ABDUL QADEER CHAUDHRY, J.---Leave to appeal was granted to consider whether the High Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction could disturb the order of the Appellate Tribunal.
2. The facts, in brief, are that on 2-3-1982, the respondent was dismissed from service as a result of enquiry held against him in which he was found to be guilty of misconduct. The respondent preferred a departmental appeal against the order of the dismissal. He was offered fresh appointment with certain conditions contained in letter dated 10-5-1983. The respondent filed a Constitution petition seeking declaration that the order of his dismissal from service was without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
3. The High Court refused to exercise its discretion in favour of the respondent. However, by its order dated 7-12-1983 it was observed that if the respondent had an alternate remedy he may avail of it.
On 4-1-1984 the respondent filed a grievance petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance in the Punjab Labour Court, Rawalpindi. The Punjab Labour Court dismissed the petition on 18-6-1984 as barred by time. The respondent filed an appeal which was accepted on 16-8-1984 by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. The case was remanded to the Labour Court for decision on merits. On remand, the parties produced their evidence and the Labour Court by means of order, dated 23-10-1984 accepted the grievance petition and ordered the reinstatement of the respondent with hack benefits. The appellant filed an appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. The appeal was accepted on 15-1-1983 on the ground that the respondent was not a workman under the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The respondent then filed a writ petition in the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench. The High Court on 9-4-1985 accepted the writ petition and declared the order of the Tribunal to be illegal. The appellant challenged the order of the High Court in this Court. This Court partly accepted the petition and remanded the case to the Labour Appellate Tribunal for decision on merits. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that out of 9 charges only 5 were proved against the respondent No,l. The appeal was partly accepted and the respondent No,1 was disallowed hack benefits. The respondent No,1 filed a petition seeking declaration that denying him the back benefits was illegal. The appellant also filed a Constitution petition on 31-10-1987 challenging the legality of the order dated 23-12-1985 of the Tribunal with regard to the re-instatement of the respondent No,l. The High Court by means of order dated 1-11- 1987 dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant on the ground of delay. However, by judgment, dated 27-2-1988, the learned High Court partly accepted the writ petition of the respondent No,1 and the case was remanded to the Tribunal to give fresh decision on the question of hack benefits.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that a finding of fact cannot be disturbed by the High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction. In order to appreciate the contention, it is necessary to refer to the judgments of the Tribunal and the High Court on this point. The Labour Appellate Tribunal in its judgment observed as follows:-- "Since out of nine charges the respondent admitted only five the remaining remained unproved. If the Enquiry Officer had found the respondent guilty of five charges only, possibility cannot be excluded that the employer may have prescribed some other kind of punishment short of dismissal. So 1981 PLC 984 applies to the case and the order of dismissal could not be maintained and was rightly set aside by the learned lower Court although on different grounds. It appears that the employer afterwards realised that in the circumstances of the case the punishment of dismissal was excessive so offered to re-employ the respondent. Since some charges were proved on account of the admission of the respondent, the latter succeeded on a technical ground and thus he was not entitled to back benefits."
5. In view of the above finding, the respondent No,1 was disallowed back benefits. The High Court has disbelieved the finding of fact recorded by the Labour Appellate Tribunal and observed as hereunder:- "A finding was thus recorded by the Enquiry Officer that the petitioner was negligent in not reporting the false transactions made by the Manager to the higher authorities. It appears that the same view was ultimately taken by the higher authorities in the bank when they disposed of the petitioner's appeal. Their conclusion after thorough examination of the case, as noted hereinabove, was that the petitioner was negligent in the performance of this duties in so far as he did not report to the embezzlement in the branch to the higher authorities and as such he could not be completely absolved of his responsibilities. It was presumably on account of this view that fresh appointment was offered to the petitioner. If the departmental authorities had really believed that the petitioner was guilty of some of the charges, they would not have offered him a fresh appointment as an officer in the bank. Learned Appellate Tribunal has not given any consideration to these vital aspects of the matter which were quite relevant and he proceeded to record the impugned finding that some of the charges were proved against the petitioner on account of his admission simply on the basis that he had admitted his signatures on some of the documents.
Learned Appellate Tribunal has not specifically or with reasons controverted the stand of the petitioner that he in good faith signed the documents prepared by the Manager not doubting his integrity. In the circumstances, the learned Appellate Tribunal was in error, if I may say so with respect, in assuming that the petitioner had admitted some of the charges just because he admitted having signed some documents in good faith and then proceeded to withhold the hack benefits on this assumption."
6. The learned counsel has taken exception to the under-mentioned opinion of the learned High Court:-- "... Yet since the Tribunal adjudged the petitioner's dismissal to be wrongful and consequently set it aside, petitioner was clearly entitled by way of consequential relief to the salary for the period during which he remained out of service as a result of the order of dismissal. It may be noted that the petitioner was all along challenging the legality of his dismissal which means that he was throughout willing and ready to render service to his employer."
7. The above observation of the High Court is against the record because the Labour Appellate Tribunal has clearly stated that the respondent No,1 had admitted five charges, therefore, there was no basis for recording such observations. The High Court has set aside the finding of fact and it has entered into realm of facts. The Labour Appellate Tribunal has appraised the evidence. It was within the domain of the Tribunal but the High Court itself took the appraisal of evidence and travelled beyond its allotted sphere. The finding of fact was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court. It is not the case of no evidence. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to Utility Stores Corpn. Of Pak. Ltd. v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal PLD 1987 SC 447.
8. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court dated 27-2-1988 is set aside and that of the Labour Appellate Tribunal is restored. There would be no order as to costs.
9. The precedents cited by the learned counsel for the respondent, namely, Niaz Ali v. Punjab Urban Transport Authority PLD 1983 Lah. 661, and Dilkusha Enterprises Ltd. v. Abdul Rashid 1985 SCMR 1882 are not attracted in the present case.