The subject-matter of this petition is a house bearing No. C/293, Radhan, District Dadu which was put to auction and purchased by the petitioner on 9-6-1965 for Rs. 2,200.00. This auction was con-- firmed by the Additional Settlement Commissioner on 25-6-1965, follow--ing which P. T. D. Was issued in favour of the petitioner on 5-10-1965 after adjustment of price. In March 1967 the petitioner filed ejectment application against, among others, the contesting respondent No. 3 under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 which was compromised on 28-9-1967, under which the respondent No. 3 agreed to pay the rent and in the event of his failure to do so he was liable to be ejected. The respondent No. 3 failed to pay the rent with the result that the petitioner filed a second application under section 13 of the Rent Ordinance on 3-2-1968, which was granted on 30-9-1968. After this the bailiff sought to eject the respondent No. 3 but he obtained time from him on the ground that he will comply with the decree within a few days. However, on 1-8-1969, the respondent No. 3 filed an appeal under section 19(1)(b) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilita--petition) Act, 1958, before the Additional Settlement Commissioner challeng--ing the transfer of the said premises in favour of the petitioner. This appeal was on the face of it barred by limitation as it was filed four years after the transfer of the house in favour of the petitioner. In the memo. Of appeal the respondent No. 3 alleged that the reserved price of the house was Rs. 7,000.00 which was too high and, therefore, no bids were offered at the first auction. It was again put to auction on the second auction when also no bid was received and thereafter the Deputy Settle--ment Commissioner, Dadu issued notice to the respondent No. 3 offering hire the house for Rs. 3,600.00 but this notice was not received by him; that he was always ready and willing to have the house on the above price but without any information or notice the house was transferred in favour of the petitioner for Rs. 2,200.00 in an auction which was not public. In the affidavit in support it is alleged that in the second auction the reserved price was Rs. 3,600.00 but no bid was received following which the respondent No. 3 was offered the house by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for the price of Rs. 3,600.00 which was accepted by him but--- "due to bad luck the above notice was stolen away from his house alongwith ornaments and goods."
Though the affidavit states that the delay in filing the appeal was bona fide no specific grounds are urged in support of the condonation for the delay. The Additional Settlement Commissioner by his order dated 20-9-1969 allowed the appeal of respondent No. 3. Strangely enough the order recites that the respondent No. 3 has filed him L.H. Form though that was not even the case of respondent No. 3. The Additional Settlement Commissioner came to the conclusion that the auction proceedings were suspicious as the reserved price for the house was fixed at Rs. 7,200.00 only and the house transferred to the petitioner for Rs. 2,200.00 only. The Additional Settlement Commissioner did not refer to contention of res--pondent No. 3 that the reserved price itself was too high and that the respondent No. 3 had himself been offered this house for Rs. 3,600.00 only.
The Additional Settlement Commissioner in these circumstances set aside the auction in favour of the petitioner and ordered fresh re-auction after due publicity. The petitioner went in revision which was dismissed by the Settlement Commissioner by his order dated 25-2-1970. This is a perfunc-- tory order and all it states is that "the bid-sheet is improper and the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner dated 25-2-1965 confirming the auction in favour of the petitioner was illegal and against the terms and conditions of the auction and actual facts".
2. Mr. Naimuddin, the learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the two orders one made in appeal by the Additional Settlement Commis--sioner and the other in revision by the Settlement Commissioner on three grounds. His first contention was that the Settlement Authorities had no jurisdiction to make any order in respect of the property in question subsequent to the issue of P. T.
D. In favour of the petitioner, as having become functus officio thereafter. For this proposition Mr. Naimuddin invited my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in S. Anwar Hussain Sani v. Sarfraz Ahmed and others (PLD 1971 SC 669). In this case the Supreme Court held that under Permanent Transfer (Houses and Shops) Rules, 1961, the Settlement Authorities could interfere after the issuance of P. T. Ds. Only in two cases, namely, to correct an error of a type which can be corrected without embarking upon a formal inquiry or holding adverse proceedings and under rules 6 and 7 of the said Rules where the transfer was obtained by misrepresentation or fraud. Mr. Naimuddin further pointed out that even the aforesaid rules 6 and 7 were deleted in the year 1964 and thereafter the Settlement Authorities ceased to possess even that much limited power to deal with the properties which were finally transferred. For this latter proposition the learned counsel invited my attention to the following observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Aminuddin v. Settlement Commissioner and others (1973 SCMR 624)-- "The learned counsel appearing in support of this petition has sought to assail the correctness of the conclusion of the high Court, but we are of the opinion that after the repeal of rules 6 and 7, there was no power left in the Settlement Authorities to correct even the clerical mistakes in the P. T.
D. This is now well settled and therefore, we can find no ground upon which any just exception can be taken in the conclusion arrived at by the High Court."
Admittedly in the present case there was no allegation against the peti--tioner that he had obtained the transfer by means of misrepresentation or fraud or that there was any clerical error in the transfer in favour of the petitioner and his case, therefore, would clearly fall within the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the first above-mentioned case. In the alternative in view of the deletion of rules 6 and 7 the case of the petitioner would be further fortified by reason of the observation of the Supreme Court referred to above in Aminuddin's case.
3. The second contention of the learned counsel was that the appeal of the petitioner was clearly barred by time and not only the respon--dent No. 3 had not made out any case for the condonation of the delay but the Settlement Authorities concerned did not even apply their minds to this question. Mr. Abdul Sattar, the learned counsel for the respon--dent No. 3 contended that in these circumstances the proper order to make would be to remand the case back to the Settlement Authorities for considering the question of condonation of delay. This of course would have been open to me if the respondent No. 3 had himself at least urged some ground for condonation of delay but not otherwise. In any event in view of my finding on the first contention of Mr. Naimuddin the question of remanding the case back to the Settlement Authorities does not arise at all.
4. The third contention raised by Mr. Naimuddin was that the petitioner's auction was confirmed on 25-5-1965 by an Additional Settle--ment Commissioner which could not have been set aside by another Addi--tional Settlement Commissioner in appeal. Prima facie I am not inclined to agree with the learned counsel for it appears to me that the first order of confirmation of the auction was an administrative order which would not make the order not subject to appeal or revision, under the Settlement Act.
5. The result is that this petition is allowed but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to cost. Before I part I may state that Mr. Abdul Sattar was present throughout the hearing on behalf of respondent No. 3, but he pointed out to me that he was so present only to assist this Court and so far as his client was concerned he had taken away brief from him and in spite of a letter addressed by him he has neither returned the brief nor instructed to appear on his behalf.
R. E. A.