' The appellant was charged under section 302, P.P.C. And was awarded a sentence of seven years'
R.I. When the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the offence amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder and the appellant was found guilty of the offence under section 304, Part II, P.P.C.
2. The occurrence took place on 21-5-1975 at Peshiwela in Mohalla Paridabad near Ganda Talab, Bohar Gate Multan. According to the story of the prosecution, the appellant told the deceased that the deceased was suffering from T.B., as a result of which the deceased abused the appellant filthy language. The accused thereafter took out a Chhuri and gave a blow to the deceased on the left side of his chest. The appellant then ran away.
3. The appellant admitted to have caused the blow which resulted in the death of Ghulam Muhammad deceased. He, however, explained that he was gravely and suddenly provoked into attacking the deceased when the deceased gave him filthy abuses. The appellant said that he caused injuries with a pen-knife and had no intention to harm him as the two were friends. The learned trial. Court accepted the version of the appellant and convicted him under section 304, Part II, P.P.C.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the learned trial Judge has relied only on the statement of the appellant for basing his conviction under section 304 which cannot be sustained. I am afraid this is not correct. The prosecution has produced not only the eye-witnesses but has also led evidence to the recovery of Chhuri P.1. The eye-witnesses had admitted that the deceased had given filthy abuses to the appellant and it was probably on that account that the trial Court came to the conclusion that the appellant had lost power of self-control on account of grave and sudden provocation to him and thus held him guilty of a lesser charge than the one under section 302, P.P.C. I am afraid, there is no reason to interfere with the conviction.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant has strongly urged that this is a case in which sentence should be reduced. He has also argued that the learned trial Judge should not have awarded the sentence in this case to run consecutively with the sentence in another case which had also been tried by the same Court. The learned counsel has referred me to a number of judgments in which sentence of less than seven years has been awarded. The learned counsel has not been able to refer to any principle of law which may require reduction of sentence in this case. It is obvious that the quantum of sentence must have relationship with the quantum of criminality. In cases under section 304, Part II a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment has been provided for. The appellant has been awarded a lesser sentence of seven years. In the present case the appellant was provoked by filthy abuses. This was believed to be a sufficiently grave provocation in order that he was convicted under section 304, Part II. Whether such a provocation justifies a lesser sentence or not will depend on the facts of each case. The past relationship of the parties, the maturity of the persons involved, the gravity of provocation and the proportionate reaction will be relevant considerations. Matters of honour have received compassionate understanding from the Courts A but abuses even when they are as filthy as in the present case will not figure at the top of a scale listing offences to honor. The accused and the deceased are both young in age and have been friends. The deceased abused the appellant when he was called a T.B. Patient. All things considered, the sentence awarded to the appellant is appropriate.
6. 16 the other case in which the appellant was accused of murder, the appellant was awarded the sentence of death. The learned Sessions Judge has ordered that in case the sentence of death awarded in the other murder case was not confirmed and was altered to imprisonment the sentence in the present case will run consecutively with the other sentence. The learned counsel has also informed that the sentence of death in the other case was not confirmed and the appellant was ultimately awarded a sentence of five years under section 304, Part 1, P.P.C. It has been prayed that the sentence in the present case may be ordered to run concurrently with the other case as was normal practice in such cases.
7. The rule laid down in section 397, Cr.P.C. Is that a sentence is to commence on the expiration of a sentence to which a person has been sentenced previously, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. Consecutive sentences is, therefore, the general rule while concurrent sentences is only an exception. Depending on the particular circumstances of a case, concurrent sentences may be awarded wherein the two offences are akin and intimately connected with each other, but not where there is no connection between the two. In the present case the two offences are not connected. They took place at different times and two different persons were killed at two different places and there was no connection of any sort between the two. Under these circumstances the sentence in this case cannot be justifiably ordered to run concurrently with the sentence in the other case.
8. In view of the above discussion, none of the prayers made by the learned counsel for the appellant can be justified. The appeal is dismissed.