This is an application under section 50 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 for the interpretation of the award in Industrial Dispute No. 7 of 1960 announced by the Industrial Court on 6-3-1962 and amended by the Supreme Court in their judgment held in the case "The Workers of Bata Shoe Company Lahore v. Bata Shoe Company Ltd. And another" (1971 PLC 1).
2. The Industrial Court gave an award in Industrial Dispute No. 7 of 1960 rejecting all the demands of the Bata Mazdoor League except one, viz. Payment of wages for weeks 47 to 49 of 1967 to the workers in Departments 421 and 424. The only relevant portion of the award for the purpose of the present petition is the dismissal of Khurshid Alam, the present petitioner, who was recruited as clerk in the Bata Shoe Company on the 22nd August 1949 on 21-3-1958, when he was working in department 606 in Batapur, he was transferred by order to the Bata Shoe Company, Retail Organization as U. T. Shop Manager at their Retail Shop at College Road, Rawal--pindi. He protested against this order and made an endorsement on the margin of the order of transfer that his transfer was against the Collective Agreement on the same day another charge-sheet was given to him to show cause why his services should not terminated because of his refusal to accept the transfer. In reply to the charge-sheet he wrote that the Standing Orders and Rules do not contemplate transfer of an employee to a place where the Standing Orders and Rules do not apply and that an order which puts an employee outside the scope of the agreement is contrary to the Standing Orders and Rules. The case of termination of service was also referred to Mr. Shah Zaman, the then Secretary of the Industries Department, Government of West Pakistan, who found that the termination of service of Khurshid Alam was proper and he was, therefore dismisses from service.
The Bata 1vlazdoor League went up by special leave before the Supreme Court which made the following observations :-- "The learned counsel for the respondent-Company was unable to refer to any condition in the Collective Agreement showing that the respon--dent-Company had the power to transfer any workman from one place to another place outside Batapur. In the absence of any such power in the Collective Agreement, I am satisfied that the transfer of Khurshid Alam was not proper. The allegation of Management that he refused to accept the transfer order is also without force. The transfer order was received by Khurshid Alam and he made an endorsement on it same that his transfer was against the terms of Collective Agreement. In my opinion, the course adopted by Khurshid Alam was proper and it cannot be said that he is guilty of insubordination by return--ing the transfer order. I would, therefore, re-instate him in the post held by him in the respondent- Company."
3. It may be noted here that the Supreme Court only re-instated Khurshid Alam, petitioner, but did not give him full back benefits, in spite of the fact that the following prayer was made in the memorandum of appeal :- "It is, therefore, prayed that this honourable Court be pleased to set aside the Award of the Industrial Court in respect of the above employee (Khurshid Alam) and pass an order of re- instating with retrospective effect and payment of emoluments for the intervening period."
4. In the present petition it was contended that since the Supreme Court bad held the transfer of petitioner, to be improper the award as amended by the Supreme Court be interpreted as conferring full back benefits on the petitioner and granting annual increments for the period of forced unemployment.
5. The respondent raised the following preliminary objections :-
(1) That the judgment dated 19-10-70 of the Supreme Court and the decree dated 11-11-70 was not an award within the scope of sec--tion 2(b) of Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 under which the award was given and section 2(d) of Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1969.
(2) That the industrial dispute in question was originally under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in which there was no provision of inter--pretation of an award analogous to section 50 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
(3) That this Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interpret the judgment of Supreme Court in question.
(4) That the claim of the petitioner was barred by the principles of res judicata.
(5) That the petition was liable to be dismissed on account of laches.
6. 1st preliminary objection.
Before discussing this direction it will be proper to reproduce relevant sections. Section 50 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, reads as under:-- ---Interpretation of settlement and award.-(1) If any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any provisions of an award and settlement, it shall be referred to the Tribunal constituted under this Ordinance. (2). . . . . . . . . .".
Section 2(it) of the same Ordinance reads as under:--- "Award means the determination of Labour Court, Arbitrator or Appellate Tribunal of any Industrial dispute or any matter relating thereto and includes interim awards."
7. In the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 under which this dispute was filed there is no provision analogous to section 54) of Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969. The award is defined in section 2(b) of the Act of 1947 as follows:- "Award means an interim or final determination by an industrial Tribunal of any industrial dispute or of any question relating there--to."
The award of the Industrial Court was given under the industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1949 wherein section 35 is analogous to section 56 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The wordings of section 35 are the same as in section 50 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Award is defined in section 2(b) of the Ordinance of 1959 as under:- "Award means the determination by any Industrial Court of any Industrial Dispute or any matter relating thereto and includes interim award."
8. Thus it will be seen that for the first time the determination of a industrial dispute by the Appellate Tribunal was inserted in the definition of the award given in section 2(ii) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. If the Legislature intended that the determination of an industrial dispute either by the High Court or by the Supreme Court was an award, it would have specifically stated so as it was done in the case of determination of an industrial dispute by the Appellate Tribunal.
Since it was not done, the A judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be called an award and as such it' cannot be interpreted by this Tribunal. So far as the modification of the award is concerned it is the decision of the Supreme Court which has to be looked into and if any doubt arises with regard to its interpretation or, the consequences which flow from the modification, it is only the Supreme Court alone which can interpret its modification. In the present case the petitioner had himself moved the Supreme Court for the clarification of the judgment and the decree but later on withdrew that application praying that the petitioner after perusal of the decree was satisfied and claimed no further relief. This also shows that the Supreme Court alone had the power and jurisdiction to clarify its own judgment.
9. The learned Representative of the petitioner, however, contended that the Supreme Court exercising its power under Article 160 of Constitu--tion of 1956 had amended the award and therefore the award as amended can be interpreted by this Tribunal under section 50 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. In support of his contention he cited the judgments of the Supreme Court in cases "Mohammed Saeed and 4 others v. Election Petitions Tribunal, West Pakistan, and 3 others" (PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 91) and "Remington Rand of Pakistan Ltd. v. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan and 2 others (PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 170). In both cases it was held that the award given by the Special Tribunal was liable to correction under Article 160 of the Constitution of 19.16. It is nowhere mentioned that the judgments of the Supreme Court could be interpreted by this Tribunal and therefore these authorities are of no avail to the petitioner.
10. Under Order XL, rule 6 of the Pakistan Supreme Court Rules of 1956 the Supreme Court has inherent power to make orders which arc necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore the Supreme Court alone can clarify and interpret its cwt judgments and the decrees.
11. In the result I uphold this preliminary objection and dismiss the petition.
12. In view of the above finding it will not be necessary to decide the other preliminary objections.