' QAISER AHMED HAMIDI, J.-- Since common question of law is involved in both these appeals, they are being disposed of by this consolidated judgment.
2. The case of the prosecution (Criminal Appeal No, 112 of 1988) in brief is that appellant Sikandar Ali, along with acquitted accused Roshan Ali forged an order of A.D.C. To the Prime Minister of Pakistan for getting an employment for P.W. Maqbool Ahmed in National Bank of Pakistan. On verification the order was found to be forged. A case under sections 420, 467, 468, 471/34, P.P.C. Was accordingly registered and after usual investigation, the appellant and co-accused Roshan Ali were sent up before Special Court (Offences in Bank) at Karachi. At the conclusion of the trial appellant Sikandar Ali was convicted for the offence under section 468, P.P.C. And was sentenced to suffer R.I. For four years vide judgment, dated 9-7-1988. Co-accused Roshan Ali was, however, acquitted.
3. The case of the prosecution (Criminal Appeal No, 113 of 1988), in brief is that appellant Sikandar Ali, alongwith acquitted accused Aslam Pervaiz and Roshan Ali, got an employment for accused Aslam Pervaiz in Lftiiicd Bank Ltd., on the basis of a forged order of A.D.C. To the Prime Minister of Pakistan. This fraud was, however, detected by the F.I.A. And a case under sections 420, 467, 468, 471/34, P.P.C. Was registered. After usual investigation appellant Sikandar All and co-accused Aslam Pervaiz and Roshan Ali were sent up before the Special Court (Offences in Banks) at Karachi.
At the conclusion of trial appellant Sikandar All was convicted for the offence under section 468, P.P.C. And sentenced to suffer R.I. For four years vide judgment dated 9-7-1988. Co-accused Roshan All and Aslam Pervaiz were, however, acquitted. The sentence awarded to appellant Sikandar Ali in Case No, 25 of 1987, was ordered to run concurrently with the sentence awarded to him in Case No, 26 of 1987.
4. Appellant Sikandar Ali has questioned the legality of conviction and sentence recorded against him in both the cases by filing separate appeals.
5. Mr. Muhammad Hayat Junejo, learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the finding of the trial Court, on various grounds. He had questioned the jurisdiction of the learned Presiding Officer of the Special Court (Offences in Banks) at Karachi, to try these cases in the memo. Of appeal, but did not press the same during his address before the Court. Since the question of jurisdiction is material for disposal of both these appeals, we propose to examine it first.
6. Jurisdiction means 'the power of a Court to hear and determine a cause to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power in relation to it'. As observed in A Muhammad Yaqub All v. The State reported in PLD 1985 Lah. 48, the offences in respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984, was promulgated to provide for speedy trial of certain offences in respect of Banks and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 4 of the above Ordinance confers exclusive jurisdiction on Special Courts to try scheduled offences. The `scheduled offence' as defined by section 2(d) of the said Ordinance means an offence specified in the First Scheduled and alleged to have been committed in respect of, or in connection with the business, of a bank. The expression in connection with' was examined in Mushtaq Hussain Shah v. The State, reported in 1986 P Cr. L J 567 and it was observed:- "I am of the view that the said interpretation of the word 'connection' applies equally well to the said word as used in section 2(d) of the Ordinance and accordingly hold that the word 'connection' in the expression 'in connection with' in the said definition of scheduled offence envisages a link which is direct cause and effect and not remote."
7. According to section 5(b) of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, banking means the accepting, for the purpose of lending or investment, of deposits of money from the public, repayable on demand or otherwise, and withdrawable by cheque, draft, order or otherwise. Section 7 of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962, further provides that in addition to a business of banking, a banking company may engage in any one or more of the different kinds of business specified therein.
8. With this legal position in view, it is now to be seen whether the act of forging an order of A.D.C. To Prime Minister of Pakistan for getting employment in a bank, is an offence committed in respect of or in connection with the business of a bank. A plain reading of section 3(d) of the Offences in Respect of Banks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984, makes it clear that the said offence of forgery was not in connection with the business of the two banks. The forged orders again did not affect the business of banks in any manner. The emphasis is upon an offence committed in respect of or in connection with the business of a bank.
9. The preamble of the said Ordinance would indicate that it was an Ordinance to provide speedy trial of certain offences committed in respect of banks and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. What is incidental in any given case depends upon the main legislation and the circumstances of the particular case.
10. The Special Court constituted for the trial of certain offences committed in respect of or in connection with the business of a bank, is competent to try such offences only. A Special Court cannot assume jurisdiction in disregard to the provisions of section 3(d) of the Offences in Respect of Barks (Special Courts) Ordinance, 1984. The omission to raise objection, acquiescence or even consent cannot invest a Court with jurisdiction which it has not.
11. Since the learned Presiding Officer had no jurisdiction to try both the cases, the entire proceedings before him were void ab initio. Consequently both the appeals are allowed and the appellant is acquitted. He is in custody and shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. It is, however, open to the prosecution to try the appellant under the ordinary law before the competent criminal Court, if so advised.