' FAZAL KARIM, J.--This is a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution; by it, Ch. Muhammad Aslam, petitioner, seeks to have it declared that the proceedings of vote of no-confidence held on 18-9- 1989 are without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
' The petitioner, Ch.Muhammad Aslam, was Chairman Union Council Sandh Wala Tehsil and District Sialkot. On 10-9-1989, the Assistant Commissioner received a written requisition signed by 15 members requiring the convening of a special meeting of the local council to consider the motion of no-confidence against the petitioner. By an order of the same date, the Assistant Commissioner directed that the special meeting should be convened at 10.00 A.M. On 18-9-1989; the meeting, he further ordered, would be presided over by Mr. Liaqat AN, Magistrate 1st Class. A formal notice of the meeting was served upon the petitioner on 15-9-1989. But before that date, i.e, on 13-9-1989, the petitioner, it appears, had moved the Assistant Commissioner with a request for the change of the Presiding Officer. That request was accepted and Mr. Khalid Majeed Pirzada EAC was nominated to preside over the meeting by the Assistant Commissioner's order dated 14-9-1989. It appears further that the Presiding Officer could not reach the place of meeting till 11.00 A.M. However, at 10.30 A.M., the petitioner "suspended" the meeting saying that the Presiding Officer had not reached. The meeting was actually held at 11.00 A.M., was attended by 14 out of 21 members and the no- confidence motion was carried. The petitioner or his supporters did not participate in the proceedings of the meeting.
3. It should be mentioned here that in the minutes of the meeting, the Presiding Officer very properly mentioned the reason for his late arrival; it was that his official jeep had broken down entailing the delay of one hour. The verity of this fact remains uncontroverted.
4. The only ground pressed upon us by the petitioner's counsel was that as the Presiding Officer had not reached at the appointed time viz. 10.00 A.M. No meeting was convened and that the proceedings held at 11.00 A.M. Had no effect in law, for the petitioner had no notice of them. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent, Malik Muhammad Aslam, on the other hand argued that merely because the meeting could not be held at the stipulated time did not have the effect of rendering its proceedings illegal. For his contention, he referred to Haji Muhammad Riaz v. Assistant Commissioner (1986 SCM R 197). That was also a case challenging the proceedings of a meeting in which no-confidence motion against the petitioner before the Supreme Court was passed. There, the special meeting was to be held on 1-3- 1981 at 11.00 A.M. And the contention of the petitioner was that he and his supporters had gone to attend the meeting at the appointed time but as no meeting had then taken place, they had left the premises. The meeting was actually held at 3.00 P.M., at which the members present passed the motion of no-confidence, and the contention there, as here, was that no valid meeting had taken place. The contention was dismissed by the High Court; in dismissing the contention, it was noticed that out of nine members, six had voted for the motion; that it was recorded in the minutes that the petitioner and another member had remained present outside the meeting place and had not participated in the proceedings and that it could not, in the circumstances of the case, be said that the "holding of meeting after the stipulated time had caused any prejudice to the petitioner" and that "it rather appears that the petitioner did not have the requisite backing so as to face the vote of no-confidence motion".
5. Now the meeting was convened and the motion of no-confidence against the petitioner was carried under the Punjab Local Council (Vote of No-confidence against Chairman and Vice- Chairman) Rules, 1980 (hereinafter to be called the Rules). These rules make various provisions requiring things to be done in a particular manner or form, but none of them expressly declares what shall be consequences of non-compliance; and it can be taken as well-settled by authority that they are merely directory (or permissive) and not mandatory (or imperative) and that their non-compliance does not annul the proceedings if no prejudice is caused. (See Allah Bachaya Khan v. Controlling Authority 1969 SCM R 127).
6. The general rule as stated in Maxwell, interpretation of Statutes, cited with approval in Zain Noorani v. Secretary of the National Assembly of Pakistan (PLD 1957 Supreme Court (Pak.) 46 at p.
62) is that "where the prescriptions of statute relate to the performance of a public duty and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty without promoting the essential aims of the legislature, such prescriptions seem to be generally understood as mere instructions for the guidance of the Government or those on whom the duty is imposed, or, in other words, as directory only. The neglect of them may be penal, indeed, but it does not affect the validity of the act done in disregard of them. It has often been held, for instance, when an Act ordered a thing to be done by a public body or public officer and appointed the specific time when it was to be done, that the Act was directory only and might be complied with after the prescribed time". The rule directly in point is to be found stated in the Statutory Construction by Crawford at pp. 535, 536 as follows: "As a general rule, a statute which specifies a time for the performance of an official duty will be construed as directory, so far as the time for performance is concerned, especially where the statute fixes the time simply for convenience or orderly procedure Where a statute imposes upon a public officer the duty of performing some act relating to the interests of the public, and fixes a time for the doing of such act, the requirement as to time is to be regarded as directory, and not as a limitation of the exercise of the power, unless it contains negative words, denying the exercise of the power after the time named, or unless from the character of the act to be performed, the manner of its performance, or its effect upon public interest or private rights, it must be presumed that the legislature had in contemplation that the act had better not be performed at all than be performed at any other time than that named."
7. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in such cases, time cannot be regarded to be of the essence of the official act of convening the meeting and that c failure to convene the meeting timeously, that is, exactly at the appointed time, would not produce the result of vitiating the proceedings. The illogicality of the contrary view can be easily demonstrated. As was pointed by the learned counsel for the contesting respondent, supposing the Presiding Officer had reached and had convened the meeting, not at 11.00 A.M. But at 10.05 A.M. Could it be urged with any amount of plausibility that the proceedings were void. Plainly, the answer has to be in the negative, for, to quote from a well-known passage of Lord Reid in Haughton v. Smith (1975) AC 476; 500), the law may sometimes be an ass, but it cannot be so asinine as that. The correct view, we conceive, is that if for any unavoidable reason, the meeting cannot be convened at the appointed time, it may be convened within a reasonable time of the appointed hour. At the D end of the day, the real question will be whether the failure to convene the meeting timeously has resulted in any prejudice to the petitioner. (See Haji Muhammad Riaz v. A.C--1986 SCM R 197).
8. Indeed, as to what is reasonable time will turn on the particular facts of each case.
9. Returning to the facts of this case, all that was said on the question of prejudice was that the petitioner was denied the opportunity to explain his position and "to submit his explanation verbally or in writing to the members". That has probably reference to rule 5, sub-rule (4) of the Rules, which provides that the Chairman or Vice-Chairman against whom a motion of no-confidence has been moved "shall have the right to offer a personal explanation either verbally or in writing and where a written explanation is offered, it shall be circulated amongst the members and shall form the proceedings of the meeting". Sub-rule (4) must be read in the context of rule 5 as a whole. That rule provides for the motion of no-confidence at the meeting to be convened under rule 3. It follows inexorably, therefore, that the opportunity to offer a personal explanation verbally or in writing can be availed of by the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman at the meeting. Here, as the petitioner did not participate in the meeting, he could not avail himself of that opportunity. As seen above, the Presiding Officer could not reach to preside over the meeting at 10-00 a.m. Because his official jeep had broken down. Instead of waiting for the arrival of the Presiding Officer, and facing the no- confidence motion, the petitioner assumed the authority to "suspend" the meeting at 10-30 a.m.
Undoubtedly, he had authority neither to convene the meeting nor to postpone or suspend it. The least that he could do was to wait for the Presiding Officer for a reasonable time as the majority of the members had. In the circumstances of the case, we do not think that an hour was an unreasonable time; it is not the case of the petitioner that he had contacted the Presiding Officer or had any other reason to think that the Presiding Officer would not come that day to preside over the meeting within a reasonable time. We, therefore, strongly feel that the expedient of "suspending" the meeting cannot avail the petitioner; to countenance it would, in our view, amount to permitting the petitioner to take advantage of his own wrong.
10. The majority of the voters had voted against the petitioner at the meeting. Those who had so voted against him are present in Court even today to support their no-confidence against the petitioner. This, in our view, also disentitles the petitioner to the exercise of this Court's discretion in his favour.
11. For these reasons, we see no merit in the petition and dismiss it with costs.