1. The respondent filed ejectment application against one Sabze A.I the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants. He died during the; pendency of the ejectment application and his legal heirs were brought on record. The ejectment was sought on the ground of default in payment of rent from June, 1984 till January, 1985, subletting, causing damage to the property and impairing the utility of the building. The appellants predecessor-m-interest filed written statement which was adopted by them in which all the allegations were denied. So far the default is concerned, it was pleaded that the rent for the month of May and June was sent by money order which was received by the respondent on 4-7--1984 and thereafter money orders were sent on 3-12-1985 and 9-1-1985 but they were refused and consequently they started depositing rent in Court from 7-2--1985 onwards.
2. It was further pleaded that under an agreement the appellants had spent Rs.600 towards the repair of sewerage which was adjustable in rent and further that Rs.390 was deposited with the respondent as advance rent which was liable to be adjusted and considering all the payments made no default has been committed. The learned Controller on appreciation of the evidence came to the conclusion that the appellants have committed default and only on this ground the ejectment application was granted.
3. Mr. Raja Sher Muhammad Khan the learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the appellants have established that no default has been committed and evidence on record has been mis-appreciated by the learned Controller. The main defence of the appellant seems to be that the respondent admits to have received rent upto the month of May 1984 which according to the appellant was remitted through money order alongwith the rent of June, 1984 and therefore, the respondent's contention that the rent for the month of June, 1985 was not paid is incorrect.
4. Once this plea is accepted then the appellants stand on a firm footing. The appellants have pressed in service the money orders sent on 3-12-1984 and 9-1-1985 to show that the rent was continuously remitted and refused by the respondent. In order to establish that the rent for the months of May and June was paid reliance was placed on remittance receipt and the money order coupon which is alleged to have been signed by the respondent. The learned Controller has disbelieved these documents. The main ground for --rejecting these documents was that the signature of the respondent on the money order coupon was not her signature, but it was a forged Signature and further that the postman who had made the endorsement was also not examined by the appellants. This document is the sheet anchor of the appellants' defence. Once it is rejected and disbelieve the entire defence falls to the ground. I have therefore carefully examined these documents. From the very beginning the respondent has been denying that she had received the rent for the month of June. The default was alleged from the month of June, 1984 and therefore, if any payment was alleged by the appellant it was their' duty to have produced cogent and convincing evidence to show that the rent for the month of tune was paid to the respondent. The burden was entirely upon the appellants which they had failed to discharge. The money order receipt produced does bear the signed name of Mahmooda Rizvi but it is written so obviously different frown her signature on the lease deed, the ejectment petition, the Vakalatnama on record that one cannot be led to believe that it has been signed by her. In cross-examination she has denied to have signed or received the rent for the months of June, 1984. In these circumstances it was incumbent upon the appellants to have examined the postman or the witness who has signed the coupon attesting the receipt of the money order by the respondent. No one was examined by the appellant and it was merely word of the appellant which could not be believed m the face of the documents which obviously did not bear the signature of the respondent. It is pertinent to, note that this document was introduced keeping in view the respondent's admission to have received the rend, for the month of May. If this document is accepted then it means that the rent for the months of May and June was paid at the same time and respondent's statement is completely false. This document could not be proved as genuine document and therefore, on the face of it default for the month of June was established. Thereafter the rents which were remitted through the money order on 3-12-1984 and 9-1-1985 could not wipe off the default already committed.
5. The learned counsel then contended that the present appellants are the successors of the deceased who had committed default and therefore, they cannot be held liable for the default of their predecessor. Admittedly the ejectment application was filed against the appellants' predecessor-in-interest who died during the pendency of the ejectment case on 22-7-1987. In these circumstances the learned counsel contends that the appellants are not responsible for the default of their predecessor. Reliance has been placed on Haji Ahmed Abdur Rehman v. Late Syed Nazar Hussain through legal heirs PLD 1987 Kar. 603 where at -page 607 the following observation has been made: ...."Mr. Sadiq has himself relied upon a case Zakaullah and another v. Safdar and others reported in 1986 SCM R 1873 whereby leave to appeal was granted to consider the point whether the legal heirs of the tenant are liable for the default committed by the original tenant:'
6. "(i) tenant" means, any person who undertakes or is bound to pay rent as consideration for the possession or occupation of any premises by him or by any other person on his behalf and includes;
(ii) any person who continues to be in possession or occupation of the premises after the termination of his tenancy;
(iii) heirs of the tenant in possession or occupation of the premises after the death of the tenant".
7. Therefore, by virtue of this definition, the legal heirs of a deceased tenant in possession or occupation of the premises enjoy the same status of a tenant and continue to be a tenant. If the legal heirs of a tenant are given the benefit of tenancy of their predecessor-in-interest they will be liable for all consequences of default committed by their predecessor. Therefore, in my view if default has been committed by the predecessor-in-interest then his legal heirs who become tenant will be liable for the default committed by him. The appeal is dismissed. The appellants should vacate and handover vacant possession to the respondent within two months failing which writ of possession shall be issued without notice.