AWARD On 15-1-1971 the above named applicant filed the present application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, against the above---named respondents in this Court.
2. In his application the applicant submitted that he was employed as Chowkidar with the respondent in the year 1963. He always performed his duties well out he was forced to proceed on long leave. He returned after availing of his leave to resume work but was not permitted to do so.
Consequently he made a grievance to his employer. Hs also sought the assistance of the Department of Labour Welfare, Karachi and through the good offices of the Labour Officer (Conciliation) as agreement was arrived at between the applicant and the respondents in confirmity with the said agreement the applicant resumed duty on 4-4-1969 and was detailed to work at Adamjee House, Karachi. After ten days i.e. On or about 14-4-1969 he was reused entry/employment in the Bank. The applicant therefore trade representation to the Management of the Bank. Thereafter he approached the Directorate of Labour Welfare but he could not get his grievance redressed. He even approached the Martial Law Authorities. He contends that he nevi r resigned from his service on 18-12-1969 as alleged by the Bank Manage--ment. According to him he was neither given discharge nor termination letter. He was not given any opportunity to explain his case if there was any charge against him. His case is that the respondents had not followed the mandatory provisions of Standing Order 12 or 13. He, therefore, filed the present application with the prayer to re-instate him in service with full back benefits from 14-4-1969.
3. In their reply statement the respondents have challenged the maintainability of the present application. They contend that the applicant was neither a worker under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 nor a workman under section 2 (xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. They have also challenged the application to be highly belated and hence time---barred.
4. On the factual aspect the respondents submit that in December 1968 the applicant tendered his resignation which was accepted. He was paid salary for December 1968, bonus declared in December 1968 and one month salary in lieu of privilege leave accrued to him. In March 1969 he approached the respondents for re-employment but the respondents expressed their inability to do so. Being an Ex-Army Personnel he filed various applications with the Martial Law Authorities at Karachi and Rawalpindi. The Labour Welfare Directorate on his petition heard the matter and an understanding dated 3-4-1969 was reached. The applicant withdrew his petition and subsequently did not approach the respon--dents as he had failed to obtain a recommendation from Capt. A.
Haque, the recruiting agent of the Bank. The applicant had collected all his dues. The only amount that remained payable was his Provident Fund dues of Rs. 219.70, which he had failed to collect.
They have denied that the applicant had resumed his work on 4-4-1969 at Adamjee House. Finally they submit that the application has been finally heard by the Martial Law Authorities on 4-1-1971 in presence of the parties and the same was filed and no action was taken on it. They, therefore, prayed that the application be dismissed.
5. The parties have led evidence in this Court. Applicant Ghulam Abbas has filed his affidavit in support of his case. He has been cross---examined by the learned Representative for the respondents.
6. Mr. Athar Hameed, Assistant Vice President (Personnel) of the respondents has filed his affidavit in support of the Management. He has been cross-examined by the learned Representative for the applicant.
7. The respondents have filed their written arguments while oral arguments have been made on behalf of the applicant.
8. I have considered all aspects of the case in light of the evidence on record and the arguments made. It is an admitted position that the applicant had stopped working in the respondent-Bank by the end of December 1968. According to him he had proceeded on 3 months' leave while according to the respondents he had tendered his resignation on 18-12-1968 and was relieved on 31-12-1968 after making payment of his legal dues. The applicant asserts that after he returned from leave be was not permitted to resume work. Hence he made representations. It was in the presence of the Labour Officer (Conciliation) that they arrived at a settlement dated 3-4-1969 whereby he withdrew his petition and resumed work on 4-4-1969 and was posted at Adamjee House. He worked there for ten days whereafter he was illegally ousted. The respondents on the other band accept that there was an understanding between the applicant and the respondents on 3-4-1969 in presence of the said Labour Officer but the condition was that the applicant would be re-instated provided he produced a recommendation letter from Capt. A., Haque, recruiting agent for the Chowkidars in the respondent-Bank. Since the applicant did not produce any letter from Capt. A. Haque, question of his re-instatement did not arise. The said settlement dated 3-3- 1969 has been reproduced on page 2 d the application. It gives support to the version of the respondent that the applicant had to produce a letter of recommendation from Cat. A. Hague the recruiting agent for Chowkidars in the respondent-Bent, Admittedly the applicant did not produce any letter from Capt. A. Hague and hence the question of his resuming duty on 4-4-1969 did not arise. There is no other evidence in support of the case of the applicant to show that he actually resumed duty on 4-4-1969. Thus I disbelieve the said version of the applicant that he resumed duty on 4-4-1969 and was ousted on 14-4-1969.
9. As far as the question of resignation d the applicant is concerned I have read Exh. R-12 which is photo copy of Exh. RR-13. I have also read Exh. R-18. Exh. R-12 is a letter from G. S. CO. 11 Labour, ML.
HQ Subsection No. I, Karachi. The 2nd para. Of this letter describes the resignation to be in order this letter the applicant was allowed a sum of Rs. 1,000 covering all his claims in full and final settlement of this matter. The same letter shows that the applicant had refused to accept the above amount for reasons best known to him. The case was, therefore, referred to G. S. O. I Labour, Sub-Admi-- nistrator Sector No. 7, Napier Barracks Karachi-4, for final disposal. The learned Representative for the respondent at the time of arguments said that the original letter of resignation was misplaced when papers were submitted to the Martial Law Authorities. Exh. RR-18 is photo copy of the letter dated 18-12-1968 whereby, the said resignation was accepted by the Management.
10. At this stage it is necessary to pint out that my learned predecessor by his award dated 14-5- 1971 had disposed of this application. On appeal to the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal the case was s remanded by order dated 18-8-1971.
11. As discussed earlier after giving full opportunity to the parties to put up their case I find that the applicant A failed to give satisfactory proof regarding his case. The evidence on record clearly indicates that he had resigned as alleged by the respondent. It was therefore that on relief he was paid all his legal dues. Consequently the factum of his resignation is fully established.
12. As far as the legal objection raised on behalf of the respondents is concerned, I agree with their learned Representative that the application is highly belated and hopelessly time-barred. The cause of action had accrued to the applicant in December 1968 when the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 had not yet seen the light of the day, while the present application has been filed on 15-1-1971 after more than 2 years. The applicant has failed to explain this delay. The Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal in Appeals No. KAR-173 and 174 of 1973---Ashraf Ali Ansari and Ahmad Mohiuddin Ghias v. Pakistan Radio House Ltd.---in its judgment dated Ahmed Mohiuddin Ghias v.
Pakistan Radio House Ltd.--- In its judgment dated 9-5-1973 have held that even a delay of about a year or so in filing of an application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 without reasonable ground, defeated the application by time. In the instant case the applicant has not come to the Court for more than Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 which law was not in existence at the time when cause of action had accrued so late as that. Under these circumstances I hold that this application is hopelessly time-barred and is liable to be dismissed as such.
13. In view of the foregoing reasons, the present application fails on facts and law. Consequently I dismiss the same.