DECISION ' This is an appeal filed by the appellant against an impugned order dated 30-10-1985, passed by the Sind Labour Court No,IV at Karachi, who had dismissed the grievance petition of the appellant under section 25-A, I.R.O.
1969.
2. Brief facts of the case were that the appellant claimed to have been working in the respondent establishment since 26-10-1972 and besides his official duties, he was also working for the welfare of the general workers of the establishment as a Social Worker and in addition to these activities, he had also been an office-bearer of workers Union from 1975 to 1984. The appellant had claimed that as a measure of victimization, he was accused of having submitted false medical prescriptions for his daughter from two different doctors, vide two charge-sheets, dated 7-5-1984 and 27-5-1984 and to these two charge-sheets, he had claimed to have submitted satisfactory replies, but, the respondent establishment had ordered to hold domestic enquiry in the said matters, and as such, being aggrieved, he had filed a case under section 25-A, I.R.O. 1969 before the learned Labour Court wherefrom he had also sought stay order against the proceedings of the alleged domestic enquiry and while these proceedings were pending, he was removed illegally from the employment on a flimsy and manufactured ground that he had tendered his resignation voluntarily from the employment. Being aggrieved, the appellant claimed to have sent his grievance notice followed by present grievance petition under section 25-A, I.R.O.
1969.
3. The respondent establishment had resisted the petition on the ground that as the appellant had committed fraud by making alterations and additions in the medical prescription resulting in the issuance of the charge-sheets, in question, but, as the appellant had apprehended that the charge would be proved against him, therefore, he had submitted voluntarily his resignation from his services and this resignation, taking a lenient view, had been accepted by the respondent management, therefore, the appellant was not an aggrieved person to maintain his grievance petition under section 25-A, 1969 which was liable to be dismissed. It was further the case of the respondent establishment that during all the time, the appellant had never, either complained that in the year 1977, when, in view of Court's order, he was being reinstated in service, one, Mr. Zaidi had taken an un-dated resignation from him; or the appellant, during the proceedings with regard to the present charge of misconduct, had ever raised an objection that the said plain piece of paper bearing his signature of 1977, has been treated as resignation voluntarily from his services. The respondent establishment had further claimed that after submitting a resignation from employment, the appellant was not an aggrieved person, either to serve his grievance notice or to maintain his grievance petition under section 25-A, I.O.R. 1969, which was liable to be dismissed.
4. Both the parties have led their respective evidence and they were duly cross-examined.
Thereafter, the learned Labour Court has passed the impugned order, hence, the present appeal.
5. I have heard the appellant, in person and Mr. Muhammad Humayoon, the learned Advocate on behalf of the respondent establishment and have also carefully perused the record and proceedings of the case as well as the written arguments, submitted by both the parties. It was argued by the appellant that while terminating the services on 4-7-1984, the management did not comply with the procedure of holding enquiry whether or not, the resignation was voluntary, therefore, it was not a resignation. It is also submitted by the appellant that the respondent did not deliberately examine the said enquiry officer only to deprive him of an opportunity to cross- examine him on the point of an envelope alleged to have contained the so-called resignation. The appellant has contended that from 21-6-1984 to 28-6-1984, the alleged enquiry was adjourned and finally it was adjourned to 11-7-1984, but, prior to it, he had received a letter of termination of his services on 5-7-1984 on the basis of a manipulated and manufactured resignation on a piece of paper on which his signatures were obtained by one Mr.Zaidi in good faith in the year 1977. The appellant has pleaded that under the Law, the respondent establishment could not accept an undated resignation from an employee during pendency of a domestic enquiry for an alleged charge of misconduct, particularly under the provisions of Standing Order 15(4). The appellant has also pointed out an illegality in the procedure being prevailed in the respondent establishment that admittedly when the alleged resignation was addressed to the Managing Director, then, the Senior Manager (P&IR) could not receive the same and forward it to the junior officer calling comments and moreover the alleged resignation did not contain a note or order by the Managing Director which could be presumed that the same was accepted or not. It was further argued by the appellant that if an employee was facing disciplinary proceedings for misconduct which may result into his dismissal, the services of such an employee could not be terminated as 'termination simplicity' and as he was facing disciplinary proceedings, therefore, after complying with all legal requirements and formalities thereof, his services would have been dismissed, and in support of his arguments, he had referred me to a case reported in PLD 1973 (Lah.) at page 425. It was also submitted by the appellant that he was also terminated by an incompetent authority, while, the Managing Director who was appointed by the Government as an authority, only had the powers to take such action. He has relied upon a case, reported in PLC 1980 at page 244. The appellant has further contended that according to an established practice, all incoming and outgoing Dak has to be entered into respective registers, but, the receipt of his so-called resignation by post in the name of the Managing Director of the respondent establishment is not proved from any such register, therefore, the receipt of resignation is a concocted story. It was also an argument of the appellant that the Senior Manager was not legally as well as procedurally competent to pass orders upon the document which used to be addressed to the Managing Director, therefore, in his case, the Senior Manager had acted beyond his power and authority and there is no evidence on record to show that he was ever authorised to do so. Lastly, it was argued by the appellant that as the learned Labour Court had proceeded in the present case in a slipshod manner, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
6. On the other hand, it was submitted by Mr. Muhammad Humayoon the learned Advocate. For the respondent establishment that as soon as the proceedings for a gross misconduct against the appellant had been instituted, he filed an application under section 25-A, I.R.O. 1969 before the learned Labour Court and had obtained a Stay Order in his favour, hut, when, it was rejected, the appellant had himself withdrawn those proceedings, therefore, it is not correct to say that he proceeded contrary to Law and as such during the pendency of these proceedings, the management had received a resignation letter from the appellant on which, the appellant had admitted his signatures as genuine and correct in the following words:-- "1 see envelope dated 20th June, 1984. It is in my handwriting I produce it Exh.A/5. I see letter of resignation dated 21-6-1984. It bears my signature but the same are before I have changed my signature. I produce it Exh.A/6. It is not correct to suggest that I have resigned in June, 1984, while the enquiry was pending."
' Further, it was submitted by the respondent establishment that it is pertinent to note that the appellant during his cross-examination was confronted not only with his resignation letter, but, he was also confronted with the envelope, dated 20-6-1984 in which the said resignation was dispatched to the management and so, the appellant had also admitted his handwriting thereon.
It was, therefore, submitted that in view of this confession and/or admission, in specific words by the appellant, himself, it has been proved beyond any doubt that he had voluntarily tendered his resignation and that the resignation letter contained his signatures and the envelope was also in his own hand-writing. I myself have examined both these documents and find that the contentions of the respondent establishment must prevail. It was further argued by Mr. Muhammad Humayoon, the learned Advocate for the respondent establishment that from the record, it is an admitted position that throughout the period, in question, the appellant had not agitated, either against obtaining of signatures on a blank piece of paper under threats; or misusing of it at a later stage as a resignation from service. In support of his arguments, he had referred me to the following admission made by the appellant himself during his cross-examination before the learned Labour Court:-- "I have not produced any letter to show that the management had victimized me due to union activities. Xx xxx xx xx xx I have not complained about my resignation of 1977 to the Police or Directorate of Labour, but, to the Union of P.M.T.F. I have not tiled any document or letter regarding filing complaint with the Union or P.M.T.P. Management in respect of my resignation of 1977."
' Therefore, it was argued by Mr. Muhammad Humayoon that after examining the entire evidence, oral and documentary, available on record and the specific confession made by the appellant himself, the learned Labour Court has come to a right conclusion that the appellant had submitted his resignation from service on his own accord and that it was correctly submitted to the Managing Director as per procedure of "through proper channel" and as such, there was nothing wrong in accepting the same by the management. Mr. Humayoon, the learned Advocate for the respondent establishment has further pointed out that even during the proceedings of additional evidence before the learned Labour Court, the appellant could not submit any other resignation, as a specimen, to prove his contention that such resignation contained the orders of the M.D. Directly. It is, however, pertinent to note that despite the fact that the learned Labour Court had issued directions to the appellant and his Advocate to produce attested copy of the letter, dated 20-6- 1987 whereby to prove that the M.D. Had accepted resignation of an employee; the appellant and his learned Advocate had miserably failed to do so. In view of this admitted position, I am of the view that the Managing Director of the respondent establishment had rightly accepted the resignation of the appellant which was submitted before him 'through proper channel'. I have also carefully examined the evidence brought on record and I find that it has been fully proved that the appellant had submitted his resignation during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings against him at the relevant time, which was rightly and lawfully accepted by the respondent management, vide its letter, dated 4-7-1984. Mr. Muhammad Humayoon, the learned Advocate for the respondent establishment has argued that the stand of the appellant that the resignation, in question, was of the year 1977, is nothing, but, an after-thought solely to defeat the truth. I see much force in this contention of the respondent establishment and I would hold that the contention of the management must prevail. It was lastly argued by Mr. Muhammad Humayoon, the learned Advocate for the respondent establishment that though disciplinary proceedings against the appellant had been instituted, but, during its pendency, the appellant had voluntarily resigned from service, therefore, the management had rightly preferred to accept the same rather to take disciplinary action against him and this action of the management was exclusively in the larger interest of the furture of the appellant. I would agree with these submissions of the management and would hold that the appellant had miserably failed to make out any case, contrary to Law, against the management, therefore, his services were rightly terminated by accepting his resignation from service and as such, the appellant was not an aggrieved person to maintain his present grievance petition under section 25-A, I.R.O. 1909, which had been rightly dismissed by the learned Labour Court.
7. For the reasons discussed by me above, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order and it is maintained. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed.