This is a petition for bail in a case of attempted murder. Learned counsel has tried to argue that the learned Additional Sessions Judge, while refusing bail, has not kept in view the principle that bail is not to be refused as a punishment. I does not agree with the learned counsel that the learned Judge, while using the word "grim", in fact refused bail as a punishment. What he probably meant was that there are strong circumstances which indicate that reasonable grounds exist to believe that the petitioner has committed the offence he is accused of.
2. When confronted with the above position, learned counsel is unable to satisfy me that the grounds do not exist. On the other hand, he has tried to argue on the basis of a judgment by me in another case Amir v. The State (1973 P Cr. L J 205) that if maximum sentence of transportation for life cannot be visualised as a possible sentence in a particular case (at the conclusion of the trial), the case would come out of the prohibition contained in subsection (1) of section 497, Cr. P. C. In fact, in that judgment I have followed some of the observations by their Lordships of the Supreme!
Court in an earlier ruling. The facts of that case are entirely different' from the present case. It cannot be visualised that in the circumstances of this case, if found guilty, the petitioner would be awarded a light punishment.
3. Learned counsel states that this observation might prejudice the mind of the learned trial Court.
In so far as these proceedings are concerned, the point having been urged by the learned counsel, in my view it is not proper not to deal with this point and if I deal with it, it is further not possible for me not to express my opinion.
4. It is, however, clarified that the opinions expressed in bail matters are always in the context of the arguments raised at "the bail stage" and are, in their very nature, not applicable or attracted to the decision stage of the case because at that stage the evidence having been recorded the case has to be decided on the basis of evidence and not on the basis of any opinions expressed in bail orders. They always remain tentative and not determinative in character. With these observations, I find no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed in limine.