in which Mr. K.B. Bhutto was engaged to appear on behalf of Complainant/landlord and on the other side Mr. Khalid Ishaq appeared on behalf of the tenant. In the High Court on 22-11-1987 my learned brother Mamoon Kazi, J., after hearing both the Advocates mentioned above disposed of appeal by a short consent order in consequence of which impugned order of eviction was set aside with finding on issue No,1 relating to default reversed and case was remanded for fresh decision on issue No,2 relating to personal need. Appeal was allowed and it was directed that both parties were at liberty to lead fresh evidence before the Rent Controller.
5. ' It appears that complainant was not present when appeal was disposed of and later he was informed by his counsel about the result of appeal. Complainant quietly without making any protest went about contesting case on remand before Rent Controller on issue of personal need and when Rent Controller gave negative finding on this issue, he wrote to Mr. Bhutto on 6-3-1988 after a lapse of 3-1/2 months raising objection to the consent order of remand passed on 22-11- 1987 in F.R.A. No, 992/1983 on the ground that his Advocate had no authority from him to give consent and further he was engaged to contest appeal on one issue only for which his services were hired. It was also claimed in that letter that appeal was not properly argued by Mr. Bhutto on 22-11-1987 and in the telephonic talk between complainant and Mr. Bhutto which took place three days after the result, such verbal objection was taken by complainant against consent, which was being reduced in writing. It may be mentioned here that Mr. Bhutto did not appear for complainant before Rent Conroller either in original proceedings or after remand. He was engaged only for appearance in the High Court. Vide letter dated 26-3-1988 Mr. Bhutto explained fatual position to the complainant as to how hearing took place and appeal was disposed of by consent order resulting in remand of the case. On 30-3-1988 complainant filed complaint against Mr. Bhutto with Sindh Bar Council for professional misconduct and he addressed his first application dated nil to the learned Chief Justice which was received by member, Inspection Team of Sindh High Court on 23-4-1988. Subsequently, complainant sent two other applications dated 14-5-1988 and 15-6-1988 to the learned Chief Justice.
6. ' In the contempt proceedings before me, complainant examined himself and closed his side.
7. Similarly alleged contemner examined himself and closed his side. No other witness was examined by either side. Subsequently, at the time when I was examining the case in detail for judgment, it occurred to me that it was essential in order to give just decision to examine Mr. Khalid Ishaq, Advocate for tenant, who was present and was heard by the learned Judge and he was not examined by any one of the two parties. I then fixed the case for further hearing and after issuance of notice examined Mr. Khalid Ishaq as Court-witness. Later in this judgment at proper stage and in the relevant paragraphs it would appear as to why it became necessary to examine Mr. Khalid Ishaq. For the time being anxiety is to find out from the evidence recorded and material brought on the record, whether allegations made by Complainant are proved or not and whether contempt is committed or not ?
8. ' When complainant examined himself as a witness before me in contempt proceedings, he chose to file statement in writing which was signed by him and requested that the same may be treated as his evidence. He had filed necessary annexures alongwith the statement. His request was allowed and he was cross-examined on behalf of alleged contemner. From the statement in writing of complainant, it appears that he was not present on 22-11-1987 when appeal was decided and subsequently, he protested to his counsel as to why consent was given by him, when order of remand was not in his favour. Complainant has given these facts very briefly and has stated the relevant dates. According to him consent order was passed on 22-11-1987 and after protesting verbally he wrote letter to his counsel on 6-3-1988 in which he objected to the consent. Now the question arises that in between the two dates mentioned above, period of nearly three and half months expired and what was complainant doing before reducing objection to the consent in writing. The answer is that he was acting upon consent order and was contesting proceedings after remand on the issue of personal need before Rent Controller. When Rent Controller found this issue against complainant he raised objection in writing against consent order which was passed three and half months ago. When complainant came to know that consent order was not in his favour and he had registered verbal protest against it with his counsel two three days after result was announed, as is claimed by Complainant, then nothing prevented him from openly disowning that consent order and he could have challenged its validity as is allowed under the law. Not doing so and belated raising of objection in witing by complainant clearly shows that in the beginning after consent order was passed complainant had no intention of raising objection to the consent and was content with order of the High Court, in compliance of which he contested the case after remand and when he lost it again he raised objection very late. In this context, factual position as stated above is admitted by complainant in his cross-examination before me and he stated that for the intervening period he waited and did not raise objection to the consent order because he was advised by Advocates, whom he consulted, to wait till finding is given in the case after remand.
9. In other words, had the finding been in favour of complainant after remand he would not have raised objection in writing against consent order passed by the High Court.
10. ' Complainant admitted in his cross-examination before me that after remand Rent Controller gave finding against him on the issue of personal need and against that decision he filed F.R.A.. No, 293/88. He was asked a question that if that appeal was allowed in his favour, would he still persist and press his objection againt consent order in F.R.A. 992/83, he was evasive and replied that he was not prepared to answer such speculative question. On this point as stated above, it appears from the record that complainant was complacent with and accepted consent order and contested proceedings wholeheartedly but when finding was against him for the second time on the issue of personal need, he pressed in service belatedly his objection against consent order; which shows lack of bona fides. In this connection, explanation furnished by complainant as stated above assigning reasons for confirming in writing verbal protest against consent order after 3-1/2 months is unsatisfactory and unconvincing.
11. ' Coming back to letter dated 6th March, 1988 written by complainant to the alleged contemner, objection is raised therein that Mr. Bhutto was engaged in appeal for issue of default only and had no authority to say anything on the issue of personal need, which was outside the scope of appeal.
12. Relevant first paragraph in the letter mentioned above is not happily worded but if it is read conjointly with second paragraph, in the same letter, then such intention would appear clearly. At the time of giving evidence, complainant was confronted with Vakalatnama Ex.1-B in F.R.A. No, 992/83, which indisputably showed that authority was given to the Advocate to compromise and withdraw the matter. With regard to the stand taken by complainant that he engaged Mr. Bhutto for one issue only which related to default, he was confronted with application under section 151, C.P.C. In F.R.A. No, 992/83 in which prayer was made on behalf of complainant to produce documents in support of issue of personal need. This application is supported by personal affidavit of complainant, certified/copy of which is on the record. In this affidavit in paras.2 and 3 this fact is admitted that eviction was also applied for on the ground of personal need but complainant had to delay his arrival in Karachi till he could get possession of disputed premises and in the meantime, his health had deteriorated and he came back to Karachi on 15-2-1985. Documents sought to be produced are transfer of residence form, relevant pages of Passport showing arrival of complainant in Karachi on 15-2-1985 and visa of U.S.A. And letters dated 11-6-1986 of Texas heart institute. Complainant in his evidence before me took up stand that such application was filed and such documents were sought to be produced not in support of personal need but in support of issue of default. Certified copy of this order dated 1-10-1986 on C.M.A. No, 1574/86 is produced, which clearly shows that these documents were sought to be produced in support of issue of personal need and the Court ordered that this application would be heard at the time of regular hearing of appeal. Confronted with such situation, complainant was still adamant and persistently insisted that these documents were to be filed in connection with issue of default and did not relate to the issue of personal need. Ultimately complainant admitted that order passed on application showed that his counsel was making efforts for hearing of appeal on the issue of personal need also but he was unaware because his counsel kept him in dark about such order having been passed by the Court. In this context claim made by complainant as stated above was vain and feeble attempt to speak against the record, which cannot be believed and is also unwarranted.
13. Complainant has failed to prove his averment that he engaged his counsel only for arguing appeal to the extent of issue of default and he had not authorised his counsel to agitate issue of personal need.
14. ' Coming back to the brass-tacks, it is claimed by the Complainant that he became aware of the contempt, when he received letter dated 26th March, 1988 from Mr. Bhutto, which gave impression that alleged contemner gave consent to the order of remand under compulsion from the Court.
15. While giving evidence before me in contempt proceedings, complainant filed statement in writing in which he has stated that letter dated 26-3-1988 of alleged contemner is contemptuous because Mr. Justice Mamoon Kazi has remarked so while taking cognizance and issuing show-cause notice to the alleged contemner. Reliance was also placed on the affidavit of alleged contemner, in which factual position is reiterated. Further complainant has quoted paragraphs from the comments and orders passed by my learned brother Mamoon Kazi, J. During contempt proceedings before and after issuance of show-cause notice. This is so stated obviously for the reason that complainant himself was physically not present when consent order of remand was passed so he does not know what transpired at the hearing. During cross-examination, plight of complainant became more pronounced on account of his vulnerability and he asserted positively that consent order was without his consent but he did not say that consent order was passed ender compulsion.
16. Complainant further stated that he did not want to examine Mr..Bhutto as his witness to prove that order passed by the Court on 22-11-1987 was not a consent order but he wanted to examine Mr.Bhutto in the light of his letter addressed to him, which gave impression that order dated 22-11- 1987 was passed under compulsion from the Court. Complainant further stated that he got :hat impression after reading letter and so did everybody else whom he gave that etter for reading. In respect of second part of assertion about others, complainant has not mentioned their names and has not examined any other witness to prove that allegation, so I shall have to confine myself to the first part )f assertion that complainant himself got such impression without being able or ready to prove the factum that order was passed under compulsion.
17. ' Since spring board of contempt case appears to be on the face of it letter dated 26-3-1988 of alleged contemner, it would be worthwhile and pertinent to reproduce hereunder relevant paragraph of it stating in detail factual position and background in which order of remand was passed, which is as follows:- "Lastly the said appeal was fixed on 22-11-1987 which date was also in your knowledge and that of your attorney. On the same date honourable Judge of the High Court heard the learned counsel of the appellant with respect to the ground of default which was impugned in the appeal and thereafter heard me also on the same ground of default partly with observation that he agreed with me on the point of default and I would be heard on the ground of personal requirement if necessary. After further hearing learned counsel of appellant in reply to my submission on the ground of default, the learned Judge, who had so expressed himself to opine in your favour on the question of default and as such did not permit me to elucidate and submit authorities, was heard to announce that appeal is allowed for reasons to be recorded later. Thereupon, I submitted to the Honourable Judge that I was not heard and also that I had yet to be heard on the ground of personal requirement. At this stage the Honourable Judge pondered for a while and asked the learned Advocate for appellant and me to consent to remand of appeal for hearing on the ground of personal requirement. As the Hon'ble Judge and already announced that he allowed appeal against you and I was made to decide about the offer for the sane remand then and there, I accepted such offer of the Hon'ble Judge for the remand of the case for re-decision on the ground of your personal requirement in your interest."
18. ' Perusal of the paragaph reproduced above and for that matter even perusal of whole letter of Mr.Bhutto does not show at any place direct or indirect mention of the fact that he gave consent to the order of remand on account of compulsion or pressure from the Court. He has only tried to explain as to in what 'actual background he had given his consent to the order of remand. He has iarrated facts as to how hearing took place and how he was briefly heard on the point of default after learned counsel for appellant and the learned Judge appeared to be in agreement with alleged contemner and then he re-heard counsel for appellant and changed his mind and announced that appeal was allowed. Alleged contemner has further explained that he informed the learned Judge that he was not heard on the point of personal need and then the learned Judge pondered for a while and suggested remand of case with consent on the issue of personal need. It is further explained by alleged contemner that he gave consent in such circumstances as it was in the interest of his client.
19. ' Application of complainant was sent by learned Chief Justice to my learned brother Mamoon Kazi, J. Who was pleased to issue notice to Mr.Bhutto vide order dated 13-7-1988 to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of Court. This order was passed after hearing was granted to the complainant. Letter dated 26-3-1988 of alleged contemner was also before my learned brother, who was pleased to observe that Mr.Bhutto had no authority from his client to give consent for a compromise order and his letter dated 26-3-1988 gave impression that he was forced by the Court to give consent. After show-cause notice Mr.Bhutto appeared and filed his affidavit dated 25-8-1988 in reply to show cause notice. In this affidavit on oath after taking some legal objections regarding jurisdiction he had once again reiterated the same factual position as was done in his earlier letter dated 26-3-1988 addressed to the complainant. In the affidavit he took up the stand that his letter dated 26-3-1988 was part of correspondence between Advocate and his client and it was fair reporting of proceedings and there was nothing derogatory in it. In paragraphs 8 and 9 it is said that at the time of hearing of appeal, his Lordship was inclined to dismiss appeal on the ground of default in favour of landlord in view of case-law as two rulings were cited namely 1975 S.C.M.R. 464 and 1987 C.L.C. 692, latter being decision of the same learned Judge Mamoon Kazi, J. It is further stated in the affidavit that afterwards his Lordship was heard to say that appeal was allowed and then alleged contemner informed the Court that he was yet to be heard on the point of personal need and the learned Judge suggested remand on the question of personal need with consent of the counsel, which was accepted. It was also pointed out in the affidavit that complainant acted upon consent order, contested case on the issue of personal need but when finding was against him, he made applications against his counsel.
20. ' In support of assertion of alleged contemner that learned Judge initially had agreed with him on the point of default but then changed his mind, two rulings were cited as is stated in paragraph 8 of the affidavit. Of course, against this affidavit, complainant filed counter-affidavit and then there was also affidavitin-rejoinder by alleged contemner but I do not propose to refer to the counter- affidavit of complainant because he was not present at the hearing so he is not expected to know as to what transpired and on this point his affidavit is not useful at all. After taking into consideration affidavit and rejoinder affidavit of alleged contemner the learned Judge passed a detailed order on 13-10-1988 holding therein positively that he was of the view that there was clear prima facie case against Mr. Bhutto for which he must be tried. Paragraph 10 of this order is very pertinent to the point under consideration, hence it is reproduced verbatim as under:-- "On merits also, I am least impressed by Mr. Bhutto's defence. Mr. Bhutto has given clear impression in his letter that it was the manner in which appeal against Dr. Jafri had proceeded before the Court which left Mr. Bhutto with no other option but to agree for a consent order. He has even gone to the extent of alleging that he had been forced by the Court to agree for such order otherwise the Court had already decided to allow the appeal against Dr. Jafri. Although it is difficult. For me now to recall how exactly the case proceeded but it may be pointed out that Courts always act as netural arbiters and question of compelling any party to agree to a particular order or judgment can hardly arise. The question of Mr. Bhutto being compelled by the circumstances as described by him in his letter also does not arise as judgments of this Court are not final and it is always open to an aggrieved party to file a petition before the Supreme Court against an order or judgment of this Court. The account given by Mr. Bhutto in his letter in respect of the conduct of the proceedings in the case is not only highly exaggerated but ex facie false. It is not very uncommon that a Judge after hearing arguments gives away his mind particularly when the case is to be decided by him then and there at the conclusion of arguments but a final decision is that which is written and signed or has been dictated in the open Court and reduced to writing. Since the only order passed after conclusion of the arguments in this case was the consent order, by which, the appeal was disposed of,' the question of any other order being announced, can hardly arise. It appears that Mr. Bhutto was already aware of the weakness of his case, therefore, he agreed for a consent order."
21. ' In the contempt proceedings before me alleged contemner examined himself as his witness and closed his side. He stated that his affidavit dated 25-8-1988 in reply to show-cause notice and affidavit-in-rejoinder dated 3-10-988 be considered as part of evidence. He further reiterated the contents of the affidavits and claimed that he had not stated in his letter dated 26-3-1988 addressed to his client that he gave consent due to compulsion from the Court but merely stated correct factual position as to how consent order came to be passed. Now it is indisputable that how and in what circumstances consent order was passed by the Court is a question of fact. In this connection, on one hand I have one version given by alleged contemner. On the other hand, there is version of complainant, who was not present at the hearing but claims that he received letter dated 26-3-1988 from alleged contemner, which gave impression that he was forced by the Court to agree to consent order. Apart from this letter and evidence of complainant, there are two orders passed by the learned Judge dated 13-7-1988 and 13-10-1988 in connection with contempt proceedings, which apparently purport to support the view of complainant but when examined minutely would show that version of alleged contemner also finds support to some extent.
22. ' Now alleged contemner claims to have very definite version of factual state in which consent order of remand was passed. He is consistent about that version from the stage of his letter dated 26-3-1988 addressed to the complainant up to the stage of his evidence recorded by me in contempt proceedings. He has maintained and stuck to this version very consistently. According to him learned Judge agreed with him on the ground of default and then after hearing counsel for the other side changed his mind and announced finding against complainant, hence he informed the learned Judge that he was still to be heard on theground of personal need and then the learned Judge suggested remand of the case to which he gave his consent. He does not say that he was compelled by the Court but he maintains that he has stated bare facts in the background of which ultimately consent order of remand was passed to which he agreed. He stated this factual position twice in affidavits and on third occasion in his evidence before me apart from his initial letter to his client. In his affidavit dated 25-8-1988 he reiterated this fact that the learned Judge agreed with him on the question of default as he had cited two decisions mentioned above, out of which one was of Supreme Court and the other was of the same learned Judge. Learned Judge in his detailed order dated 13-10-1988 has not made any reference to these two rulings and the following observations in the order tend to show that learned Judge was unable to recall all the facts in detail and there was some amount of probability that version of alleged contemner may be true.
23. "Although it is difficult for me to recall now how exactly the case proceeded.
24. ' It is not very uncommon that Judge after hearing of arguments gives away his mind particularly when the case is to be decided by him then and there at the conclusion of arguments but final decision is that which is written and signed......."
25. ' I have studied record of F.R.A. No, 992/83 minutely and there are not notes in it except consent order, so record is not helpful and reliance is to be placed solely on memory for recall of details of facts. I have seen the cause list of the Court for 22-11-1987, which shows that two judgments and one order on bail application were to be announced and then three F.R.As. Were fixed for Katcha Peshi. Thirteen applications were fixed for hearing and then fourteen appeals were fixed for final hearing. It was no doubt a heavy board and it is normal for a Judge to be anxious to dispose of as many applications and cases as possible. Now when alleged contemner has given categorical version of factual nature and has stated so on oath repeatedly, it would be very unfair to discard his version when his veracity stands unchallenged and unshaken in cross-examination. On the other hand the learned Judge was unable to recall all the facts and rightly so specially when record was also not helpful and there were indications in the order of learned Judge not denying certain factual assertions of alleged contemner, so I decided to fix the case for further hearing to examine Mr. Khalid Ishaq, Advocate, who appeared for appellant in F.R.A. 992/83, although no attempt was made by any party to examine him before me. I did so with expectation that he would be able to throw some light on the factual position in which the consent order was passed because he was present there and was heard by the learned fudge.
26. ' Mr. Khalid Ishaq deposed before me that on 22-11-1987 the cases were taken up for hearing in the chamber of the learned Judge, who, in the instant case appeared convinced that it was not a case of wilful default. Mr. Bhutto tried to the case on the ground of personal need. Mr. Khalid Ishaq remembered hat Mr. Bhutto had taken out two authorities and cited a case of the Supreme Court and stated that the other reported decision was of the learned Judge himself on the point of default. The learned Judge appeared to be conversant with both decisions and stated that they were distinguishable. Mr. Khalid Ishaq urther stated that he had read affidavit of Mr. Bhutto in reply to show-cause notice and had no cavil with facts stated in paragraphs 9 and 10 because the facts were substantially the same according to his recollection. Mr. Ishaq further stated hat at the end of the proceedings he did not have impression that Mr. Bhutto was or he acted wrongly in any manner by accepting option of remand of the case. Mr. Khalid Ishaq further stated that he had read letter dated 26-3-1988 addressed by Mr. Bhutto to his client explaining factual position, which was done correctly but language used in it is of Mr. Bhutto and is slightly different. It may )e mentioned here that Mr. Khalid Ishaq was cross-examined by complainant as well as counsel of alleged contemner. Evidence of Mr. Khalid Ishaq supports fully stand taken by alleged contemnor except on one point which is to the effect hat learned Judge agreed with Mr. Bhutto on the point of default. Apart from hat Mr. Khalid Ishaq has wholeheartedly supported version of Mr. Bhutto.
27. ' Now this can be a genuine case of misunderstanding and that misunderstanding apparently was in the mind of Mr. Bhutto, who got the oppression during the hearing that learned Judge was in agreement with him on le point of default in view of case-law cited by him. It is possible that absequently after hearing Mr. Ishaq, learned Judge changed his mind. It can be 3, because his Lordship was unable to recall as to how the case proceeded. Then the learned Judge announced decision allowing appeal of tenant, Mr. Requested for hearing on the other issue of personal need and it was in the circumstances suggested by learned Judge that the case could go back on remand ur hearing on the issue of personal need. Had Mr. Bhutto been right that the Judge had agreed with him then appeal would have been dismissed or would have been opened widely to include rehearing on issue of default well. In the circumstances, it can be said that the version of alleged contemner could be correct to the extent stated above based on misunderstanding.
28. ' On the point stated above there is case-law available for guidance. It is :.1d by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Mian Qadeeruddin and another v. Mian Ghulam Yakoob and another 1977 SCMR 475 that proceedings in a case of Contempt of Court are quasi-criminal in nature in which all doubts are to be excluded before recording conviction. In another case of Abdul Sattar v.
29. Income Tax Officer, Circle XV, East Zone, Karachi PLD 1989 Kar. 264, it is held that in a contempt case if there are two versions of the incident on the record, divergent in nature, allowing room for doubt, then benefit of that doubt must be given to the alleged contemner. Instant case stands on a much better footing for the reason that version stated by alleged contemner is fortified by evidence of Court-witness namely Mr. Khalid Ishaq to a great extent and I feel that there are valid and convincing reasons that this version based on misunderstanding as it is may be correct and on this ground alleged contemner is entitled to acquittal.
30. ' I am also of the view that letter dated 26-3-1988 of alleged contemner is not offending and does not attract mischief of definition of contempt as contemplated under section 3 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976 for the reasons that it does not tend to lower the authority of the Court or scandalise a Judge in relation to his office. In fact nothing has been said in that letter against the learned Judge not even by way of tacit inference. What that letter purports or was intended to convey is as to in what circumstances consent was given by alleged contemner to the order of remand, which was on account of preconceived notions in his mind due to factual background as he saw it.
31. According to the alleged contemner learned Judge agreed with him on the point of default in view of case-law, which was not correct and was due to genuine misunderstanding as stated above.
32. Emphasis in the letter was on situation and set of facts and there was no intention of imputing anything to the Judge. It now appears that letter was not intended to convey the message that consent was given due to compulsion from the Court but attempt was made to state bare facts giving rise to development of a situation in which consent had to be given, which was considered at that time in the interest of client.
33. ' Assuming for the sake of argument that letter dated 26-3-1988 of Mr. Bhutto contained criticism in respect of learned Judge, then it has to be kept in view that the letter in question was written by alleged contemner not to the Judge but to his own client and that also when he was called upon to do so by his client, who registered protest in writing against consent to the order of remand.
34. Alleged contemner felt himself pushed in a tight corner and he had to explain to his client as to how and why consent was given. Here conduct of both parties is to be considered. On the one hand there is alleged contemner, who claims that the learned Judge first agreed with him on the ground of default but then after hearing counsel for the other side changed his mind and when he insisted for hearing on issue of personal need, the learned Judge suggested remand of case for hearing on issue of personal need only and he accepted the proposition as it was in the interest of his client. This had happened on account of some misunderstanding in the mind of alledged contemner. On the other hand, there is client, who has chosen to be complainant against his counsel. He has taken inconsistent stands. He acted upon consent order and contested case after remand on the issue of personal need and when finding was against him, he wanted to take revenge from his counsel sand was on the look-out to find something against his counsel.
35. Complainant first said that his counsel had no authority to give consent and was engaged for one issue. Of default only but ultimately he was not proved right. So when he got letter in question, he sent it to the learned Chief Justice for initiation of contempt proceedings and he has also moved Sindh Bar Council for proceedings against his counsel on the ground of misconduct. It appears that complainant is fully determined to settle scores with his counsel, which is in the nature of dispute between Advocate and his client.
36. ' In the case of Choudhry Zahoor Ilahi v. Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and others? L D 1975 SC 383, it is held that any person, even though a total stranger to the proceedings, can lay information before the Court and apply for committal of contempt but whether Court will act upon it or not is a different matter. It will depend upon a variety of circumstances such as seriousness of the matter, the nature of offending speech or publication, the occasion on which it is made, the intention of the maker, and above all the bona fides of applicant or informant. The Court must not allow itself to be used for settling private scores or vendettas and much less for gaining political advantages.
37. ' One other point needs consideration. Letter in question of alleged contemner is confidential communication between Advocate and client written in connection with professional duty. Article 12 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 (President's Order No,10 of 1984) gives such letter cover of confidential communication and neither Advocate nor client between whom such communication has taken place can be compelled to disclose to the Court or tribunal or other authority such communication, unless such person offers himself as a witness, in which case he may be compelled to disclose any such communication as may appear to the Court necessary to be known. Article 9 of Q.Anun-e-Shahadat imposes restriction on Advocate not to disclose any communication made to him by his client unless with his consent or disclose any advice given to his client. In the instant case in such circumstances it was not fair on the part of complainant as client to have sent that letter of his Advocate to the learned Chief Justice when endeavour was made by alleged contemner to write professionally to his client explaining factual position regarding hearing of appeal in sheer good faith.
38. ' It would not be out of place to mention here that in celebrated case of State v. Sir Edward Snelson PLD 1961 Lah. 78 at page 106 of the report, a very pertinent observation is made, which is reproduced as under:-- "In order that criticism of judicial acts of Judges should be immune from punishment under the Contempt of Court Act, the criticism should be fair and not made with the object of lowering the authority of the Court and should not impute motives to Judges nor should it be intended to depict Judges as incompetent people unfit to hold their onerous offices."
39. ' Keeping in view legal position enunciated in reported cases mentioned above, I have subjected to scrutiny evidence recorded in these proceedings and other material produced for and against the charge and am of the view that charge is not established and for reasons already stated above alleged contemner is hereby acquitted.
40. Acquittal ordered.