1. ' This is an application under section 151 C.P.C. Praying that the order of suspension of the membership of the plaintiff be suspended till the final disposal of this suit.
2. ' Briefly stated the case of the plaintiff is that on 3-11-1989 the plaintiff, who is a member of Karachi Gymkhana Club, while he was playing bridge in the bridge room of the Gymkhana, was asked by Defendant No,2, Honorary Secretary of the said Club to remove his car from 'No Parking' area. The plaintiff denied this allegation and offered the keys of the car to Defendant No,2 to remove the car himself, but the matter did not end there. Subsequently the Managing Committee of the Club on 20-1-1990 suspended the membership of the Plaintiff for a period of 90 days w,e,f, 21-1-1990. The Plaintiff filed this suit on 7-3-1990 which contains the following prayers:- "The Plaintiff prays for judgment and decree as under:--
(a) Declaring that the action of the Managing Committee of Defendant No,1 regarding suspension of the membership of the Plaintiff w.e. f. 21-1-1990 for a period of 90 days is illegal, bad in law, discriminatory, biased and contrary to facts;
(b) An injunction suspending the operation of the order dated 20-1-1990 passed by the Defendant suspending the membership of the Plaintiff;
(c) Mandatory injunction against the Defendants directing them to withdraw the order of suspension of membership of the Plaintiff and to allow the Plaintiff and his family members to use the Club premises;
(d) Any other better/further relief/reliefs which the Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case;
(e) Costs of the suit."
3. ' Along with the suit application for suspension of the order suspending the membership of the plaintiff has been made as shown above.
4. ' Mr. Mansoorul-Arfin, who appeared for the Plaintiff, submitted that Defendant No,2 as well as other members of the Managing Committee were not only prejudiced against the Plaintiff due to the heat of election which was taking place on the day of incident, but also because, as they themselves claimed, being the witnesses of the incident. Hence they were not qualified to act as Judges in their own cause. He relied upon the citation from Halsbury's Laws of England IVth edition, which reads as under:- "69. Likelihood of bias. In a wide range of other situations the impression may be received that an adjudicator is likely to be biased. A person ought not to participate or appear to participate in an appeal against his own decision, or act or appear to act as both prosecutor and Judge; the general rule is that in such circumstances the decision will be set aside. Normally it will also be inappropriate for a member of a tribunal to act as a witness. Likelihood of bias may also arise because an adjudicator has already indicated partisanship by expressing opinions antagonistic or favourable to the parties before him, or has made known his views about the merits of the very issue or issues of similar nature in such a way as to suggest prejudgment because he is so actively associated with the institution or conduct of proceedigs before him, either in his personal capacity or by virtue of his membership of an interested organisation, as to make himself in substance, both judge and party, or because of his personal relationship with a party or for other reasons. It is not enough to show that the person adjudicating holds strong views on the general subject-matter in respect of which he is adjudicating, or that he is a member of a trade union to which one of the parties belongs where the matter is not one in which a trade dispute is involved."
5. ' Mr. M.L. Shahani, who appeared for the Defendants, submitted that neither the Defendant No,2, nor members of the Managing Committee were biased against the Plaintiff. The mere fact that there were elections on the day of incident or that they were witnesses of the incident, did not disqualify them from acting as Judges. He relied upon the well-known case of Federation of Pakistan v.
6. Muhammad Akram Shaikh reported in PLD 1989 SC page 689, where it was observed as under;-- "32. The ground of general unspecified bias now put forward cannot be allowed to prevail. The learned Chief Justice had while passing the order, dated 16-5-1989 (reproduced) consulted the concerned Judges and noted that "they have stated that they will not feel embarrassed to hear the case". In the case of Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Abdul Wali Khan PLD 1976 SC 57 a passage, as reproduced hereunder, was quoted with approval from American Jurisprudence Volume 30 page 774, paragraph 74:-- `at common law bias or prejudice on the part of a Judge, not the result of interest or relationship, is not supposed to exist, and generally it does not incapacitate or disqualify a Judge to try a case unless the Constitution or statute so provides."
7. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties. The ruling cited by Mr. M.L.
8. Shahani is distinguishable. It speaks of unspecified general bias, whereas in the present case there is clear and unequivocal bias on account of the members of Managing Committee claiming to be eye-witnesses of the incident, if nothing else. It is an admitted position that the Honorary Secretary and the members of the Managing Committee were witnesses of the incident and there were elections on the day of incident and therefore, the Plaintiff has a prima facie case. The balance of convenience is also in his favour. Moreover in this case the allegation against the Plaintiff, even if it is true, is of trivial nature, which in the ordinary circumstances, would not have resettled in the suspension of the membership of a member of such a popular club for 90 days. The period of suspension is almost over and hardly 8 days remain in completion thereof. Hence no harm would be caused to the discipline of the club, if the order of suspension of the plaintiff is suspended for the remaining period. I, therefore, grant C.M.A. No, 1166/1990 and direct that the order of suspension of the Plaintiffs membership be suspended forthwith and shall continue to remain suspended till further orders.