DECISION This is an appeal against an Award dated- the 26th of March 1974, passed by the Sind Labour Court No. II, under section 25-A of the industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance. The appellant Mr. Habib Ahmed Qureshi was employed by letter dated the 26th of December 1966, (Exh. R-3)as Assistant Manager (Stores P. M. T. F. Landhi) The learned Court held that the appellant was not a workman and therefore, not entitled to any relief under section 25-A of the Ordinance an3 dismissed his application.
2. Mr. Syed Hamid Ali, the learned Advocate for the appellant, contended in the first place that the provision of the law, which the learned Labour Court applied was not the law, at the tine when the services of the appellant were terminated. The services of the appellant were terminated on the 6th of April, 1972; by the Assistant Secretary for the Secretary. The definition of workman at the relevant time when appellant's services were terminated was that if a person did not fall within the category of an employer he was a workman. The appellant, on the basis of the evidence produced by him, cannot be said to have any power to appoint, dismiss or discharge any person. He, therefore, cannot be said to be not a workman.
3. Mr. Aftab Ahmed Alavi for the respondent took a preliminary objection that the application under section 25-A was not maintainable as the date when the cause of action arose to the appellant section 25-A was not there. It was introduced on the 13th of April 1972. There is not much force in this contention. It is true that section 25-A, when introduced on the 13th of April 1972, was not given any retrospective effect it was only prospective. In other words where the cause of- action continues a workman could make an application under section 25-A. In the present case, admittedly notice under Standing Order 18 was given which expired after section 25-A was introduced in the Ordinance and, therefore, the appellant had a cause of action under section 25- A. Mr. Alavi in this connection relied on a decision of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court reported in 1974 PLC 80. That case is distinguishable. In that case an application had been made under section 25-A before the cause of action arose. In the present case it is otherwise. In that case my Lord Dorab Patel, J., observed that fresh application should have been made after promulgation of section 25-A. In the present case, however, the application had already been made.
4. In the next place Mr. Aftab Ahmed AM contended that the applica--tion was beyond time as it was filed on the 30th of June 1972. I do not think so. Under section 25-A, a person aggrieved by an order of dismissal could make an application within three month of the cause of action. Sub-- clause (1) of section 25-A reads as under: "(1) A worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing, either himself or through his Shop Steward or Trade Union, within three months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises."
It is only after the expiry of the period of three months that a person could avail of his remedy in the Court of law under section 25-A. I would hold that the application was not beyond time.
5. On the 11th of July 1974, when I heard the learned representatives of the parties I announced the order and allowed the appeal. I was, however, under the mistaken belief that the Secretary had not acted under clause 10(i.e) of the order of appointment, While dictating the order, however, I read the order of termination of the services of the appellant and found that the Secretary had acted under clause 10(ill) of the appointment letter and, therefore, the same day, i.e. 11th of July 1974, issued notices to show cause as to why I should not review my order. The learned representatives appeared today in response of my notices. Mr. Syed Hamaid Ali, the learned representative for the appellant contended that I have no power to review my order, as the same must be conferred through statute. On the other hand Mr. Aftab Ahmed Alavi for the opposite-party contended that powers of review is an implied power. It is a power inherent in the Court, which passes the order in suitable cases. In the present case none of the parties representatives have read out the impugned order of 6th of April 1.974. I got' the impression that the secretary had not acted under Clause 10(i.e) of the Appointment Letter. Clause 10(i.e) of the Appointment Letter dated the 26th of December 1966 reads as under: "(10) During your services on regular basis your appointment will be terminable at any time (i.e) by 180 days' notice on either side without assigning any reason or by payment of 1.80 days' salary in lieu thereof or proportionate payment for the un expired period of notice."
It will appear from Clause 10(i.e) that all that was necessary was to make payment for 180 days in lieu of notice. That has been done. In this connection Mr. Syed Hamid Ali, however, contended that the Secretary has acted mala fide in passing the impugned order of terminating the services of the appellant. Whether an order is mala fide or bona fide is a question of fact. It would depend upon the evidence and circumstances of each case whether a person has acted mala fide or otherwise.
In the present case I find that the appellant has failed to establish that the Secretary has acted mala fide.
6. For the reasons given above I review my order dated the 11th of July 1974, and withdraw the same and dismiss the appeal. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.