' CH. HASAN NAWAZ (MEMBER).--This appeal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 is for the expunction of adverse remarks recorded by respondent No, 1 for the period from 13-2-1982 to 1- 12-1982 in the Annual Confidential Report of the appellant who had been working as Income-tax Officer, Survey and Collation, Hyderabad during the period under report.
2. The report said that he was unpunctual and an average worker with limited ambitions. The remarks of the Countersigning Officer were that on "one pretext or the other, Mr. Qazilbash (the appellant) often absented from duty and did not take interest in his work".
3. Only two main grounds were relied upon in support of the prayer for expunction of adverse remarks; First, the appellant did not serve under the Reporting Officer for a period of three months which was necessary to entitle him to initiate the report. The second was that the remarks were not justified even on merits, in view of the fact that he had always been earning good reports before and after the report regarding the year 1982. A plea regarding mala fides of the Reporting Officer is also there, but it is not of any consequence and worth an analysis.
4 Merits apart, the defence in the main is that the appellant had come to the Tribunal without exhausting the departmental remedy and that the appeal was, therefore, incompetent under first proviso to section 4 of the Act.
5. It has been alleged in the grounds of appeal that "the appellant submitted his representation dated 26-12-1983 (Annex. B) to respondent No, 3" and that "though a period of ninety days has since expired, but no reply has so far been received by the appellant." As already pointed out, this fact has been denied by the respondents whose case is that no departmental appeal was ever filed for the expunction of the adverse remarks and that the appeal is, therefore, incompetent.
During the course of arguments, the appellant produced a receipt which purports to have been issued by the Post Office Authority, in an attempt to establish that he sent his departmental appeal dated 26-12-1983 to the Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad in a registered cover. He contended that the receipt should be taken as sufficient proof of the dispatch of a departmental appeal meant to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.
6. This receipt, however, does not constitute any proof of the assertion made by the appellant. The truth is that this document does not even deserve the use of word 'proof; which, incidentally, in our view, is only a mild criticism of the document.
7. The receipt shows that the authorities concerned received a sum of Rs, 3.50 (rupees three paisa fifty only) on account of certain telephone bills. Obviously, it has got nothing to do with the dispatch of any document in a registered cover, as the appellant wants us to believe. The receipt issued by the Post Office Authorities is entirely of a different nature and, in actual fact, the matter hardly requires any analysis, as the receipt evidently pertains to some telephone bill.
8. Then, it may be noticed that it bears 30-12-1983 as the date of its issuance. The appellant appears to have made an attempt to establish that he despatched his departmental appeal dated 26-12-1983 on 30-12-1983. However, here again, the purpose has not served because the receipt in actual fact seems to have been issued on 30-12-1982 rather than 30-12-1983. Even a naked eye-examination would at once reveal that the figure "82" has been converted into "83" by over-writing. This fact is also supported by the stamp over the receipt which bears 30-12-1982 as the date of issuance of the receipt. In this receipt, figure "30 Dec" is very clear and easily legible. In the year "82", the figure "8" is clearly legible, but it is not difficult to decipher "2" with a closer application. We have no doubt in our minds that the stamp on the receipt was affixed on 30-12- 1982, which is a conclusive proof of the fact that it was issued on that date, particularly when it is read with the aforementioned date (30-12-1982) which has been changed by overwriting into 30- 12-1983.
9. Further, it is not sure if the aforementioned stamp pertains to the Post Office Department. This observation is based on the fact that another stamp can be seen along with the aforementioned stamp dated 30-12-1982. It clearly says that the stamp belongs to the Post Office. The other stamp which bears 30-12-1982 as the date of its affixation is not of the same kind; which indicates that it has not been affixed by the Post Office Department. As for evidentiary value of the adjoining stamp of the Post Office Department, we are inclined to hold that it is quite worthless, firstly because of the fact that it was not difficult to contrive its affixation and secondly because it is seemingly redundant. If the other necessary stamp dated 30-12-1982 had already been affixed, we fail to understand what was the justification of affixing another stamp alongside stamp dated 30-12-1982.
It does not appear to have served any purpose and we feel constrained to remark that it seems to have been procured only to cause an impression that the receipt was issued by the Post Office Department, which purpose had not been fulfilled by the other stamp, dated 30-12-1982.
10. We wish that this document had not been produced by the appellant. Now when it has been solely relied upon as proof of the despatch of the departmental appeal, we take it as conclusive proof of the fact that no such appeal was ever despatched. As already pointed out, the receipt is only a bogus document and it proves nothing which could have been relied upon in support of the despatch of a departmental appeal to the Central Board of Revenue as alleged by the appellant. In view of his reliance on the document, he cannot turn round and say that the appeal should be presumed to have otherwise been despatched.
11. As for the other grounds regarding three months service under the Reporting Officer, we feel inclined to hold that this is without any substance. In the first place, it has been mentioned in the grounds of appeal that the "appellant had hardly three months to work under respondent No, 1" and "in this shortest span of time how a Reporting Officer can give his finding for the full calendar year". This clearly shows that he did work under the Reporting Officer at least for a period of three months. Even otherwise, there is ample proof of the fact that he did remain under him for a period of more than three months and he was entitled to initiate the report. The fact that either of them remained on leave during the year under report, is immaterial in computing the period of three months.
12. Since the appellant came to the Tribunal without satisfying the jurisdictional requirement laid down in first proviso to section 4(1) of the Act, the appeal is incompetent and liable to dismissal. It is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.