' The appeal captioned above arises from the decision dated 3-7-1988 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No5, Sargodha, whereby the respondent was directed to be reinstated in service with all back benefits, and the order dated 31-1-1988, whereby the grievance petition dismissed in default was restored.
2. The facts are that the services of the respondent were terminated on the offer of three months' pay in lieu of notice vide order dated 24-4-1985 under rule 15(2) of the Staff Service Rules. The respondent had twenty-two years' service on his back. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that giving of reasons was not necessary as there is no such provision in the relevant rule referred to above Much stress has been laid on the point that the respondent is not covered by the definition of workman. The line of argument of the learnt- counsel is that the respondent was an employer as he used to pass cheques. The said cheques are Exhs.R-5 to R-19.
As regard back, benefits the learned counsel has argued that the evidence of RW-3 was not rebutted who said that the appellant was working since the date of his termination in General Insurance Company and Pakistan Insurance Company.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the very appeal is incompetent as it is not signed by the Regional Head namely Muhammad Yar Dona, whereas the appellants are President and Senior Executive Vice-President, Administration Division, Head Office.
Name of the signatory of the appeal is not given but they tally with the signatures appearing on the power of attorney executed in favour of the learned counsel for the appellants. Malik Muhammad Yar Dona who signed the power of attorney is described as Regional Head, National Bank of Pakistan, Principal Office, Lahore. The objection of the respondent appears to be correct. No document executed by the appellants in favour of Malik Muhammad Yar Dona has been produced.
This objection was not taken on the day of arguments but has been taken in the cross-objections dated 7-9-1988, copy of which was delivered to the learned counsel for the appellants on 6-12- 1988. So the appellants had ample opportunity to bring any document, if in existence, to show that the officer who signed the memo of appeal had been authorized in that behalf by the appellants.
Even no application was made to the effect that the appeal had been lodged with the consent of the appellants and no prayer has been made to allow the appellants to put their signatures on the memo of appeal.
4. Even the order of termination has no blessing of law. No doubt, in rule 15(2) it is not specifically provided that the reasons are to be given but if the said rule is read along with the rule regarding probation, it becomes quite clear that giving of reasons is necessary. Power has been given to the employer to extend the period of probation or to demote the employee or to terminate his services if his work is not satisfactory. It is apparent that the employer has to give reasons for passing either kind of order at the stage of probation. If he extends the period of probation, it is necessary for him to inform the employee that since his work is not satisfactory, he is being given further opportunity to improve his work by extending the period of probation. Likewise if the employer elects to reduce him in rank, he has to give reasons for doing so. It does not appear to be the intention of the law- makers that at the time of terminating the services of an employee, no reason be given. A person who has been confirmed is at a Letter footing than a person who is still under probation. Even this is the demand of natural justice that a person whose services are terminated after twenty-two years, should be conveyed the reason for being shunted out. The order of termination, therefore, suffers from serious legal infirmities and thus is not maintainable and was rightly struck down by the learned lower Court.
5. So far as back benefits are concerned, no documentary evidence was produced by the appellants to show that actually the respondent remained employed with any other employer. It was not difficult for the appellants to call for documents from General insurance Company and Pakistan Insurance Company if in reality the respondent had taken employment there. The other thing is that there is no evidence on the record as to the emoluments of the respondents, in consideration of which he may have been employed by the abovementioned Insurance companies. So the oral statement made in this behalf is not sufficient to controvert the assertion made by the respondent in his statement that he remained jobless. So the learned lower Court has rightly allowed back benefits also. So far as the appeal against the order dated 31-1-1988 whereby the grievance petition was restored is concerned, it does not lie. According to section 38(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 an appeal lies against the decision whereby petitions brought under section 25-A or 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 have been decided. While restoring the grievance petition the petition itself was not decided.
6. As a result the appeal fails and is dismissed.