' This is an appeal by Shah Nawaz defendant in a suit for pre-emption. The appellant purchased the land measuring 40 kanals, situated in Chak No,152/M.L. Tehsil Kot Addu, District Muzaffargarh through registered sale-deed dated 22-10-1978. The respondent filed a suit for pre-emption of this land on 22-10-1979. The appellant contested the suit. The trial Court accordingly framed following issues on 1-6-1980:-
(1) Whether the suit is time-barred?
(2) Whether the defendant has made any improvement upon the suit land, if so, what extent and what amount?
(3) Whether the plaintiffs have superior right of pre-emption qua the defendant?
(4) Whether the ostensible sale price Rs,40,000 was fixed in good faith or actually paid?
(5) If issue No,4 is not proved in affirmative what was the market value of the suit land at the time of its sale?
(6) Whether a notice U/s 19 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act has been served upon the plaintiffs?
(7) Whether the defendant is entitled to recover registration fee etc.?
(8) Relief.
' The respondent-plaintiff closed his side on 16-2-1981.
' Thereafter the suit was adjourned for the evidence of the appellant for 22-5-1981. The appellant failed to produce any evidence on this date. The trial Court allowed its request for adjournment subject to payment of Rs,20 as costs and made 5-10-1981 as last date. The appellant still failed to produce evidence. He again requested on 5-10-1981 for yet another adjournment. The same was also granted subject to payment of Rs,35 as costs and it was observed that it is last opportunity. It was followed by 19-5-1982, 31-7-1982 and 3-1-1983 when it was observed that there will be absolutely no further adjournment. Thereafter the parties on 12-6-1982 requested for adjournment as there was possibility of compromise between them. The Civil Judge was too liberal to grant adjournments for almost two years for compromise. This practice cannot be approved.
2. It seems that trial Court, also, got fed up with the requests for adjournment in the vain hope of compromise, therefore, directed that in case compromise is not arrived at then the appellant should produce evidence. The appellant was allowed adjournments on 11-7-1984, 22-10-1984 and 2-12-1984.
3. Ultimately it was on 1-7-1985 that the evidence of the appellant was closed and the suit decreed in view of the evidence of the respondent on record. The appellant filed an appeal before the District Judge, Muzaffargarh, who entrusted the same to Additional District Judge, who dismissed the appeal vide judgment and decree dated 23-7-1988.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the appellant in support of the appeal has argued that since the suit was not adjourned at the request of the appellant from 4-5-1985 to 1-7-1985, therefore, provisions of Order XVII Rule 3 C.P.C. Were not applicable. No other point was argued. The learned counsel in support of the plea canvassed by him has referred to the cases of Manzoor Ahmad v. Z.H. Khawaja PLD 1976 Kar. 526, Muhammad Haleem and others v. H.H.Muhammad Naeem and others PLD 1969 SC 270, Lal v. Ghulam Muhammad and another PLD 1975 Lah. 385, Argen Singh v. Mahinder Kumar AIR 1964 S.C.993 and Wadera Dalal Khan and 7 others v. Province of West Pakistan and 6 others PLD 1970 Quetta 79.
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the argument is absolutely incorrect and against record. The learned counsel in this behalf has referred to the orders dated 22-5-1981, 5-10-1981 and 19-5-1982 to show that appellant did make a request for opportunity to lead evidence. It is added that when an opportunity is afforded after first date fixed for evidence then request is presupposed. The learned counsel for the respondent further argued that the request of party for adjournment is not legal requirement and in the alternative it was submitted that once the case is adjourned at the request or instance of party then Court is legally competent to close the evidence on any subsequent date.
6. The learned counsel in this behalf has referred to the cases of Faiz Bakhsh v. District Judge Multan and others 1983 CLC 2437 and Administrator Lahore Municipal Corporation, Lahore v. Abdul Hamid and others 1987 CLC 1261 to argue that evidence should be closed validly under Order XVII Rule 1(3) C.P.C.
7. I have given my anxious considerations to the argument and the counter arguments and gone through the record. The appellant was given more than sufficient opportunities to lead evidence but had failed to avail the same. The case was at least thrice adjourned at his behest and on two occasions adjournment was allowed subject to costs. This is not all. The appellant was lucky to have more than half a dozen 'last opportunities' but he did not avail the same for the reasons best known to him. The appellant is to blame none else but himself for this gross carelessness in prosecution of his cause.
8. The learned counsel while raising this plea was not perhaps mindful of the Lahore amendment made in Rule 1(3) Order XVII C.P.C. The same reads as under:- "(1) The Court may, if sufficient cause is shown, at any stage of the suit grant time to the. Parties or to any of them, and may from time to time adjourn the hearing of the suit.
(2)
(3) Where sufficient cause is not shown for the grant of an adjournment under sub-rule (1) the Court shall proceed with the suit forthwith."
9. The trial Court has simply closed the evidence without reference to Rule 3 Order XVII C.P.C. Even if there was such a reference in the order, it was of no legal consequence because mere mention of wrong provision of law will not vitiate the order. There is nothing wrong with the order, which is fully covered by sub-rule (3) Rule 1 of Order XVII C.P.C. And justified by the facts on record.
10. Before parting with the judgment, I must observe that the manner in which the trial Court granted adjournments for leading the evidence and for recording compromise is unwarranted and highly objectionable. Once last opportunity was granted to the appellant to produce evidence then the trial Court should have pressed the order into service. It is making mockery of Court by recording such ordes repeatedly. Once last opportunity is granted then there should be extraordinary situation warranting another adjournment and the trial Court should be in a position to fully justify the order necessitating yet another adjournment. This was not done in this case. It shows at least lack of application of mind on the part of Presiding Officer if not inefficiency.
11. The result is that I do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed with costs.