' This is a revision petition arising out of a judgment of the learned District Judge, Karak dated 1-10- 1988 by which he directed return of the appeal for presentation before the proper forum.
2. The relevant facts briefly stated are that on the basis of a single contract the respondent herein, namely, Khiyal Nawaz Khattak, sued the Chairman, Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation and another in order to recover from them three sums in total amounting to Rs,72,998 but to avoid paying the court-fee he split up the amount so as to bring it down to less than Rs,25,000 and in so doing he filed three separate suits viz Suits Nos.101/1, 102/1 and 103/1 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Karak. These suits were independently handled and tried separately but were disposed of by a single judgment written in Suit No,101/1. In the other two suits short orders only were recorded.
However, decree-sheets in all the three suits were drawn up separately.
3. The defendants filed only one appeal challenging the judgment in Suit No,101/1, enclosing of course, copies of the orders also made in other suits and of the decree sheets. The learned District Judge dismissed the appeal holding that the combined amount of three decrees exceeded his pecuniary jurisdiction. The defendants questioned this order in this Court in Revision Petition No,487 of 1987. Same was disposed of by order dated 30-4-1988, observing as here under:-- "From the order made by the learned District Judge it appears that the points involved and agitated above have not been properly considered by the learned District Judge before dismissing the appeal. He should have first decided whether the appeal filed by the appellants before him was to be treated as one appeal against all the decrees passed against the appellants, or the three appeals against the said decrees. In case it was to be deemed as one appeal, whether one appeal was competent in the circumstances of the case and thereby three separate decrees in three separate suits could or could not be impeached. He was also to decide whether the single judgment passed by the learned trial Judge amounted to consolidation of the subject-matter of suits with the result that the total amount decreed in favour of the respondent was to be deemed as consolidated, or each decree of the amount of less than Rs,25,000 stood by itself and was to be scrutinized and adjudicated upon by the Appellate Court as separate entity. In the event of the learned District Judge coming to the finding that the total decretal amount in the three suits was to be regarded as one decree and was therefore, beyond the pecuniary appellate jurisdiction of the District Judge, then an order for the return of the appeal to the appellants is to be made instead of the dismissal of the appeal."
3. As a result of the above observations the revision petition was accepted and it was directed that the appeal be reheard and a fresh decision given on merits of the case.
4. As directed, the learned District Judge reheard the appeal and found that it was competent even though three decrees drawn up separately had been assaked therein. He placed reliance for this view on a judgment reported as PLD 1957 (W.P.) Peshawar 129. With regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction he held that the aggregate decrial amount would he regarded as the valuation and so computed the valuation would exceed the pecuniary limit up to which he was competent to hear an appeal. And on this view he directed that the appeal be returned. He did not advert to the question of consolidation of the subject-matter of the suits, ignoring the direction given in that behalf. Hence this revision petition.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that if a single appeal be held to be competent against three or more decrees, then the decretal amounts for purposes of pecuniary jurisdiction will not have to be combined, each decree will continue to stand as an independent entity and the amount decreed therein will be regarded as that of an independent decree. In other words, the contention of the learned counsel was that once the appeal was found to have been competently filed, even though there were three or more decrees impugned wherein, the value of the appeal for pecuniary jurisdiction would be the same as in the plaint in the suit, and if the value he less than fifty thousand rupees the appeal would lie to the District Judge, as laid down under section 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance 1962. Since the value in each case was less than the said amount the appeal before the District Judge was competent and could be heard and disposed of by him.
6. It is correct that each suit as instituted was for an amount of less than Rs,25,000, but the judgment was passed only in one case. This was done after consolidating the three cases. An order to this effect stands recorded on each of the three cases separately on 19-2-1987. By the said order, with Suit No,101/1 were the other two cases consolidated. The order recorded on File No,101/1 reads as hereunder:- FILE NO.101/1.
19-2-1987 Presence as before.
' Since there are other Two (2) File No,102/1 and 103/1 of the similar nature, having one single agreement and the parties too are the same. All the three Files are consolidated. This would be the main file consolidated. Issues framed. Arguments heard. To come up for orders on 25-2-1987.
7. On the other two files similar orders were briefly recorded and the same reads as under:- FILE NO.102/1.
19-2-1987 Presence as before.
' This file is consolidated with the main File No,101/1 as the agreement is one and the parties are the same. To come up with the main file for orders on 25-2-1987.
FILE NO.103/1.
19-2-1987 Presence as before.
' This file is consolidated with the main File No,101/1 as the agreement is one and the parties are the same. To come up with the main file for orders on 25-2-1987.
8. As a result of the above orders, the three cases stood consolidated and the judgment accordingly was passed in one of them, namely, Suit No,101/1 whereas short orders decreeing the claims in the other suits were recorded, referring to the detailed judgment placed on File No,101/1.
Thus, clearly after having consolidated the cases the judgment was recorded in one case, referring to the other cases which also stood decreed on the basis of it. It was apparently one judgment that was passed and only one appeal against the same could be preferred. In filing one appeal, therefore, no mistake was committed, copies of the decree sheets formally drawn up in the other cases, having been filed. The authority of PLD 1957 (W.P.) Pesh. 129 is also to the same effect.
9. The question now is if as a result of consolidation of the suits the claims therein also stood merged or continued to remain independent as in the suits. A look at the judgment of the trial Court indicates that the claims too were regarded as combined and decreed accordingly. The total amount of the decree worked out to Rs,73,890 and for the same the plaintiff was directed to pay the court fee. As such, this amount will be the amount to be taken as the value for the appeal.
The course adopted by the Court in amalgamating the cases was not intended to extend favour to the plaintiff but for the sake of its own convenience to be able to write only one judgment. In a way, it can be said, the plaintiff also stood favoured on account of this exercise because independently considered two of the three cases might have been hit by the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2, C.P.C.
10. Now on the basis of a single judgment, will it be open to assert that three independent decrees have been passed. I understand that as a result of merger of the suits the subject-matter stood also merged and value of the same for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction as also of the court- fee will be the same as emerged on amalgamation of the subject-matter, i,e, Rs,73,890. This amount accordingly was rightly taken as the value of the appeal for pecuniary jurisdiction by the Court of learned District Judge. The appeal under section 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 was preferable only to the High Court. The petitioners having taken it to the Court of District Judge had erred and it deserved to be returned to them.
' In this view of the matter, I uphold the order of learned District Judge whereby he directed return of the appeal and reject the revision petition. No order as to costs.