This revision petition is directed against the judgments of both the learned trial Court as well as the Appellate Court whereby the suit and the appeal of the petitioners were dismissed vide their judgments dated 5-12-1988 and 12-1-1989 respectively.
2. The petitioners have invoked revisional jurisdiction of this Court to examine the propriety of the judgments. I have heard Mr. Mohammad Ayub Khattak, the learned counsel for the _petitioners at length and also perused the record placed along with the petition.
3. Both the learned lower Courts have arrived at a conclusion of dismissing the suit on the common ground that since no decree was passed before 31-7-1986, the suit would stand dismissed in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case Sardar Ali and others v. Muhammad Ali and others reported in PLD 1988 SC 287, as also in the case of Ghulam Qadir v. Nawab Din reported in PLD 1988 SC 701. The principle thus laid down has been reiterated in subsequent case of Mian Ghulam Ali v. Ali Nawaz Khan reported in 1989 SCM R 276.
3-A. The learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners contended that para. 4 of the plaint does indicate that the requirement of law of pre-emption, as it stands today, was complied with by the plaintiffs and they should have been given an opportunity to prove the same, and both the learned lower Courts have failed to apply their mind to this aspect of the case.
4. A reference to the record, however, reveals that the said paragraph 4 of the plaint is highly vague and no such plea has been taken either in the grounds of revision or before the learned Appellate Court and in fact the point raised on behalf of the petitioner before the lower forums was that the law laid down by the Supreme Court regarding '"TALABS" was not applicable to the pending cases.
5. Besides, the answer to the point raised by the learned counsel is also available in the decision given in the case of Ghulam Qadir v. Nawab Din reported in PLD 1988 SC 701 wherein it has been observed:- "In some cases which have come to our notice, the learned counsel tried to make out case for "Talabs" by relying on such phrases in the plaints, which were used to--be filed, under the old law, like so as to canvass that the plaintiff should be permitted to elaborate such assertions in the context of requirements of the Islamic Law. For obvious reasons such a position would be untenable."
6. Again unless `TALABS' are exercised in conformity with the modelity prescribed by the law and is in accordance with the Islamic Jurisprudence, no decree can be granted in favour of the plaintiff- pre-emptor. The decision in case A of Barkat Ali v. Khan Muhammad and another reported in 1988 SCM R 1800(1) lends support to the view, I have taken of the matter. In the said case it is held:-- "In this petition for special leave to appeal which arises out of a pre--emption suit, so far no decree has been passed in favour of the petitioner, who is. a pre-emptor. There is no assertion in the plaint that the "Talabs" were made in the mode accepted by Islamic Jurisprudence.That being so, no decree can now be passed in his favour".
7. I have given serious consideration to the submission made by the learned counsel and bearing in mind the law laid down in the above noted cases, the inescapable conclusion I have arrived at is that in cases instituted and not decided in favour of the pre-emptors by way of granting him decree before the date of 31st of July, 1986, no question of Islamic "TALABS" could arise inasmuch as the suits were instituted under the law which were hit by the judgments of the Supreme Court in cases of Said Kamal Shah PLD 1986 SC 360 and Sardar Ali PLD 1988 SC 287.
8. Resultantly, I find this revision petition bereft of any merits and dismiss it hereby in limine.