1. ' The case of petitioner in this Constitutional petition is that since 1947 he is in possession of a piece of land bearing No,A-26/195, admeasuring 135' x 65', situated in Takri Colony, Bath Island, Karachi.
2. Such piece of land is stated to be located opposite Plots Nos.B/4 and B/8, Bath Island, Karachi, in Katchi Abadi, adjacent to the P.W.R. Boundary. The petitioner, allegedly, upon filling up of the land, constructed a Pacca house thereon and has been putting up in such house with his two sons and a brother-in-law. Takri Colony aforesaid is claimed to be a Katchi Abadi. However, a notice dated 9-4-1981, under M.L.O. 130 of 1980 (Removal of Encroachments Order, 1980), was served upon the petitioner at the instance of Gulshan-e-Faisal, Cooperative Housing Society, which society is said to be unlawfully claiming the disputed area. The petitioner was thereupon constrained to file Suit No,1608 of 1983 in the Court of the XVth Senior Civil Judge at Karachi praying for necessary declaration and permanent injunction. A copy of the plaint in such suit has been appended to the petition wherein Gulshan-e-Faisal Cooperative Society Ltd., the Commissioner of Karachi and Director Katchi Abadis are cited as co-defendants. Speaking briefly, the plaintiff-petitioner in the referred suit urged, in addition to what he has stated in this petition, thit having raised constructions on the disputed plot and putting up therein he was issued National Identity Card bearing No,510-23-210570 in the year 1977 and, also, was accorded electricity and telephone connections in the said premises in 1980 and 1983, respectively. However, petitioner's possession was not regularized on the ground that the land in question stood reserved by the Government. At any event, Takri Colony, according to the plaintiff-petitioner, stood declared as Katchi Abadi under the provisions of M.L.O.110 (Regularisation and Development of Katchi Abadis Order). Still notice dated 9-4-1981 was received by the petitioner on 18-4-1983 purportedly under M.L.O.130. The plaintiff-petitioner in such suit pleaded that he could be removed, if at all, under M.L.O. 110 and not under M.L.O. 130, as was sought to be done. Reverting to the present petition the petitioner maintains that, on an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. The defendants in the said suit were restrained from disturbing the petitioner's possession, as projected in such suit. However, on 7-1-1990 at 2-30 p.m. Some persons, claiming to be K.DA. Officials and accompanied by policemen, who were equipped with a bulldozer and other implements descended on the disputed plot and demolished and damaged parts of the structure standing thereon. On intercession by the neighbours such people had to withdraw, threatening to come back and carrying out further demolition. These persons included Ameerzada Kohati, Additional Director, Anti-Encroachment Cell, K.D.A. And S.H.O. Gul Rehman of K.D.A. Police alongwith a truck full of policemen plus a lady searcher. Mobile Police of Civil Lines Police Station was with them. Such contingent was also accompanied by Zia Muhammad Khatri, Executive Engineer in the Water and Sewerage Board, who is stated to be interested in the said plot, Aijazul Yakeen, General Secretary of Gulshan-e-Faisal Cooperative Society, and Aijaz Ali Khan, S.D.M. (South) Karachi, the last named claimed to be overseeing and supervising the operation. Relief against such action is sought on the ground that the land does not belong to respondent K.D.A. Which is acting in a mala fide manner at the behest of interested persons, without so much as even issuing a notice.
3. ' To start with, pre-admission notice was issued to the respondent. Subsequently, an order of status quo was passed in the petition. In response, respondent K.D.A. Has filed a counter-affidavit, through Ameerzada Kohati, Additional Director (Anti-Encroachment Cell). In such counter-affidavit, it is urged that the land in dispute has not been declared as Katchi Abadi nor has any notification to that effect been issued. Such land is stated to be belonging to Gulshan-e-Faisal Cooperative Housing Society Limited. Notice, as required under M.L.O. 130, is said to have been served on 9-4- 1981 and removal of the alleged encroachment was made thereafter, under the supervision of the S.D.M. Civil Lines. As regards Suit No,1608 of 1983, it is claimed that in relation to the interlocutory proceedings therein Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No,32 of 1985 was filed by the Gulshan-e-Faisal Cooperative Housing Society and, finally, the matter came upto this Court in Civil Revision No,89 of 1989, which was dismissed on 24-8-1989. Gulshan-e-Faisal Cooperative Housing Society is said to be a necessary party to these proceedings. In the meantime, Gulshan-e-Faisal Cooperative Housing Society also applied for being joined as a party to this Constitutional petition. In support, inter alia, it is urged that the petitioner was an encroacher of Plots Nos.98-B and 99-B of the intervenor society in respect whereof he was litigating since 1983 and has suppressed several orders in that behalf including those of this Court itself. From the copies of such orders, which have been brought on record by the intervenor society, it would appear that the orders of interim injunction granted in favour of the petitioner in Suit No,1608 of 1983 on 31-5-1984 were questioned in an application under Order 39, Rule 4, C.P.C. But that application having been disallowed, Gulshan- e-Faisal Cooperative Housing Society preferred Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No,32 of 1985, which was allowed on 31-7-1986 and the case was remanded for reconsideration, upon site inspection, if that was found to be desirable or necessary. Such inspection was made on 9-8-1988. On 12-1-1989, the IInd Senior Civil Judge, Karachi, disposed of the application under Order 39, Rule 4, C.P.C. In Suit No,1608 of 1983, observing that the stay granted to the petitioner-plaintiff shall not operate in respect of Plots Nos. 81-B to 99-B of the Gulshan-e-Faisal Cooperative Housing Society. Against such orders another Civil Miscellaneous Appeal namely C.MA. No,4 of 1989 seems to have been preferred, this time by the petitioner herein, but the same was dismissed on 21-3-1989. Assailing the appellate order, revisional jurisdiction of this Court was invoked through Civil Revision Application No,89 of 1989 but the same also was dismissed on 24-8-1989.
4. ' In reply to the application under Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. Filed by the Gulshan-e-Faisal Cooperative Society Ltd., the petitioner has submitted a counter-affidavit wherein, without denying the factum of the referred proceedings, he maintains that the question in this petition is not whether the disputed plot is or is not situated in a Katchi Abadi or whether it belongs or does not belong to the intervenor society but the sole question of consideration is whether respondent K.D.A. Is competent to demolish the disputed construction on the plot in question and whether it is acting lawfully in doing so.
5. Drawing upon the above factual recitals, it seems clear to us that the action of respondent K.DA., which has been questioned in this Constitutional petition, is directly relatable to the notice, dated 9-4-1981 under M.L.O. 130, alleged to have been served on the petitioner on 18-4-1983. Manifestly, proceedings assailing that notice were initiated in Suit No,1608 of 1983 and are still pending. If, therefore, any action, whether lawful or otherwise, having a clear nexus with such suit, was initiated or continued, by or at the behest of parties to that suit, such grievance, if any, should have been raised in that suit itself. If necessary or proper, respondent-K.DA. Could also have been impleaded in the suit. One of the salutary provisions enshrined in Order II, Rule 1, C.P.C. Is that a suit shall be so framed as to afford ground for final decision upon all the subjects in dispute and prevent further litigation concerning them. Rule 2 of the same Order explains that successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed to constitute but one cause of action. With a view to curtail the controversies a plaintiff, under Order II, Rule 3, C.P.C. May, in the same suit, unite several causes of action against the same defendant or defendants. Law, thus, does not countenance any unnecessary duplication of proceedings. Even when a fresh cause accrues, pendente lite, which could be part of the same transaction or series of transactions and relief may, conveniently, be sought in the pending litigation and parties can be confined to such proceedings, without doing any violence to procedural requirements, such eminently due process ought to be followed. In situations where a fresh action be called for or is found to be in order, a suit in the same or similar forum, where the earlier Lis is pending would be a more logical exercise of choice, if any. Like, principles, mutatis mutandis apply to Constitution petitions. Adherence to such rule ensures confinement of the Lis in the same proceedings or, where necessary, at least in the same or similar forum, thereby precluding inconsistency or even possible conflict in decisions.
6. Clearly, none of this was observed or followed and this petition was brought, without so much as impleaded even the Gulshan-e-Faisal Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. As a party herein. Such conduct has resulted in the intervenor society coming forward, applying for joinder in these proceedings and placing on record detailed facts which obviously, were necessary for recital on the part of the petitioner himself, in order to place the controversy, in its totality, C before this Court.
7. We do not approve this conduct. To say the least, it was obligatory for the petitioner to state all facts, albeit briefly, and implead all necessary or proper parties. In fact, from what has been stated in the petition itself, it is obvious that not merely the intervenor society but even a purported allottee of such society, claiming interest in the disputed land, was also necessary party to this petition, but was likewise, unaccountably, left out.
8. This, substantially, is a discretionary jurisdiction. Sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause (1) of Article 199, which visualise the various reliefs grantable in Constitutional jurisdiction, are predicated by the word 'may' in the opening part of such Article. The intention is to allow a degree of flexibility in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. The discretionary element in the exercise of such jurisdiction is, however, not the equivalent of arbitrariness or fancifulness. It is a judicial discretion, controlled by judicial norms, conditioned by centuries of conventions and precedents and is always to be exercised in aid of justice and never to perpetuate injustice. Those who approach this jurisdiction are expected to do so not otherwise than with clean hands. All relevant facts are required to be disclosed in making of the invocation. Nothing material is to be suppressed. Every person, who is a necessary party, must be 'impleaded. This Constitutional petition can, therefore, be dismissed on the short ground for not duly detailing material facts and, on account of an apparently studious evasion on the part of the petitioner to implead necessary or proper parties.
9. Relief cannot also be -granted in the petition because another equally efficacious remedy namely, a properly instituted suit is already pending in which suit any act of commission or omission on the part of any of the defendants therein or of any other person or persons acting on behalf of the defendants or in furtherance of the defendants objectives can easily be agitated. As it is, the case' of the petitioner is that an order of injunction is still operative in such suit in respect of that portion of the plot, which does not belong to the intervenor society. If a subsisting interim injunction is transgressed, as would appear to be implicitly urged here, recourse, to contempt proceedings, if relevant, can be made. There is also nothing to preclude the plaintiff-petitioner from seeking amplification of the interim orders in the pending suit or, so to say, what may tantamount to altogether fresh orders, provided such are duly and lawfully called for. If need be, even due amendments in the suit can be sought. Not only availability of an alternative adequate remedy but, in actual fact, pendency of one in a Court of competent jurisdiction bars this Constitutional petition, which must be dismissed on that score, as well.
10. Finally, we cannot fail to observe that, as claimed by the respondent K.DA., demolition work of the disputed portion has already been completed. The petitioner has failed to repudiate such assertion. If this be so, this petition is, additionally, liable to be dismissed, being in fructuous. In the remote alternative of such not being the case the petitioner, as observed above, would be free to seek relief in the above referred suit still acknowledged to the pending. With these observations, we dismiss this Constitutional petition and with it Civil Miscellaneous Appeals Nos.1059 of 1990 and 38 of 1990, both having served their respective purposes. Status quo earlier granted would stand vacated.