QAISER AHMED HAMIDI, J.--The question that has been raised in this Constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), relates to the interpretation of clause (2) of Article 212 of the Constitution.
2. Petitioner Abdul Aziz, a police constable was proceeded against under the provisions of Sindh Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1988, by Senior Superintendent of Police, Sukkur, the respondent No, 3, who awarded him penalty of removal from service vide order dated 17-4-1989.
The petitioner filed an appeal under rule 13 of the Sindh Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1988, before Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Sukkur, who converted the order of removal from service into compulsory retirement from service. A mercy petition was then filed before Inspector- General of Police, Sindh, Karachi, but without success. The petitioner has, therefore, approached this Court with the following prayer:- "(a) To declare the removal order dated 17-4-1989 passed by the respondent No, 3 as illegal, void, in violation of Sindh Police (E&D) Rules, 1988 and a nullity in the eyes of law, and subsequent orders passed by the respondents Nos, I and 2 are also illegal and void.
(b) That it may also be declared that the petitioner is entitled for reinstatement in service with full back benefits."
3. Article 212 of the Constitution provides as follows:- "212.(1) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, the appropriate Legislature may by Act (provide for the establishment of) one or more Administrative Courts or Tribunals to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in respect of-
(a) matters relating to the terms and conditions of persons (who are or have been) in the service of Pakistan, including disciplinary matters;
(b) matters relating to claims arising from tortious acts of Government, or any person in the service of Pakistan, or of any local or other authority empowered by law to levy any tax or cess and any servant of such authority acting in the discharge of his duties as such servant; or
(c) matters relating to the acquisition, administration and disposal of any property which is deemed to be enemy property under any law.
(2) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, where any Administrative Court or Tribunal is established under clause (1), no other Court shall grant an injunction, make any order or entertain any proceedings in respect of any matter to which the jurisdiction of such Administrative Court or Tribunal extends (and all proceedings in respect of any such matters which may be pending before such other Court immediately before the establishment of the Administrative Court or Tribunal (other than an appeal pending before the Supreme Court), shall abate on such establishment): Provided that the provisions of this clause shall not apply to an Administrative Court or Tribunal established under an Act of a Provincial Assembly unless, at the request of that Assembly made in the form of a resolution, Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) by law extends the provisions to such a Court or Tribunal.
(3) An appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment, decree, order or sentence of any Administrative Court or Tribunal shall lie only if the Supreme Court, being satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law of public importance, grants leave to appeal."
4. The prayer of the petitioner which we have reproduced above relates to a matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sindh Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of service matters has been ousted to the extent of the jurisdiction of Service Tribunal. The cases reported as Abdul Bari v. Government of Pakistan and 2 others PLD 1981 Karachi 290, Khalil- ur-Rehman and others v. Government of Pakistan and others PLD 1981 Karachi 750; Mian Amanul Mulk v. N.-W.F.P. through Chief Secretary PLD 1981 Pesh. 1 are leading judgments on this point: In the first cited authority a Full Bench of this Court held as follows:- The plain reading of clause (2) of Article 212 leaves no manner of doubt or ambiguity that the jurisdiction of the High Court would be ousted in regard to all such matters which fall within the ambit of the authority of the Tribunal to adjudicate, even though the Tribunal may be conferred with jurisdiction limited to some of the matters relating to the terms and conditions of service."
5. Under the previous Constitutions, the High Courts could interfere in service matters only where there was any violation or infringement of law. The Service Tribunals which are quasi-judicial bodies can go into the merits of the case and interfere with the discretion of departmental authorities. It was, therefore, necessary to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon such Tribunals."
Accustomed as we have been in our day to day administration of justice to the interpretation of numerous statutes, we are apt to lose sight of the fact that the Constitution is unlike most of the statutes that we came across and has to be judged from somewhat different standards. The Constitution is the very framework of the body policy: its life and soul; it is the fountainhead of all its authority, the mainspring of all its strength and power. The Executive, the Legislature, and the judiciary are all its creation, and derive their 'sustenance from it. It is unlike other statutes which can be at any time altered, modified or repealed. (Bindra's Interpretation of Statutes, 7th Edition).
Therefore, where the ouster of jurisdiction of High Court under clause (2) of Article 212 of the Constitution, being of Constitutional nature, it necessarily curtails its jurisdiction.
6. Again where the law provides a remedy by way of an appeal to a Special Trily mal fully competent to give the relief sought, any indulgence to the contrary by the High Court is bound to produce a sense of distrust to such Tribunal. If any authority is needed reliance may be placed upon the case of Messrs Shahid Agency v. The Collector of Customs (Appraisement) and another 1989 CLC 1938.
7. Mr. Manzar Alam, learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, contended that the superior Courts have always the powers to review the decisions of authorities when their findings are in violation of rules and the impugned order is void ab initio. He has placed reliance upon the cases reported as Pakistan v. Public-at-large PLD 1987 SC 304 and St. Jude's Secondary School and others v. Employees' Old Age Benefits Institution and another 1988 PLC 746. None of the above authorities has got any application to the facts of this case.
8. On the careful review of the case-law on this point, we are clearly of the view that it is now almost well-settled that the jurisdiction of the High Court is ousted in regard to all such matters which fall within the authority of Service Tribunal to adjudicate. The present petition is wholly misconceived, and is dismissed in limine. C.M.A. No, 265 of 1990 is also dismissed.