The petitioner was selected as a Class A Tehsildar-Candidate by order of the Governor of the Punjab, dated the 27th of June 1950. He was posted as an officiating Tehsildar and Incharge of the treasury at Rajanpur in the district of D. G. Khan in the month of March 1956. A departmental inquiry was Qrdered against him on the allegations that on the 14th of March 1966, he had closed the treasury before time and had gone to village kotla Nasir, where he attested a mutation in favour of one Sharaf Din and received an illegal gratification of Rs. 2,000.00 (Rupees two thousand) for himself and Rs. 500.00 (Rupees five hundred) for Imam Baklish, Patwari who was not the Patwari, of the circle concerned. While the petitioner was coming back on a tonga alongwith the aforesaid Sharaf Pin and Imam Bakhsh Patwari, a raid party headed by a Magistrate recovered a sum of Rs.
2,500.00 from two pockets of Imam Bakhsh, Patwari. A case was registered against the petitioner, and while the question of grant of sanction to his prosecution was pending, the Commissioner, Multan Division, framed a charge against him and suspended him from service by order, dated the 3rd of November 1958. The Board of Revenue, however, found that the Commissioner was not authorised to frame a charge against him. The order of suspension passed against the petitioner was set aside with effect from the 27th of May 1959 but he was asked to proceed on leave. The case of the department is that thereafter the petitioner absented himself from duty without furnishing his correct address and it was only in response to an advertisement in a newspaper that he attended the office of Deputy Commis--sioner, Multan, on the 25th of February 1960, and received the charge-sheet and other relevant documents. A supplementary charge, dated the 28th of June 1960, was also served on the petitioner calling upon him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service for being absent without leave or permission.
2. The Inquiry Officer found that the petitioner had absented himself from the treasury during the working hours; that he had gone to Kotla Nasir alongwith Imam Bakhsh, Patwari, to attest the mutation in favour of Sharaf Din and had actually accepted a sum of Rs.-2,000.00 (Rupees two thousand) as bribe for himself from Sharaf Din and Rs. 500.00 (Rupees five hundred) for Iniam Bakhsh Patwari. The supplementary charge was also held to have been proved. Mr. Nasir Ahmad, Member, Board of Revenue and Secretary to Government of West Pakistan, Revenue Department, passed the order of his dismissal on the 2nd of November 1962.
3. The petitioner after his dismissal, filed Writ Petition No. 159 of 1963 in the High Court of West Pakistan, at Lahore, which was withdrawn on the 15th of March 1966, as it was discovered that the petitioner had a right to file a review petition before the Governor under Article 178 of the Constitution of 1962. The petitioner thereafter filed a review petition which was dismissed by Mr. A.
H. Qureshi, Member, Board of Revenue, on the 13th of May 1968. The main ground raised before the Reviewing Authority was that the Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, Revenue Department, had no authority in law to pass the order of dismissal. It is mentioned in the order passed in the review petition that the order of petitioner's dismissal had been passed with the approval of the Minister for Revenue and with the concurrence of the Public Service Commission.
The Reviewing Authority further found that the petitioner had no case on facts and that the technical ground raised by him had no merit. The petitioner then filed the present writ petition.
4. The main argument advanced in this case is that the petitioner had been appointed by the Governor and the Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, could not have passed the order of his dismissal. It was also urged that during the inquiry, the petitioner was not given adequate opportunity to produce his defence.
5. I heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties at considerable length. The averment that the petitioner was appointed by the Governor is based on a factual misconception. According to paragraph 3(6) of Financial Commissioner's Standing Order No. 129 the final selection of Telisildar- candidate rests with the Government on the recommendation of the Financial Commissioner.
Under rule 3 of the TehsildariRules of 1932, which held the field when the candidature of the petitioner was approved, the Commissioner was authorised to make officiating appointments in his own division, while the powers for making substantive appointments vested in the financial Commissioner. The service record of the petitioner shows that he remained an officiating Tehsildar till the date of his dismissal and his officiating appointments from time to time were made by the Commissioner. The dismissing authority under the Rules of 1932 was the Financial Com--missioner and an appeal lay to the Government.
6. The Tehsildari Rules of 1932 were substituted by the rules of the same name vide notification of the Revenue Department No. 1826-B, dated the 23rd of March 1953. According to these rules fifty per cent. Posts in the cadre of Tehsildars were to be filled by direct recruitment as a result of competitive examination held under the auspices of the Public Service Commission. Appendix B' to these rules indicates, that the authority empowered to dismiss a Tehsildar is the Government itself.
By notification, dated 26-10-1958, the Board of Revenue (Delegation of Powers) Rules of 1958, came into force "notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any service rules for the time being in force in the Province or any part thereof". According to item 6 of the Schedule to these rules, the appointing and dismissing authority in case of a Tehsildar is the Board of Revenue and the appellate authority is the Government. These rules, however, contained a proviso saying that nothing contained therein shall have the effect of varying the conditions of service of any person affected by them to his disadvantage, or authorise any such person to be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. It will be observed that the appointing authority of the petitioner as officiating Tehsildar was the Commissioner. The Proviso to the Delegation of Powers Rules of 1958 did not, therefore, apply in terms to his case.
7. Before the order of the dismissal of the petitioner was passed, an amendment was made in the Board of Revenue (Delegation of Powers) Rules, 1958, vide Notification No. Integ. 15/5-61, dated the 15th of September 1962, whereby in view of Articles 177 and 178 of the Constitution of 1962, the proviso to sub-rule (2) was omitted and a new sub-rule was introduced in the following terms----- "an authority empowered under these rules to impose penalties ` on the holder of a post shall be competent to impose such penalties on every person holding such post whether such person was appointed by such authority or not."
The position, therefore, that emerges after a review of the relevant rules, is that on the 2nd of November 1962, when the order of dismissal of the petitioner was passed, the Board of Revenue was competent to order the dismissal of the petitioner. My view finds support from the case of Muhammad Azhar v. Commissioner of Karachi (PLD 1966 SC 253), where the rules applicable to the delinquent officer were changed after the completion of the inquiry, but before a show-cause notice was issued to him. It was held that the case of the delinquent officer was to be governed by the rules which were in force at the time when the show-cause notice was issued and not by the rules under which the inquiry was conducted, but which were no longer in force. Mian Nasir Ahmad passed the order of the petitioner's dismissal in his dual capacity as a Member, Board of Revenue and Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, Revenue Department. The position, there--fore, is that the petitioner shall be considered to have been dismissed by the Board of Revenue and under clause 3 of Article 178 of the Constitution of 1962 an appeal lay to the Government.
8. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Member, Board of Revenue, was not the Board of Revenue itself and that the order should have been passed by the full Board. I do not think the objection has any substance. The Board of Revenue is competent to distribute various functions among its members and under subsection (2) of section 6 of West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act of 1957 any order passed by a Member is deemed to be an order of the Board.
9. It has been noticed above that the dismissal of the petitioner was approved by the Minister for Revenue in consultation with the Public Service Commission. It was, perhaps, because of the fact that the Board of Revenue were under the impression that the Rules of 1953 applied to the case of the petitioner and he was liable to be dismissed by the Government. The stand of the petitioner is the same, from whatever angle we examine the case of the petitioner, he should have no grievance that the formalities prescribed by law had not been complied before ordering his dismissal. According to the rules of business his case was not to be submitted to the Governor.
10. The next point raised in the case was that the petitioner had not been given an adequate opportunity to produce his defence. In the written statement this allegation has been refuted and it is said that out of twelve witnesses cited by the petitioner, eight were examined and two were not summoned because the records prepared by them were before the Inquiry officer; one witness did not turn up in spite of service, and only one witness was dropped as unnecessary. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the evidence did not warrant the dismissal of the petitioner. The sole Judge of the weight of evidence in a departmental inquiry is the punishing authority and it is not for this Court to go into the question of evidence, unless it is a case of no evidence. It will be open to the petitioner, subject to all just exceptions, to raise all grounds open to him. In case he chooses to file an appeal.
11. The result is that this writ petition is dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs.