QADEER DDIN AHMAD, J.----The respondents are represented by Mr. Azizullah K. Memon of Khairpur and notices were sent to him in accordance with the rules, but neither the respondents, nor any body for or on their behalf is present. This is an old matter of 1964. We waited for them yesterday up to 11-30 a.m. And then decided to hear the appeals ex parte.
2. These are certified letters patent appeals from a common judgment of our learned brother Mr. Justice Anwarul Haq in 11 Appeals bearing Nos. 60, 61 and 62 of 1963. The judgment was announced by Mr. Justice Inamullah Khan on 13th January 1964. The relevant facts, which form the background of these appeals, are that three suits instituted by the predecessor-in---interest of the present respondents were dismissed by a trial Court of the former Khairpur State. The appeals which were preferred against those decisions to the District Judge of the State were also dismissed. The plaintiffs, therefore, went in second appeal to the High Court of the Khairpur State, which accepted them and decreed the suits on 17th December 1950. The defendants then went in appeal to the Judicial Committee of the State. The appeals were preferred on 6th January 1951 and were dismissed on 22nd December 1954. The Judicial Committee affirmed the decision of the High Court vide its order dated 22nd December 1954 and accordingly submitted its recom--mendations to the Ruler of the State, who accepted them on 14th February 1955.
3. The above facts will show that it was a long-drawn litigation, since the dispute related to land the numbers, by which it was described, changed in the meantime. Originally, it was situated in deh Patta of taluka Gambat, but as a result of the changes in the boundary it fell in deh Wali Muhammad of the same taluka and new survey numbers were given to it.
4. On 9th January 1.958, the decree-holders applied for the execution of the decrees to a Sub- Judge, but according to Mr. Ghulam A.I, it was found that the survey numbers, which were mentioned in the decrees, did not tally with the new survey numbers, therefore, the decree-holders withdrew their execution applications, on 30th September 1960. On 31st October 1960, they submitted fresh execution applications.
5. The new execution applications were resisted by the judgment-debtor, who are the present appellants, on two grounds mainly. One of them was that the decrees had ceased to be effective because the land, which was described in them, had ceased to exist. Secondly, that they were barred by Limitation under Article 182 of the Limitation Act. The objections were overruled on 20th March 1962 and first appeals preferred to the District Judge of the Khairptu were dismissed on 31st July 1962. Second appeals were then preferred to this Court because integration of the State had, in the meantime, taken, place on 14th October 1955. They were dismissed by a single Judge of this Court on 31st January 1964 who, however, certified the cases as fit for letters patent appeal. These letters patent appeals were accordingly filed and admitted in 1964.
6. Counsel for the appellants has raised two contentions in support of these appeals. Firstly, he says that Article 182, and not Article 183, of the Limitation Act applies to these cases. In other words, the period of Limitation for executing the decrees was 3 years from the date of those decrees and not 12 years as, provided by Article 183 of the Limitation Act. Secondly, if the finding of this Court is that Article 182 applies then the first execution application which was filed on 9th January 1958 and withdrawn on 30th September 1960 did not save limitation for the execution applications which were filed on 31st October 1960.
7. It will be seen that the second question arises only if the first contention of counsel for the appellants is accepted. The argument which counsel has advanced in favour of the first contention is that Article 183 of the Limitation Act could apply if the orders made by the Judicial Committee of the Khairpur State dated 22nd December 1954 could be treated as orders of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in terms of subsection (3) of section 9 of the Federal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act, 1949. But this, according to counsel, cannot be done, because that Act enlarged the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Pakistan which was created by the Government of India Act, 1935 and as such it was an amending or a supplementary statute to the Government of India Act, 1935. The Government of India Act, 1935 was repealed by virtue of Article 221 of the Constitution of 1956 ; therefore, the Federal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act, 1949, being an amending or supplementary Act to the main Act of 1935, should be taken to have been repealed in 1956, with the result that the provision contained in subsection (3) of section 9 of the Federal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act, 1949, was not in existence at the time at which the first three execution applications and the second three execution applications were filed in 1958 and 1960 respectively.
8. The above contentions show that the main part of counsel's argument is that the Federal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act, 1949 was not an independent statute but only an amending or a supplementary statute to the 1935 Act, therefore, it stood or fell with that Act. The reason for contending that the Federal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act, 1949 was an amending or supplementary statute, is that the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Pakistan was defined by Article 205 of the 1935 Act ; therefore, any statute, by which that jurisdiction was enlarged, must be taken, according to counsel, to be either amending or supplementing the provision which was contained in Article 205 of 1935 Act. This argument, was supported by the fact that in Article 206 of the 1935 Act it was provided that the Legislature of Pakistan could, by passing an Act, enlarge the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Pakistan.
9. We do not think that the argument advanced by counsel is sound, because every statute, which enlarged or altered the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Pakistan, was not necessarily an amending or supplementary statute to the 1935 Act. It may be noted here that the Government of India Act. 1935, provided a Constitution of India. It was passed by the British Parliament. It could only be amended or supplemented by that Parliament. The power to amend and supplement it was conferred on the Legislature of Pakistan by virtue of the Independence Act, 1947, but that power could be exercised by the Constituent Assembly. These provisions and considerations indicate the recognition of a difference between constitutional enactments and enactments of the subordinate nature. Constitution is a superior law as compared to the ordinary statutes which are inferior laws.
The result of this distinction is that the Government of India Act, 1935 could not re amended or supplemented by inferior legislation It was for this reason that Article 206 was inserted in the Government of India Act, 1935. By doing so the authority to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Pakistan or for that matter of India was separated from the other constitutional provisions and this power was specifically conferred on the ordinary Legislatures of the two countries. These legal distinctions and provisions show that the Federal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act, 1949 was not a constitutional statute and cannot be treated at par with the Government of India Act, 1935. It was an independent statute and had its own separate existence, with the result that it was not repealed when the Government of India Act, 1935 was repealed in 1956. This is the view which the Legislature has expressed in a fairly clear manner by amending section 9 of the Federal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act, 1949 by the Federal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction (Amendment) Act of 1957. If the Act had been repealed and was not in existence after the repeal of the Govern--ment of India Act, 1935 made in 1956 then section 9 of the Federal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act, 1949 could not have been amended by the Legislature in 1957.
1. The above reasons lead us to the conclusion that the Federal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act, 1, 49 was in existence when the first set and the second set of the execution of applications were filed in 1958 and 1960 and were governed b the provisions contained in subsection (3) of section 9 of that Act. That subsection is as follows :-- "9(3) Any order made by the Judicial Committee of a State on any appeal or petition heard and decided by that Committee on or before the 13th day of October 1953, shall, for all purposes, have effect as an order made by the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction tinder this Act."
The orders of the Judicial Committee of the Khairpur State, with which we are concerned, were all made before the 13 day of October 1955. If they were made on 22nd December 1954 ; they should be given effect to for all purposes as orders made by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in exercise of the Federal Court Enlargement of Jurisdiction Act, 1949. This being the situation, Article 183 of the Limitation Act applies. It provides 12 years' period of Limitation ; therefore, the execution applica-- tions made on 31st October 1960 were within time.
11. The above being our answer to the first question the second does not arise. In conclusion we dismiss these appeal with no order as to costs.