1. ' RAZA AHMAD KHAN, J.--By this Constitutional petition, the petitioners have called in question the order passed by the Labour Court, Peshawar, respondent No, 2, dated 15-6-1982 and judgment of the Labour Appellate Tribunal N.-W.F.P. Respondent No, 1, dated 27-9-1983, whereby the order of termination of service of respondent No, 3 was set aside and he was ordered to be re-instated with all back benefits and wages.
2. ' Brief facts giving rise to this petition are that respondent No, 3 has been in service of the petitioners since 1st December, 1952 as Execution Agent on a fixed salary of Rs,55 per month with commission at the rate of 10 percent of the recovery of amounts. He was dismissed by Assistant Registrar on 2-1-1971. He questioned this dismissal in a civil suit in which he succeeded vide the judgment of the Civil Court dated 20-9-1971. Appeal against the judgment was also dismissed. The services of respondent No, 3 were again terminated on 21-12-1973 which was again challenged in a civil suit but ended in failure vide the judgment of the Civil Court dated 29-9-1979. The appeal of respondent No, 3 was also dismissed on 13-12-1980. He filed a revision petition in the High Court which was dismissed as withdrawn on 10-2-1982.
3. ' On the following day i,e, 11-2-1982 a notice of grievance, as required under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance), was served on the petitioners against the termination order dated 21-12-1973 and later approached respondent No, 2 where he succeeded in striking down the order of his dismissal vide the order of the Labour Court dated 15-6-1982. The petitioners went in appeal to respondent No, 1 which met the same fate vide the judgment of the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 27-9-1983, now impugned in the instant writ petition.
4. ' Mr. J.D. Akbarji, Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioners assailed the impugned orders of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 on the grounds that section 25-A of the Ordinance postulates a scheme of things relating to redress of individual grievances in terms of acts to be performed thereunder and with reference to a time specified in relation thereto. He urged that accordingly the respondent No, 3 could serve his notice of grievance "within three months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises", within fifteen days of such notice a decision is to be communicated to the worker and if the worker is dissatisfied with such decision, the worker may take the matter to the Labour Court within a period of two months from the date of the communication of the aforesaid decision.
5. Thus,it was contended, that in all, a total period of five months and fifteen days was available to respondent No, 3 whereas he has taken more than eight years in resorting to an action as envisaged under section 25-A of the Ordinance. He, therefore, argued that respondent No, 2 could only exercise his jurisdiction under the Ordinance if the petition of respondent No, 3, filed before him on 2-3-1982, was in accord with, and within the limitation of the period prescribed under section 25-A of the Ordinance.
6. ' This ingenuity, per se, seems quite plausible but when we refer to another provision of the Ordinance as embodied in section 65-B, ibid, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners seems to be begging for the question. Section 65-B reads:- "Limitation.--The provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908), shall apply in computing the period within which an application is to be made, or any other thing is to be done, under this Ordinance."
7. ' It will thus be clear that the Ordinance itself provides the concession of condoning the time in excess of the period prescribed "within which an application is to be made or any other thing is to be done", under the Ordinance and section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 is made applicable to such a situation.
8. Now a reference to the impugned order of respondent No, 2 as well as the impugned judgment of respondent No, 1 would disclose that an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for the condonation of the delay has been made by respondent No, 3 with his application before respondent No, 2 on the ground that he was pursuing his remedy, in good faith, in the Civil Courts earlier and that the moment he came to know the correct forum for the redress of his grievance, he withdrew the proceedings from the High Court and filed the petition under section 25-A of the Ordinance. It will be pertinent to note that the petitioners did not contest the application for condonation of delay and they seemed to be contented by simply justifying their action of terminating the services of respondent No, 3 claiming it to be in accordance with the law. It is to be further noted that the learned Labour Court as well as the Labour Appellate Tribunal in their impugned orders have given careful consideration to the issue of condonation and have arrived at a concurrent conclusion, based on well-founded grounds, to the effect that the respondent No, 3 had pursued his litigation in Civil Courts in good faith and consequently the application for condonation of delay was accepted.
9. ' To condone the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 read with section 65-B of the Ordinance, in the circumstances of the case, is primarily a question of fact and, in the limited Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court, it can neither be agitated nor, in our considered opinion, can be examined as such, more particularly when on undisputed facts of the instant case we find that the grounds relied upon by both the learned lower forums are reasonably justifiable.
10. ' The learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the respondent No, 3 being the servant of Registrar, N.-W.F.P. Cooperative Societies, was a Civil Servant and not a worker within the ambit of the Ordinance and as such neither his application under section 25-A of the Ordinance was competent nor the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had the jurisdiction to pass the impugned order/judgment.
11. Irrespective of the merits of the question posed, the same can be repelled on a simple and short ground that this point has neither been raised before respondents Nos. 1 and 2 nor seems to have been taken explicitly in the grounds of this writ petition. In fact the learned counsel has attempted to make out absolutely a new case at this stage, which, we are afraid, he cannot be permitted to do so.
12. ' It may also be added that the question of jurisdiction, in general even, has never been raised before either of the lower forums, particularly before the Labour Appellate Tribunal which the petitioners themselves approached for seeking relief against the order of respondent No,
2. In this context of the matter, it does not lie now in their mouth to turn round and assert that the lower forum had no jurisdiction to entertain or decide the case of respondent No, 3; reason being that had they succeeded there, they would have no grievance of the alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in holding that a party approaching itself a Court, Tribunal or forum, in original, appellate or revisional jurisdiction cannot at any subsequent stage, raise the question of jurisdiction of such Court, Tribunal or forum.
13. ' At the bar we are also informed by the learned counsel for respondent No, 3, Qazi Muhammad Anwar, Advocate that the services of his client were terminated again sometime in 1984 by a fresh order which has not been questioned in any Court or Tribunal and he is no more in the service of the petitioners.
14. ' Taking all the foregoing factual and legal aspects of the case into consideration, we are of the view that this writ petition is misconceived and merits dismissal. We accordingly dismiss it with costs.