The appeal captioned above challenges the decision dated 11-2-1989 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 4, Faisalabad, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant for his reinstatement in service has been dismissed.
2. The ground on which the services of the appellant were terminated is absence for more than ten days as is evident from the dismissal order dated 28-8-1975 Exh. R-4. Notice was issued to the appellant by publication in the newspaper asking him to appear on or before 28-8-1975 and to give reply to the charge-sheet, otherwise he would be proceeded against ex parte. It was published in the newspaper on 22-8-1975. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that 28th was the 7th day, therefore, on the said date services of the appellant could not be terminated. The argument has no force. Firstly, the order passed on 28-8-1975 was not of termination from service under paragraph 236 of the First Wage Commission Award but an order of dismissal and secondly, the provisions of paragraph 236 of the said Award are that the notice shall require the employee to report for duty on or before the date specified therein which shall not be less than seven days. In the notice the appellant was asked to appear on 28-8-1975. The notice was issued on 22nd which means that 28th was the 7th day. Since the provision is that the employee be called upon to report for duty on or before the date specified and the period should not be less than seven days, it is apparent that the notice was legal. The word is not 'after' but is 'on'. Since the notice was of seven days, therefore, the appellant had to appear on 28th. Since he did not appear, action could have been taken if it be said that it could be issued under paragraph 236.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the charge-sheet, notice under paragraph 236 of the First Wage Commission. Award were not issued on the permanent address and since for this defect they did not reach the appellant, he could not in compliance with the notice appear and report for duty. He argues that the appellant had not furnished any further or temporary address. He says that Exh. R-1 is not the original application of the appellant but a photostat and that the address given on it was not given by the appellant. The argument has no force. The notice was issued by post and published on the address given in Exh. R-1. On Exh. R-1 in the same handwriting the address of the appellant is given, therefore, it appears that the address was not forged by anybody for the respondents. If the contention of the appellant was that the address had not been given on his application, copy of which is Exh. R-1, he should have called the original application but he did not do so. Since the address given in Exh. R-1 was the latest and since the provision of paragraph 236 of the First Wage Commission Award is that on the latest address, notice is to be given, the notice Exh. R-6 was quite correct if it be held that it could be sent under paragraph 236 of the First Wage Commission Award. If the appellant had not furnished fresh address, of course, the respondents would have been guilty of not sending the correspondence on the correct address.
4. However, there is no evidence that the order of dismissal dated 28-8-1975 was conveyed to the appellant. No document in this respect has been produced. Neither there is any letter of intimation sent to the appellant by registered post, nor copy of any advertisement made in the newspaper with regard to the dismissal order had been produced. The period of limitation, therefore, did not start from 28-8-1975. The learned lower Court has observed that the appellant remained silent upto 1984, therefore, he was guilty of laches and that his grievance notice and the grievance petition were time-barred. Since the order of dismissal was not conveyed to him, he did not know that he had been removed from service, therefore. he did not challenge the order. The argument advanced by the learned Presiding Officer and the learned counsel for the respondents have no force, because service of dismissal order does not stand established.
5. The issuance of charge-sheet also does not stand proved. No doubt in Exh. R-6 it is mentioned that the appellant should give reply to the charge-sheet on 28-8-1975 but no letter or publication was produced to show that actually any charge-sheet was issued to the appellant. The other thing is that after charge-sheet is issued, some date of inquiry is to be given, of which the person/employee concerned is to be informed. According to Exh. R-6, reply to the charge-sheet was to be filed on 28-8-1975 but on the same day the order of dismissal was passed, which clearly shows that in reality no inquiry was held, nor any date of inquiry was fixed. This being so, it is clear that the appellant was not informed about the appointment of any Inquiry Officer and the date of holding of inquiry. Thus, it is clear that in reality no inquiry was held. On account of this defect the order of dismissal is not sustainable. Learned counsel for the respondents has argued that since the appellant did not appear after notice by publication was issued, the bank treated him as absconder and thus following of the procedure contained in sub-paras (4) and (5) of paragraph 258 of the First Wage Commission Award, was not necessary, vide sub-rule (6) clause (b). Firstly, no order has been produced whereby the appellant may have been declared as absconder and secondly, when a charge-sheet had been issued, although it was not proved to have been served upon the appellant, it was necessary to appoint Inquiry Officer and to hold inquiry.
6. So far as back benefits are concerned, the appellant is not entitled to the same, inasmuch as he did not urge in his statement that he remained jobless.
7. As a result, the appeal is accepted and setting aside the impugned decision of the learned lower Court and the order of dismissal dated 28-8-1975, the appellant is directed to be reinstated in service without back benefits.