' CH. HASAN NAWAZ (MEMBER).--The appellant was employed on 15-1-1976 as Ward Bearer under the respondents in WAPDA Hospital, Sunny View, Lahore in consequence of an application made on 12-1-1976. Paragraph 5 of the letter of appointment (Annex. A) said that the appointment was temporary and may be terminated at any time on one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof on either side. He was to remain on probation for a period of one year.
2. An office order (Annex. B) was passed on 23-5-1977 whereby he was informed that he had satisfactorily completed the period of his probation and that he will henceforth be treated as a regular employee of WAPDA with effect from the date of his initial appointment. The order further said that other terms and conditions of his appointment "will, however, remain unchanged".
3. On 26-10-1977, his services were terminated "with immediate effect under clause 5 of the letter of appointment dated 15-1-1976 with one month's pay in lieu of one month's notice (Annex. C)."
4. The present appeal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act is directed against the order dated 26-10-1977 terminating his services.
5. It has been pleaded by the appellant that after the successful completion of the period of probation, he became a regular employee of respondent and that his services could not have been terminated in a summary manner without show-cause notice and any allegation of misconduct, irrespective of the provisions of paragraph 5 of the letter of appointment.
6. Although the appeal has also been opposed on merits, but the defence, in the main, is that it is hopelessly time-barred. An objection to its competency has also been raised but it does not appear to be of any serious nature. However, it was averred by the respondents that his appointment was purely temporary in nature and that his services could be terminated in accordance with the terms of his letter of appointment, particularly when it was clearly stated in order dated 23-5-1977 that the terms of his appointment will continue to remain the same in spite of successful completion of the probationary period.
7. As we see from the record, the appellant challenged the validity of the impugned order in a representation made on 3-11-1977. Having failed to get a response, he sent a reminder to the respondent on 20-4-1978 requesting that he may be informed of the order passed on his representation. Eventually, he was obliged to have recourse to the Civil Court on 27-4-1978 with a suit for a declaration to the effect that the impugned order dated 26-10-1977 was ab initio void, illegal and without jurisdiction. On 27-9-1978, the plaint was returned under order 7 rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code with the direction that he should present it either before the Labour Court or the Service Tribunal.
8. On 30-11-1978 he filed a petition before the Labour Court No, 2 of Lahore under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. It was accepted by the Court by means of order dated 21-1- 1979 and a direction was made to reinstate the petitioner. The Labour Court's order dated 21-1-1979 was subsequently challenged before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal on 3-2-1979 and the case was remanded to the Labour Court on 14-6-1982 for allowing the respondents another opportunity to file a written statement. When the evidence of the parties had been recorded and the case fixed for arguments on 5-4-1983, the plaint was returned for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal to the Appellate Tribunal, the Labour Court's order was upheld by order dated 4-5-1983. An attested copy of this order appears to have been obtained by the appellant on 16-5-1983.
9. Despite the fact that the appellant had become aware of the proper forum, he filed the present appeal on 1-8-1983, after the expiry of more than 30 days from 16-5-1983, the date on which he had been provided with an attested copy of the Appellate Tribunal's order; which was in evident offence against the provisions of section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 under which it should have been filed within thirty days of the communication of the final order to him. The best for the appellant is to assume that he had been prosecuting his case in good faith before a forum having no jurisdiction and that the period so spent should be excluded in computing the period of limitation. Even then, the limitation started running against him after he had become aware of the Appellate Tribunal's order dated 4-5-1983 and there was no justification for sleeping over the matter and then come to the Tribunal long after the expiry of thirty days. The application for condemnation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act does not disclose any plausible reason for the appellant's failure to have recourse to this Tribunal after the expiry of the period of limitation.
10. For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed as being time-barred. Under the circumstances, however, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
11. Parties to be informed.