TUFAIL ALI A. RAHMAN, C. J.-The deceased Mst. Soomri was the wife of prosecution witness Gajjan with whom she was living at the time of her murder in Kandhkot town. The prosecution witness Ghulam Haider who is an old man of about 70 and retired from active life also lived in the same town but his house was separated from that of the deceased by one other house. On the 31st of January 1970 at a little past mid-day the witness Ghulam Haider was sitting with his daughter in her house when the appellant Karamullah came to that house and requested that Mst. Soomri accompany him since his own daughter Mst. Hazooran was ailing. It does not clearly transpire on the record whether the appellant was related to Mst. Soomri but they certainly belonged to the same case and other relationships are involved, which I shall presently state and which make it likely that the appellant was related to the deceased and her father. Certainly the manner in which the witness Ghulam Haider speaks of this request, which was not made the subject-matter of cross-examination or comment in the trial Court, would seem to indicate that there was some connection for otherwise it would be an extremely unusual request for a total stranger to come and ask that a married woman, aged about 40 should go away with him upon such a pretext.
2. What happened between the time of the deceased leaving with Karamullah and her killing, we do not know, but at about 3-30 p.m. Prosecu--petition witness Abdul Sattar going from his house to his shop passed by the house of Sultan Sabzoi. There he found the appellant dragging a woman (who was the deceased) from the courtyard of that house with a knife in his hand. Obviously lie was going to kill her and in fact gave her an injury on the neck while the witness was still there.
Feeling unable alone to rescue the woman from the appellant who was armed, the witness ran back to his houses and caked his two brothers, prosecution witnesses Ghulam Rasool and Ghulam Hussain, arid came back to the scene. By that time, however, the appellant had finished killing the woman whom he half wounded so severely in the neck that the trunk was attached to the neck by only a fragment of skin. Her ears in which were nineteen valis he had completely severed from the head. The appellant asked the three brothers to leave him alone as he said he had some private scores to settle with the deceased woman, who, he informed them; was named lust. Soomri wife of Gajjan, Soomro by case. One or two other people from the neighbourhood also crime up and the facts were given to them but they are not witnesses in the case. The witnesses and these others then overpowered the appellant and tied him with his own turban to take him to the police station.
On the way to the police station the appellant is alleged to have taken out the ears of the woman from the pocket of his coat and threw them on tie ground. Abdul Sattar, however, picked up these cars and along with the appellant produced them before the S. H. O., Kindhkot at the Kaadhkot Police Station which is about half a mile from the scene. He lodged an F. I. R. There and the time of the lodging of the report as indicated on it is 4-00 p m.
3. The S. H. O. Who is P. W. 9 Inayatullah, searched the person of the appellant and from the pocket of his coat recovered the blood-stained knife. All the clothes of the appellant were also blood- stained and these, viz. Shirt, shalwar, coat, sacks, turban and an Ajrak, besides his shoes were also secured and a mashirnama prepared. The S. H.O. Then went to the scene of offence where he recorded the statements among others of Gajjan and Ghulam Haider, husband and father of the deceased and the two brothers of the first informant, namely, Ghulam Rasool and Ghulam Hussain.
The place where the ears had been thrown by the appellant was also noticed by the S. H. O. Who prepared a mashirnama of that fact. Subsequently the statements of witnesses were recorded under section 164, Cr. Y. C. Nothing else of any consequence would appear to have been done in the course of the investi--gation and the appellant- was duly sent up to Court and committed to the Court of Session. The learned Additional Sessions Judge who tried him found him guilty of an offence under section 302, P. P. C. And sentenced him to death. Against this conviction and sentence the appellant has appealed and the proceedings are also before us for confirmation of the death sentence.
4. The sole ocular testimony in the case was that of the first informant and his two brothers. There was the evidence besides of Ghulam Haider as to the appellant taping away the woman earlier in the day and the circum--stantial evidence of the recovery of the knife and the clothes worn by the appellant all of which articles have been found by the chemical analyser to be stained with human blood.
5. In order to appreciate some of the contentions that have been put forward in this case on behalf of the defence it is necessary to state a little of the history of the woman, Mst. Soomri. She was originally married to one Hashim and about 15 or 16 years before the incident the was declared kari with one Kamal who is a cousin of the appellant. Hashim therefore, divorced her and she then married prosecution witness Gajjan, who is a cousin of the appellant. As I have stated before, it seems likely that the appellant is also related but it is not expressly stated anywhere on the record.
6. The appellant's case was one of complete denial. He even denied having been arrested as and when the evidence alleges that he was. In the Court of Session he does not state when and where he was arrested but in the course Of his statement under section 342, Cr. P. C. Before the committing Magistrate he had stated that he was arrested from his own otak in the evening and he therefore, stated that he would give further details in the Court of Session but in that Court tic made no reference to the circumstances of his arrest at all beyond denying the prosecution case.
He denied any recovery of a knife or clothes from his person.
7. The evidence of three eye-witnesses was accepted by the learned Judge, and I see no reason, whatever, to disagree with his assessment of their evidence and in fact should have myself come to the conclusion that they were thoroughly to be relied upon, They are Punjabis, not in any manner connected with either party by any relationship or course of friendship or even hostility. They were natural witnesses living very near the scene; the house of Sultan Sabzoi is separated from the house of the first informant by one intervening house. The first informant has a shop in the same town and he states that be normally goes to the shop at 7-00 a.m. Returning to his house at about 2-00 p.m. For lunch and then going back to the shop at 3-30 p.m. His passing by the scene was, therefore, natural. The criticism levelled by learned counsel who appeared for the accused in the trial Court that his own conduct was dishonourable inasmuch as he did not attempt to rescue the woman is not, I think, justified. He was after all facing a man armed with a knife and determined to kill and he could hardly expect to intervene with success or at least without considerable danger to himself. Help was available very close by, that is, from his two brothers who were sitting in their own house. In these circumstances, therefore, his not attempting to rescue the woman does not appear to me to be a circumstance which would reflect upon his credibility. Even if his conduct be regarded as dishonourable it is after all to be remembered that it is not the witness's honour which is on trial and that his conduct is relevant in the present context only on the question of his credibility.
8. Learned counsel who appeared before us on behalf of the appellant, however, criticised his evidence and that of his brothers as highly interested. It is difficult to see in what this interest lay. It is true of course that the three witnesses were brothers inter se which would make them at most interested in one another but that would hardly constitute interest in the deceased and much less interest against the appellant.
9. The appellant himself in the course of his statement alleged that the woman was of bad character and that she was on terms of illicit intimacy with Abdul Sattar and that, therefore, the opportunity had been seized upon by Abdul Sattar and his brothers, to implicate the appellant who had expressed disapproval of the illicit relationship. There is, however, no evidence at all of any such intimacy or even of the general bad character of the woman. No such question was ever put in cross-examination to Abdul Sattar or even to either of his brothers or to any other witnesses. The sole foundation for learned counsel's suggestion, if it can be called a foundation, is a question put to P. W. Ghulam Rasool suggesting that Abdul Sattar had told him, the witness, that the appellant had seen him (Abdul Sattar) intimate with the woman and had, therefore, killed her. Now in the first place the witness denied this and, whether he denied it or not, it would still be inadmissible inasmuch as Abdul Sattar himself was asked no such question and the witness's own answer could be admissible only as corrobo--rating or contradicting what Abdul Sat tar stated. In the second place the allegation in itself is highly improbable. It is difficult indeed to believe that Abdul Sattar would be carrying on an intrigue with a woman, who incidentally is at least ten years older than himself, in the house of a total stranger in a town and leave the door open for any body to come in and catch him in the act. In truth there is really nothing on the record, what--ever, which inclines me even to regard this allegation as a probability. The accused himself never suggested it; his case was one of denial. His reference in his own statement to the first informant's illicit relations with the deceased was not in context of having caught them in the act but as a motive for their false implication of him. Of course this statement by itself naturally raises the question as to who killed the deceased. But, if the evidence against the appellant was not otherwise satisfactory, it is certainly no part of the accused's duty to explain how the deceased came to be killed.
10. Assuming, however, for the sake of argument that the evidence of the witness was of a character which needed corroboration there was in fact in this case ample corroboration. This is not a case in which there was any question of an exaggeration in the number of the culprits, the sole person accused being the appellant only. He was arrested on the spot literally red---handed and taken to the police station. All his clothes were profusely blood--stained and a blood-stained knife was recovered from him immediately after the occurrence. There was in this case, therefore, corroboration of the strongest kind, indeed such corroboration as by itself would come very near complete proof of his guilt.
11. To these circumstances might be added the fact that the evidence of Ghulam Haider discloses that a little before the time of the murder the appellant came and on a pretext took the deceased away. This evidence has not been challenged and, even if the evidence of the eye-witnesses were to be eliminated, there would remain yet the evidence that the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the appellant and that only a short period of time before her killing. The appellant was arrested on the spot with the freshly killed body of the deceased lying there and wearing heavily blood--stained clothes.
12. Despite a most anxious consideration therefore, of the evidence I see no room for any doubt, whatever, that it was the appellant who killed the deceased.
13. In the trial Court it seems that learned counsel for the defence did not really question the participation of the appellant in the crime, but raised a question of grave and sudden provocation.
For this, however, there was not an Iota of evidence. It is true of course that it is not necessary for the appellant to lead defence evidence to establish such a plea and, if it can be made out upon the prosecution evidence itself, he would be entitled to the benefit thereof. Even if upon the whole case there be a doubt on this point that doubt would have to be resolved in favour of the appellant.
But in the present case there was nothing, whatever, from which it can be at all inferred that circumstances existed which would make Exception 1 to section 300, P. P. C. Applicable. Indeed it was not even the appellant's own case, who throughout, denied any connection with the crime. It is clear from the judgment and the notes of the argument in the trial Court that this plea was advanced very faintly and not with any seriousness.
14. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the appellant's conviction under section 302, P. P.
C. Was entirely justified. There remain the question of sentence. On this point again in the trial Court the argument was apparently advanced that the appellant being a relation of the woman was provoked, even though not suddenly, by reason of her own bad character. But again there was no evidence, whatever, on the record to show that she was a woman of bad character. It as true that she had been declared 'kari' but that was about 15 or 16 years ago and there is nothing on the record which would show whether she was justly declared 'kari' or not. Her husband divorced her and she married Gajjan and it is difficult to understand that, if this was the basis for the appellant's doubt in her character, how a long period of 15 or 16 years would have elapsed since the marriage with--out any exhibition of the appellant's doubts. Even his conduct on the day itself in coming to ask that she attend his sick daughter is hardly compatible with such a suspicion. If, however, the basis for the appellant thinking her to be a woman of bad character is not this previous declaration of a. 'kari' there is nothing whatever on the record, excepting the statement of the appellant to which I have referred and which is made in the context of showing a motive for Abdul Sattar to implicate him falsely, which goes to show her bad character.
15 It is true that prosecution have not shown any motive for this murder. It is well settled, however, that the absence of motive, or rather to put it more accurately, the absence of knowledge or proof as to what --the motive was, will not matter, if, upon the evidence the guilt of the accused is established beyond reasonable doubt.
16. Apart from the, argument that has been addressed to us by the appellant. I have examined the record of this case carefully to see whether there was any circumstance which would justify the imposition of a sentence less than death which is the normal sentence for murder and I can find none. On the contrary the attack was a particularly savage one, a number of blows being inflicted upon the neck of the deceased so severely as almost to cut off the head from the body. Besides this the ears of the woman were completely cut away which might suggest that the motive of the murder was robbery. I do not, however, so hold because the woman was wearing gold bangles on each arm and silver laris at her ankles which were not removed. Possibly of course they were not removed because the appellant had no time but it would be dangerous to speculate on this. In any case the cutting of the ears, if not motivated by a desire to commit robbery, was an added and gratuitous atrocity. I have, therefore come to the conclusion that death was the only possible sentence that could be awarded in this case.
17. I would therefore, dismiss this appeal, maintain the conviction under section 302, P. P. C. And confirm the death sentence.
FAKHRUDDIN G. EBRAHIM, J.--I agree.