' AJMAL MIAN, C.J.--This petition is directed against the Cancellation order of the lease/allotment, dated 16-11-1980, of plot of land bearing No,52, survey sheet No,C.F.1/5, measuring 2,600 square yards or thereabout, situated in Clifton Quarters, Karachi (hereinafter referred to as the plot).
2. The relevant facts, as per averments in the petition, are that respondent No,1, in April 1950, granted 99 years lease to one Muhammad Ghulam Qadir on payment of the full occupancy value amount in to Rs,65,000. Upon receipt of the payment, he was put into possession. He sold the plot on or about 1-10-1953 to one Haji Muhammad Ishaquc. The name of the said purchaser Haji Muhammad Ishaque was mutated in the City Survey Record. Upon his death, the names of his next-of-kind were duly mutated in the record of rights maintained by the City Deputy Collector, Karachi, namely, Javcd Ishaque and others, The aforesaid next-of-kind sold and conveyed the plot to Sheikh Ishtiaq and Sheikh Afaq through a registered sale-deed dated 28-2-1978. Thereupon, the names of the purchasers were mutated in the City Survey Record. After that, aforesaid Shcikh Ishtiaq and Sheikh Afaq sold and conveyed the plot to the petitioners for a sum of Rs,6,32,000 under a registered sale-deed dated 19-7-1980. It may be observed that before the execution of the aforesaid sale-deed, the petitioners through public notices published in daily English newspaper 'DAWN'. On 14-4-1978 and 21-5-1978 and daily Urdu newspaper `JANG' on 1S-4-1978 and 14-5-1978 invited objections to the above then proposed sale. Since no objections were received, the above sale transaction was finalized and in pursuance whereof the aforesaid sale-deed was registered on 19-7-1980. The petitioners informed respondent No,1 about the aforesaid purchase through their letter dated 24-5-1980 and forwarded a photo stat copy of the sale-deed.
' It may be pertinent to observe that adjacent plot of land bearing No,20, measuring 2,400 square yards, of which lease was granted for 99 years by the KMC in favour of one Thawardas Rat an hand prior to the partition of India, was also eventually purchased by the petitioners and, therefore, they had become the purchasers of the two plots which were situated adjacent to each other. It appears that the Director of Parks and Recreation of respondent No,1, by his letter dated 11-10-1973, informed Javcd Ishaq that the land lying in front of Mohatta Palace owned by him was lying unutilized, with the result that it was covered with shrubs and haphazard and wild growth of trees and that the plots were utilized by the various people for dumping of refuse and grazing of goats. It was also staled that the KMC desired to clear the plots of The objectionable wild growth so that the locality should look clear and be kept clean. The addressee was also assured that his ownership occupation right of the said land would not be affected in any way. After that, the Director of Parks and Recreation of KMC, by his letter dated 13-3-1979 informed said Javed Ishaq that the KMC had no objection to retaking possession of the plot as it had abandoned the maintenance w.e.f, 12-3- 1979. It may be pointed-out that the petitioners had purchased the plot after the KMC's Director Parks and Recreation aforesaid letter dated 13-3-1979.
3. It may also be stated that the Mayor of respondent No,1, by order dated 15-10-1980, directed the Director Land and Estate to cancel the lease and resume the plot. In pursuance whereof, the Director Land and Estate of the KMC issued his letter dated 16-11-1980 under Rule 13(3) of the Land Sales Rules, 1929 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) for the cancellation of the lease on the ground that the construction on the plot was not completed within three years, Against the above cancellation order, the petitioners filed an appeal under Section 108 of the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance), but the above appeal was dismissed by respondent No,2, by an order dated nil received by the petitioners through respondent No,2's letter dated 4-11-1981, in which inter alia it was held that aforesaid Muhammad Ghulam Qadir had no title in the plot and the transferees did not consequently get any title. The petitioners, being aggrieved by the above order, had filed the above petition on 1-2-1982.
4. It may also be pertinent to mention that the Mayor of the KMC through the Commissioner of Karachi initiated proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring adjacent plot hearing No,20 for public purpose, namely, public park, reference of which has been made hereinabove. The above acquisition proceedings have been challenged through Constitutional Petition No,D-1/1984.
The latter petition and the above petition were fixed for hearing of the arguments together, but we intend to dispose of the same by two separate judgments, as different points of law arc involved.
5. In support of the above petition, Mr. Naseem A. Faruqui, learned counsel for the petitioners, has urged as follows:--
(i) That rule 13 of the Rules was not applicable to the instant case and, therefore, the impugned action is without jurisdiction.
(ii) That under the Rules, Director Land was competent to cancel the lease of the plot and not the Mayor who had in fact directed the Director Land to take the above action.
(iii) That under Section 114 of the Ordinance, the petitioners were entitled to a notice which was not admittedly served and, therefore, the action was without jurisdiction.
(iv) That since the KMC had not taken action for cancellation of the lease for a period of nearly 30 years on the ground of non-construction, it was not open to the KMC to cancel the lease on the above ground after the petitioners had paid a sum of Rs,6,32,000 as sale consideration.
6. On the other hand, Mr.Ghulam Hussain Abbasi, learned counsel appearing for respondent No,1, whose arguments were adopted by Mr. Abdul Hafeez Lakho, learned Advocate-General, Sindh, appearing for respondent No,2, has submitted as under:-
(i) That the petitioners did not acquire any right in the plot, as admittedly no lease deed for 99 years was executed by the KMC in favour of Muhammad Ghulam Qadir and, therefore, the latter was not competent to pass any title to his successor,
(ii) That the petitioners are seeking the enforcement of contractual right and, therefore, writ is not competent.
(iii) That rule 13 of the Rules was applicable to the instant case.
(iv) That the petitioners were not entitled to any notice under section 114 of the Ordinance.
7. That it may be pertinent to take up the first two contentions of Mr. Ghulam Hussain Abbasi, learned counsel for respondent No,1. Mr. Ghulam Hussain Abbasi, in support of his first submission that the petitioners did not acquire any right in the plot, as admittedly no lease deed for 99 years was executed by the K.M.C. In favour of Muhammad Ghulam Qadir and, therefore, the latter was not competent.To pass on any title to his successors, it may be observed that in furtherance of his above submission, he has relied upon section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and section 49 of the Registration Act. He has also referred to the following books and the cases:-
(i) Paragraph (4) from the Commentaries on Transfer of Property Act, section 105, in. AIR Publication, Volume 1, III Edition at page 1606.
(ii) The case of Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam and 2 others reported in PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 104.
(iii) Abdullah Bhai and others v. Ahmad Din reported in PLD 1964 SC 106.
(iv) The case of Gulab Singh v. Nanaji reported in AIR 1929 Nagpur 13(1).
(v) The case of E.M. Joseph and others v. Samsunder and others reported in AIR 1929 Rangoon 164.
(vi) The case of Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co., reported in AIR 1919 Privy Council 79 at page 80.
' In the above passage of AIR Commentaries, there is a discourse on the question what is an agreement to grant lease, and it has been observed that a lease under section 105 is a transfer of an interest in immovable property and hence, there must be a present demise to constitute a lease and whereas, a mere agreement to grant a lease in future will not be a lease. Whereas, in the above case reported in PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 104, it has been held that an allottee of an evacuee property does not acquire the status of a tenant as to attract the provisions of Sindh Rent Restriction Act 1947. In the above second case of the Hon'blc Supreme Court reported in PLD 1964 SC 106, the distinction between a lease and a licence has been highlighted by B.Z. KAIKAUS, J. In the above Nagpur case, it has been held that a tenancy cannot be created by implication, whereas, in the aforesaid Rangoon case, the Court ordered the grant of lease by the defendant on the basis of letters and not on the basis of oral agreement. In the above Privy Council's case of 1919, while construing section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, it has been held that the phrase "agreement for a lease" must relate to some document that creates a present and immediate interest in the land and that an agreement that upon the happening of a contingent event at a date which is indeterminate and might he far distant, a lease would be granted does not satisfy the meaning of "agreement for a lease".
8. On the other hand, Mr. Naseem A. Faruqui, learned counsel for the petitioners, has invited our attention to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the petition and paragraph 2 of respondent No, l's comments to contend that respondent No,1, KMC, has admitted the factum that Muhammad Ghulam Qadir was granted 99 years lease. It may be pertinent to reproduce the above paragraphs No, 2 and 3 of the petition and paragraph 2 of the respondent No,1's comments, which read as follows:-- Writ petition. "2. That the said Plot in April 1950 was granted on 99 years Lease by the Respondent No,1 (ICMC), to one Muhammad Ghulam Qadir on payment of the full occupancy value amounting to Rs,65000 and actual physical possession of the plot was given to him.
3. That the said Muhammad Ghulam Qadir remained in possession of the said Plot till 1-10-1953 when he in exercise of his absolute right sold and conveyed the same to one Haji Muhammad Ishaq whose name was mutated in the City Survey Records."
Comments. "2. That paras 1 and 2 of the petition are not denied."
' Mr. Naseem Farqui's contention that factually respondent No,1 has admitted the factum that Muhammad Ghulam Qadir was granted 99 years lease and that he had absolute right to sell and convey the plot to Haji Muhammad Ishaq has been admitted in their comments seems to be correct. However, Mr. Ghulam Hussain Abbasi, learned counsel for the respondent No,1, submitted that a wrong admission can be resided. In support of his above submission, he has referred to the case of Pakistan Development Corporation Ltd. v. The Bank of Bahawalpur Ltd., reported in PLD 1960 (W.P.) Karachi 885, in which a learned Single Judge of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan at Karachi, while construing section 31 of the Evidence Act, held that admissions according to the above section are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted and that it is always open to a person who has made an admission to show that he had done so under some mistake, misapprehension or miscalculation. It has been further held that an admission unless coupled with other facts which might constitute an estoppel, cannot form the foundation of a right. It will suffice to observe that though in the comments, respondent No,1 has made the above admission but no subsequent document in the form of supplementary comments or affidavit has been filed by them to resale from the above admission. In our view, it is not necessary to go into the above controversy, as for the purpose of deciding the above petition it is not required to adjudicate upon the question whether Muhammad Ghulam Qadir had factually acquired 99 years lease or not without the execution of a registered lease deed. However, it cannot be denied that he had paid full occupancy value amounting to Rs,65,000 to the KMC and was put into possession of the plot. He had, therefore, acquired some right and interest in the plot which was transferable. It was not the case of respondent No,1 even upto the stage of cancellation of the lease that Mohammad Ghulam Qadir had not acquired 99 years lease or that he had no interest in the plot. On the contrary, the cancellation notice is based on the assumption that Muhammad Ghulam Qadir had acquired rights in the plot. Admittedly, the petitioners had paid a sum of Rs, 6,32,000 as a sale consideration for the plot after public notices published on four different dates in daily English newspaper 'DAWN' and daily Urdu newspaper `TANG' to which no objection was raised by respondent No,1 or by anyone else. In our view, the petitioners have some interest in the plot as to entitle them to file the above petition. It may be observed that in order to maintain a Constitutional petition, a petitioner need not possess a legal right in strict sense but if we can show that he A has some personal interest in the subject-matter, he can maintain a petition. In this behalf, reference may be made to the well-known Supreme Court case, namely, Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore and another reported in PLD 1969 SC 223, in which the petitioner had impugned the modification of a development scheme by the Lahore Improvement Trust, one of the objections to the petition raised by the learned counsel for the Trust was that the petitioner had no right to maintain a writ petition. In that context, the Hon'ble Supremf Court has held that a petitioner need not necessarily have a right in the strict juristic sense but it is enough if the petitioner discloses that he had a personal interest in the performance of the legal duty which if not B performed or performed in a manner not permitted by law would result in the loss of some personal benefit or advantage or the curtailment of a privilege or liberty or franchise.
9. As regards the second submission of Mr. Ghulam Hussain Abbasi learned counsel for respondent No,1, that the petitioners are seeking the enforcement of contractual right and, therefore, writ is not competent, it may be observed that in furtherance of his above submission, he has referred to the case of Messrs Momin Motor Company v. The Regional' Transport Authority, Dice and others reported in PLD 1962 SC 108, in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court while commenting upon the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that his client had contractual rights to have stage carriage permits for a particular route, observed as follows:-- "Learned counsel then attempted to argue that his client had contractual rights, because he had been made to spend a lot of money on making the road bus-worthy and the understanding was that no other permit-holder would be introduced in this route. The short answer to this contention is that contractual rights, if any, are not enforceable by recourse to writ jurisdiction."
' Mr. Ghulam Hussain Abbasi, has also referred to the following passage from the Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies by Forrest G. Ferris and Forrest G. Ferris, Junior, Paragraph 195 at page 229 and paragraph 281 at pages 351 and 352, which read as under:-- "195. Contract Rights.--The duties enforceable by mandamus, although not necessarily public duties are those imposed by law. Mandamus will not lie therefore to enforce a right founded purely on private contract, however clear that right may be."
"281-282. Corporate Contracts: 281. In General.-It is well-settled that duties imposed on corporations, not by virtue of express provision of law or character, or necessarily arising from the nature of the privileges or obligations conferred, but arising out of private contractual relations involving no question of public trust or duty, will not be enforced by mandamus, either against the trustees or the corporation. The aggrieved party is left to his ordinary remedies, either at law or equity. This is necessarily so, for mandamus is limited to the enforcement of obligations imposed by law; and for the further reason that the writ cannot be substituted for a decree of specific performance in equity."
10. On the other hand, Mr. Nasim A. Faruqui, has submitted that since the respondent No,1 had granted the lease in exercise of statutory power and also cancelled the lease under statutory rules illegally, the petitioners are not enforcing any contractual right but they are seeking declaration that respondent No,1 has exercised statutory power of cancellation of the lease illegally. In support of his above submission, he has referred to the following cases:--
(i) Anjuman-e-Ahmadiya, Sargodha v. The Deputy Commissioner, Sargodha and another reported in PLD 1966 SC 639.
(ii) The Majlis-i-Intizamia, famia Masjid, Ghulam Muhammad Abad Colony, Lyallpur v; The Secretary to Government of West Pakistan, Communication and Works Department, Lahore reported in PLD 1975 SC 355.
(iii) Haji Noor Muhammad and others v. Karachi Development Authority and 2 others reported in PLD 1975 Karachi 373.
(iv) Pakistan Medical Association, Karachi v. Government of Sindh and 5 others, reported in 1979 CLC 382.
' In the first case, the action of cancellation of the grant of the land in favour of the appellant was impugned through a Constitutional petition which was dismissed by a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan, in limine on the ground that another adequate remedy in the form of a civil suit existed. Upon appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the same and held that a valid grant can be cancelled only in accordance with the provisions of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912, and conditions of grant and that the arbitrary cancellation of grant can be impugned through a Constitutional petition. In the second case the facts were that the lease in favour of the appellant Anjuman was cancelled after its execution, writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the High Court. Upon appeal, the same was allowed by the Supreme Court. It was held by the Supreme Court that since the cancellation of the lease was not in terms of the lease deed, it was without lawful authority and, therefore, a writ was competent. In the, third case, a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Sindh and Balochistan, to which the Hon'ble present Chief Justice of Pakistan was a party, has held that cancellation of an allotment of a plot in a Housing Scheme framed by the KDA could be impugned through a Constitutional petition and that an allottee is not merely a licensee or sub-licensee but, has a right in rem in respect of plot allotted to him. In the fourth case, a Division Bench of this Court in which one of us (Ajmal Mian, Ci.) was a party, while repelling the contention that a writ was not competent against the cancellation of an allotment of a plot by the KDA, held that the case was not one of simple agreement but one of performance of statutory obligations and functions and susceptible to exercise of writ jurisdiction.
11. We are inclined to hold that by now it is a well-settled principle of law that if a Government functionary in exercise of some statutory power acts in violation of the relevant law or the rules or acts arbitrarily or acts mala fidely, a writ would be competent notwithstanding that the impugned action relates to cancellation of an allotment or a lease of a plot or any other property. In the instant case, admittedly the impugned action has been taken in exercise of statutory power under rule 13(2) of the Rules. The grievance of the petitioners is that the above statutory rule has been wrongly invoked. In our view, a writ will be competent to examine the above question. It is not a matter of enforcement of a contract, as contended by the learned counsel for respondent No,1.
12. Adverting to Mr. Nasim Faruqui's contention that rule 13 of the Rules was not applicable to the instant case and, therefore, the impugned action is without jurisdiction, it may be observed that he has referred to the relevant chapter of the Rules which is given in the caption "Rule for the Management and Disposal of waste lands within the Municipal limits of Karachi". The sanction for framing of the rules was given by the Commissioner of Sindh by Memorandum No, 4082/G, dated 14th October, 1929. It has been contended by him that since the rule relates to waste land and not to the plot situated in a developed area, the above rule 13 has been wrongly pressed into service.
He has further submitted that the relevant rule applicable is Rule 20 of the Sindh People's Local Council (Land) Rules, 1975, which provides for the recovery of non-utilization fee in case of non- construction within the stipulated period and not cancellation of the lease. The above contention seems to be devoid of any force as the lease was granted to Muhammad Abdul Qadir under the rules which includes Building sites as per Chapter 5 of the rules and not under the Sindh People's Local Council (Land) Rules, 1975. The rules have not been repealed but on the contrary under section 120 of the Ordinance inter alia all the rules and the bye-laws etc., have been saved.
13. As regards the petitioners' counsel's second submission that under the Rules, Director Land was competent to cancel the lease of the plot and not the Mayor who had in fact directed the Director Land to take the above action, it may be observed that he has referred to the Cancellation order dated 16-11-1980 addressed to Shaikh Ishtiaq, by the Director Land and Estate KMC, copy of which was endorsed to the Mayor of City Karachi with reference to his orders dated 18-10-1980. It has, therefore, been submitted that the Director Land and Estate has not applied his mind independently to the facts of the present case but acted at the direction of the Mayor. In this regard, it may be observed that from the documents on record of the present petition and the connected petition No,D-1/1984, it is evident that the Mayor had decided to construct a public park on the plot and the adjacent plot bearing No,20, and, therefore, he ordered the cancellation of the lease of the plot and initiation of the land acquisition proceedings of the adjacent plot. It is, therefore, evident that the Director Land in fact had not initiated the proceedings for the cancellation of the lease/allotment of the plot. However, we may observe that the rules do not refer to the Director Lands or the Mayor but have referred to the Standing Committee.
14. Reverting to Mr. Nasim Faruqui's contention that under section 114 of the Ordinance, the petitioners were entitled to a notice which was not admittedly served and, therefore, the action was without jurisdiction, it may be observed that in furtherance of his above submission, he has referred to the above section 114 which provides that, "where anything is required to be done or not to be done by any person under this Ordinance or the rules or by-laws, a notice shall be served on the person concerned specifying the time within which the requirement shall be complied with". It has, therefore, been submitted that the petitioners were entitled to a notice for the completion of the construction of the building on the plot before impugned action could have been taken. Leaving apart the question, whether the above section 114 of the Ordinance can be pressed into service in the instant case, in our view the facts of the case warranted the service of a notice upon the petitioners calling upon them to complete the construction of the plot within a reasonable time. In this regard, it may be pertinent to point-out that it is an admitted position that the plot was granted to Mohammad Ghulam Qadir in the year 1950, no action was taken against him or against his successors for the non-completion of the construction of the building within the period permissible under the rules during long period of 30 years, The plot was sold thrice. In the instant case, as observed hereinabove, before making payment of Rs, 6,32,000, the petitioners gave public notice in 1978, four times, and invited objections but no one objected to the transaction. We are inclined to hold that if a Government functionary or a corporate body does not take action for the non-completion of building within the period allowed, within reasonable time after the expiry of the permissible period and if a third person acquires the plot/property for valuable consideration, the Government functionary/corporate body cannot cancel the lease/allotment on the ground of non- completion after expiry of 20 or 30 years but in case it wishes to get the compliance of the relevant rule after the expiry of reasonable period, the least which is expected is to serve a notice calling upon the party concerned to comply with the requirement of the rule. In this behalf reference may also be made to. Section 114-A of the Act, which reads as follows:- "114-A.' Relief against forfeiture in certain other cases.--Where a lease of immovable property has determined by forfeiture for a breach of an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter, no suit for ejectment shall lie unless and until the lessor has served on the lessee a notice in writing-
(a) specifying the particular breach complained of; and
(b) if the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the lessee to remedy the breach and the lessee fails, within a reasonable time from the date of the service of the notice, to remedy the breach, if it is capable of remedy.
' Nothing in this section shall apply to an express condition against the assigning under-letting, parting with the possession or disposing of the property leased, or to an express condition relating to forfeiture in case of non-payment of rent.
' In our view, even if we were not to examine the controversy whether Muhammad Ghulam Qadir had acquired lease of 99 years or not, in our view, the principle enacted in the above section on all fours will be applicable to the present case, keeping in view the facts referred to hereinabove.
15. Reverting to the last submission of Mr. Nasim A. Faruqui that since the KMC had not taken action for cancellation of the lease for a period of nearly 30 years on the ground of non-construction, it was not open to the KMC to cancel the lease on the above ground after the petitioners had paid a sum of Rs,6,32,000 as sale consideration, it may be observed that we have already held hereinabove that even if the KMC wanted the enforcement of Rule 13 after the expiry of nearly 30 years, it should have served a notice upon the petitioners before taking action of cancellation. It may again be pointed out that the action has been taken for cancellation after the expiry of 30 years as the Mayor of the KMC decided to use the plot with the adjacent plot for the construction of a Park, the cancellation has, therefore, been not made because of the fact that the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest or the petitioners had committed the breach of rule 13 but for obvious reason to get the plot for utilization of the same for the park.
16. It was also contended by Mr. Ghulam Hussain Abbasi, learned counsel for respondent No,1, that in the instant case none of the five well-known writs, namely, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus can be, granted. He has laid particular emphasis on the writ of mandamus in order to contend that a writ of mandamus can be granted when there is failure to perform a legal duty by a Government functionary and not when there is no such failure, the reliance has been placed by him on paragraph 110 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume H, at page 52 and the case of Hindu General Panchayat (Regd.) v. Government of Province of Sind and 21 others, reported in 1984 CLC 503, in which a Division Bench of this Court while dismissing the petition filed by the petitioner Panchayat for a direction to the Government to remove the encroachment from its land enunciated the following principles as to the grant of writ of mandamus.
' A writ of mandamus may be invoked to compel reasonable exercise of official discretion.
(ii) A writ or order of mandamus is a direction to any natural person, corporation or inferior Court requiring them to do some specific thing appertaining to the office or duty.
(iii) The object of writ of mandamus is to enforce a plain, positive, specific and ministerial duty presently existing and imposed by law upon officers,
(iv) A writ of mandamus is issued when there is no other adequate and specific legal remedy and without which there would be failure of justice.
(v) The person claiming a writ of mandamus should show that he has a clear legal right to the performance of duty by the respondent against whom writ of mandamus is sought.
(vi) If a writ of mandamus is claimed against a public office, the duty must be such, which is clearly defined, imposed and enjoined by law as a duty resulting from public office.
(vii) A writ of mandamus cannot be issued to enforce a contractual right.
(viii) Though under the relevant Article of the Constitution of Pakistan, the power of judicial review of administrative actions conferred on the High Courts is to be exercised by issuing direction or order without using their technical names like mandamus, certiorari etc. But this power is akin to the high prerogative writs known by their technical names in England."
In our view, the question of issuing of a writ of mandamus is not involved in the instant case, as we are not going to issue a writ of mandamus. If the impugned action is not warranted by law, a declaration under Article 199 of the Constitution can be given and the respondent can also be prohibited from acting upon the above impugned order. The language of suh-para (ii) of clause
(a) of sub-Article (1) of Article 199 is very clear, which empowers the High Court to declare that any act done or proceeding taken within its territorial jurisdiction by a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority has been done or taken without lawful authority and is of no legal effect.
17. We would, therefore, allow the above petition and declare the impugned order as being without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The respondents are restrained from acting upon the same.
18. The petition stands disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs.