ABAID ULLAH KHAN, J.--The facts relevant for the purpose of disposal of this appeal against the ex parte decree passed on the 12th February, 1986, by the learned Special Court established under the provisions of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, for the realisation of Rs.
60,00,000 plus interest in favour of the Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Lahore, respondent, and against the Punjab Industrial Development Board, Lahore, appellant, may' be shortly stated. On the 3rd October, 1985, the respondent instituted suit for recovery of Rs. 90,26,085 against the appellant in the Special Court, Lahore. On the 11th December, 1985, the learned Court directed that summons be issued to the appellant and the suit be listed for the 12th February, 1986. In the meantime on the 3rd February, 1986, a meeting of the senior executives of the appellant, respondent and Pakistan Banking Council was held at the appellant's office in Lahore to resolve certain issues including the one which was subject-matter of suit initiated by the respondent. At that meeting the respondent intimated that since the matter was already under review with the Pakistan Banking Council and the Ministry of Finance a long adjournment in the suit against the appellant had been obtained from the learned Court. It was agreed at the meeting that the issue would be finalized after necessary instructions were received in that regard from the Ministry of Finance. The appellant contends that on the basis of this information given by the respondent it had not put in appearance before the learned Court on the 12th February, 1986 and as the respondent had not disclosed to the Court that it had already told the appellant that a long adjournment had been obtained, the learned Court proceeded ex parte against the appellant and decreed the suit that very day.
2. The Learned counsel for the respondent admits that at the meeting. Of the 3rd February, 1986, whose minutes are on the file, the respondent had given information of obtaining of a long adjournment in the suit. However, he insists that someone on behalf of the appellant ought to have put in appearance before the learned Court and in default of such appearance the ex parte decree passed against the appellant was valid. We believe that it was due to the explicit assurance held out by the respondent re-taking of long adjournment in the suit that the appellant did not choose to appear on the 12th February, 1986, before the learned Court. It was not a case where the appellant could be said to have shown lack of care and caution in entering appearance. It was the duty of the respondent to apprise the learned Court of the circumstances, of its assurance at the meeting of taking long adjournment; on account of which the appellant did not appear before it.
Had the respondent laid correct information before the learned Court it would not have proceeded to decide the suit ex parte. It is due to the respondent's failure to disclose the true facts and for no fault of the appellant that ex parte decree was recorded. It is in the interests of the justice that the suit should be decided on merits. Therefore, we accept this appeal, set aside the impugned ex parte decree and remand the suit to the learned Special Court for its trial and decision according to law. The parties are left to bear their own costs of the appeal.