' This revision petition arises out of an arbitration matter. The background of the dispute is that the respondent was awarded a contract by the petitioner for the construction of New Carriage-way between Lahore and Sheikhupura from mile No,I5 to 17, on 1st of June, 1973. It appears, however, that the dispute and differences arose between the parties during the execution of this contract. Clause 25(a) of the Contract provides for resolution of these disputes through arbitration.
2. On 22nd of May, 1976, the respondent invoked this arbitration clause by filing an application under sections 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 in the Civil Court at Lahore. On 20th of July, 1976, the trial Court referred the dispute between the parties to the arbitration of two Superintending Engineers namely Mr. Shafique Ahmad and Mr. Rauf Ahmed, who made their award on 3rd of December, 1985 and filed it in Court. The petitioner submitted its objections to the award on 4th of January, 1986. The respondent, however, pleaded that these objections were not within time. The trial Court on 7th of March, 1986 repelled the objection regarding limitation. This order was challenged by the respondent by filing a revision petition which was accepted by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore on 6-12-1987 and it was held by the Additional District Judge that the objection petition filed by the petitioner was barred by time.
3. After the decision of the Additional District Judge on the question of limitation, the trial Court proceeded to make the award rule of the Court after observing that the objections stand dismissed on 13th of March, 1988. The petitioner went in appeal against this order before the Additional District Judge, who, however, dismissed it on 20th of September, 1988. Hence this revision petition.
4. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that notwithstanding the rejection of the objections of the petitioner as being barred by time, the trial Court should have itself examined the award in order to see whether or not the same was valid, before making it rule of the Court. Mr. Riaz Karim Qureshi, Advocate, learned counsel for the respondent, however, contended that the Court was under no obligation to undertake this exercise and after the rejection of the objections there was no option with the trial Court but to accept the award and make it rule of the Court.
5. Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which is relevant for the determination of the present controversy reads as under:- "Judgment in terms of award:-Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award, the Court shall, after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with the award."
From the perusal of this provision, it is abundantly clear that the award is to be made rule of the Court only, "if the Court sees no reason to set aside it or to remit it".On a plain reading, this section casts a duty on the Court to satisfy itself that the award does not suffer from any patent illegality or defect necessitating either the setting aside or its remission, to the Arbitrator. Failure to file objections within the prescribed time does not absolve the Court of its responsibility to decide whether or not award was valid on the face of it. Of course, while undertaking this exercise the Court cannot hold a roving inquiry and take upon itself role of a party to fish out defects in an award. As already indicated the jurisdiction of the Court in the absence of any objections is limited to finding out if there is some patent illegality. The provisions of sections 15 and 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 should also to be kept in view while deciding the matter.
6. In Ashfaq Ali Qureshi v. Municipal Corporation Multan and another (1985 SCM R 597) it was observed by the Supreme Court that the Court cannot act blindly on an award and mere absence of objections would not altogether debar the Court from its responsibility of deciding whether the award was valid on the face of it. While making these observations, the provisions of section 16 and 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 were noticed by the Court. Similarly, while considering the import of the phrase "where the Court sees no cause to remit the award", it was observed by the Baluchistan High Court in Province of Baluchistan v. Messrs Tribal Friends Company Loralai (PLD 1986 Quetta 321) that it required to be independently interpreted and if any jurisdictional defect, lack of authority, excess of exercise of power or a material irregularity appears on the face of award, the Court cannot close its eyes to such defects or patent illegalities. It will be useful to refer the statement of law appearing in Russel on Arbitration (20th Edition) at page 395, which is as follows:- "The Court has further an inherent power to set aside the award which is bad on its face as not complying with the requirements of finality and certainty. The inherent power to set aside also extends to an award which exceeds the Arbitrator's jurisdiction."
' The decision of Dacca High Court in Abdul Khaleq v. Province of East Pakistan and another (PLD 1964 Dacca 166) also supports this view.
7. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, relied upon a decision of the Indian Supreme Court in Madan Lal (dead) by his legal representative v. Sundar Lal and another (AIR 1967 SC 1233) to canvass the proposition that in the absence of any objection, the Court cannot set aside, remit or modify the award suo motu. However, it is apparent from the perusal of this judgment that no view was expressed on that question but the Court proceeded on the assumption that such a power was available to the Court and went on to lay down that the power cannot be exercised to set aside an award on the grounds which fell under section 30 of the Act. As already observed, the jurisdiction of the Court, in the absence of any objections, is limited to finding out whether the award suffers from any patent illegality, apparent error or is in excess of authority or such like defect.
' The learned counsel next relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of Sind High Court in the case of Elite Builders and Developers (Private) Ltd. v. Abdul Majeed and others (1988 CLC 1872). This decision does not advance the case of the respondent nor does it lend any support to the contention being advanced by the learned counsel as it was observed by the Division Bench that the learned ' Single Judge in that case was justified to make the award rule of the Court in the absence of any objections to the award any patent illegality or defect on the face of it.
8. In the present case, it was on an application filed by the respondent under sections 8 & 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, tha the Court appointed the Arbitrators and referred the dispute to them. The nature of the disputes between the parties was specifically spelt' out in the said petition and it was categorically asserted in paragraph 16 thereof that the Arbitrators were required to decide the thre disputes enumerated therein. In these circumstances the jurisdiction B of the Arbitrators was limited to determining the disputes as mentioned in the application under sections 8 and 20 of the Act. The Arbitrators could not proceed to decide or determine any other dispute which would be beyond the scope of reference. In Qazi Mughal Baz v. The N.-W.F.P. Through the Provincial Govt.
Through Secretary P. W.D., Peshawar and 2 others (1987 CLC 50) it was observed that:- "....We are, therefore, of the view that the arbitration in this case was with the intervention of the Court in a pending suit which had been filed by the appellant for recovery from the respondents of the amount specified in the plaint. That being so, the authority of both the arbitrators to resolve the dispute extended to the claim and the amount which was specified in the plaint and not beyond that, and the decision made by the second Arbitrator awarding amount in excess of the suit amount, in so far as it related to that excess, was to be regarded as a decision without jurisdiction and beyond reference...."
' This principle also applies in the present case. The present award, however, prima facie, proceeds to grant claim other than those mentioned in the application under section 8 and 20 of the Act. The Trial Court while making the award rule of the Court did not advert to this aspect of the case. On the other hand, it acted mechanically without being aware of its jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act, 1940 and made the award rule of the Court only on the ground that the objections stood rejected by the revisional court on the ground of limitation. The Trial Court should have proceeded to examine the award to find out whether it was beyond the scope of reference or not and also to decide the allied questions as to whether the scope of the reference could be enlarged and the effect of the participation in the proceedings by the parties without any objection. In these circumstances, the impugned orders are not sustainable and the matter will have to be remanded to the Trial Court for its decision afresh.
' In view of what has been stated above, this revision petition is accepted, the orders of the two Courts below are set aside and the matter is remanded to the Trial Court for its decision afresh in accordance with law.
' Since the dispute arises out of arbitration matter and the parties are in litigation for the last about six years, the Trial Court shall dispose it of within two months. No order as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.