' Since all the 34 grievance petitions were disposed of by the learned lower Court through a single decision, all the appeals captioned above are being disposed of together through this single judgment.
2. The above mentioned 34 appeals emerge from the decision dated 7-11-1987 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 2, Lahore, whereby the respondents have been directed to be reinstated in service with back benefits.
3. The facts of appeals mentioned at serial Nos. 1 to 27 above are different from the facts of the cases from which appeals mentioned at serial Nos. 28 to 34 arise. The respondents in the appeals mentioned at serial Nos. 1 to 27 were the regular employees of the appellant and on the allegation of commission of misconduct they were charge-sheeted and after holding inquiries were dismissed from service. The services of the respondents in appeals mentioned at serial Nos. 28 to 32 were terminated on the ground of surplusage, whereas the respondents in appeals mentioned at serial Nos. 33 and 34 were seasonal workers and according to the appellants, they did not join duty on the restart of the factory. The learned lower. Court has wrongly observed that all the respondents in all the 34 appeals are regular employees and that on the ground of misconduct they were dismissed from service. The impugned order so far as it disposed of the grievance petitions from which appeals mentioned at serial Nos. 28 to 34 arise is not sustainable, inasmuch as the learned lower Court did not consider the facts of the said cases being under the wrong impression that the respondents in the said appeals were dismissed on the plea of commission of misconduct. So far as the appeals mentioned at serial Nos. 28 to 32 are concerned, the learned lower Court has not said that the appellants wrongly declared the said respondents as having become surplus. Likewise with regard to the respondents of appeals mentioned at serial Nos. 33 and 34 the learned lower Court has not observed that the said respondents had applied for being given duty on the restart of the factory and they were wrongly refused duty. The impugned order, therefore, so far as it relates to the cases from which the appeals mentioned at serial Nos. 28 to 34 are concerned, is set aside.
4. So far as remaining cases are concerned, accepting the application given under section 36 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 read with Standing Order 15(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 the learned lower Court did not afford opportunity to the parties to produce evidence and directed the reinstatement of the respondents in all the cases and allowed the appellant to hold fresh inquiry. The reasons given by the learned lower Court are that show, a use notice did not require the respondents to show cause against the penalty of dismissal from service and thus the respondents have been virtually condemned unheard; that the employer did not make an independent inquiry before granting the approval of dismissal and that the> order of dismissal has been passed by an authority other than the employer. In the application given under section 36 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 many grounds were taken on behalf of the respondents which were also argued before the learned lower Court but the learned lower Court has not recorded any finding thereon. Therefore, only the grounds given by the learned lower Court arc to be considered.
5. 'Many objections were raised on behalf of the appellant and it was contended that without inviting evidence they could not be decided, but the learned lower Court has dealt with only one of them. It has been observed by the learned lower Court that the objection of the appellant taken in the written statement was not that no grievance notice was served but rather was that no valid grievance notice was served. The learned lower Court has observed that copy of the grievance notice was on the record which was addressed to the General Manager and that since the respondents were dismissed by the order of the General Manager, notice was rightly addressed to him. The contention of the appellant raised in the written statement with regard to, the grievance notice appears to be that no notice was served. Simply by adding the word 'valid' they did not mean that notice was served but it was not valid. If the word 'valid' is omitted, the intention of the appellant becomes quite clear that according to them, no notice was served. If in the written statement it had been contended that the notice received from the respondents was not legal, of course, it could be said that the service of grievance notice was admitted and the objection was only to the effect that the same was not legal. The question of service or non-service of grievance notice is a question of fact which could only be decided after inviting evidence from the parties. In certain cases postal receipts are on the record but only by evidence it could be shown that the said receipts relate to grievance notice and no other correspondence. A very important objection was raised on behalf of the respondents but unfortuntately the learned lower Court has not adverted to it. The objection was that the show-cause notice was incompetent, inasmuch as it had been issued by the officers who, according to the very show-cause notice, are alleged to have been belabored by the respondents. The show-cause notice is signed by the General Manager and Personnel Manager and the show-cause notice is to the effect that both of them were abused and beaten. The question needed consideration whether the officers who could be the witnesses of the incidents could issue the very charge-sheets. If the answer to the question had been given by the learned lower Court in favour of the respondents, there would have been no occasion to permit the appellant to hold fresh inquiry on the same charge-sheet. Where a charge-sheet is not valid, on its basis neither any inquiry can be held nor any order of dismissal can be based upon. This point obviously did not need any evidence and only by inviting arguments the learned lower Court could have decided it one way or the other. The learned lower Court, no doubt, has held that no independent inquiry was held by the employer before granting approval of dismissal, but since this is remand case, I do not propose to express my opinion thereon. However, I uphold the view taken by the learned lower Court that where certain legal points are such that they do not require evidence and on their basis the dispute between the parties can be resolved, inviting of evidence is not necessary and the case can be decided forthwith but as observed above, in the present cases the evidence was required on certain points, therefore, the learned lower Court was not justified in accepting the grievance petitions of the respondents without inviting evidence.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the decision of the learned lower Court is a nullity in law, inasmuch as without being prepared and signed it was announced. Comments were invited from the learned Presiding Officer on the point. The comments are that the judgment was dictated on 7-11-1987 and was signed after it was typed on 8-11-1987. The date of announcement of the judgment as 7-11-1987 is admitted by both the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the judgment could not be signed on 8-11-1987, inasmuch as copy of the order was supplied on 17-11-1987 although application for copy as is apparent from the seal affixed on the copy was presented on 8-11-1987. He has also argued that whenever the official concerned of the learned lower Court was approached for the delivery of copy it was informed that the copy was not ready. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the judgment was prepared and signed on 14-11-1987. He has argued that since the judgment was announced before it was prepared and signed, it was a nullity in the eye of law. Some affidavits have also been filed in support of the contention that the judgment was typed and signed on 14-11-1987. Since the learned Presiding Officer has in the comments said that the judgment was typed and signed on 8-11-1987, the contention that it was signed on 14-11-1987 does not appear to be correct. But the question remains that the judgment was orally announced on 7-11-1987 when it had not yet been prepared and signed. On this point the learned counsel for the appellant has cited PLD 1976 Lahore 1162 and PLD 1982 Karachi 250. The argument of the learned counsel is supported by both the rulings. The former ruling arises from a labour case. Reliance was placed upon PLD 1973 SC 379. The observations of the Supreme Court read as under:-- "We are inclined to agree with the view taken by the High Court in this behalf. It has to be borne in mind that the requirement that orders of Courts ought to be publicly made and announced is not only a matter of accepted judicial procedure, but is invariably a requirement of law regulating the functioning of civil and criminal Courts. The Tribunal constituted under Act XII of 1957 was admittedly neither a civil nor a criminal Court and there was apparently no statutory or legal requirement as to the mode in which its orders were to be promulgated.
' In the absence of such requirement it is difficult to hold that the order, which was duly made, signed and dated by the members of the Tribunal before the expiry of its term, would stand invalidated, or would be rendered ineffective simply for the reason that it could not be publicly announced on a Sunday. The High Court has rightly remarked that no doubt was expressed as to the genuineness or the authenticity of the order of the Tribunal."
' Basing his opinion upon the Supreme Court's ruling it has been observed in the former ruling, "The ratio of decided of the above judgment appears to be that a judgment should be in writing, be announced publicly and signed, then an oral order may be merely an intention of the Court as to what judgment is going to be, but that certainly is not a valid, operative and a final judgment in the eye of law. That judgment can be altered at any time before it is announced and signed and even fresh proceedings can be started."
7. In PLD 1982 Karachi 250 after discussing the question, it has been observed, "it is, therefore, clear that a judgment in order to be operative has to be signed and delivered so that a verbal decision without even a short order recorded by the Court cannot be an effective judgment disposing of the case." Since on behalf of the respondents no arguments have been advanced, before me has come no other ruling in which a contrary view may have been taken. However, where, after hearing the arguments, a judgment is dictated in the presence of the parties or their counsel which by the very dictation stands automatically announced, will be valid, provided it is prepared within a short time of the dictation and is signed by the Presiding Officer on the same date. In the present case this was not the position. As admitted by the learned Presiding Officer, the order was announced on 7-11-1987 but it was signed on the following day. The learned Presiding Officer does not say that the order was dictated in the presence of the parties or their counsel. It is thus clear that the order was announced orally before it was prepared and signed. The impugned judgment, therefore, is not sustainable for this reason also.
8. As a result, all the appeals are accepted and setting aside the impugned decision of the learned lower Court, the cases are remanded with the direction that after inviting evidence on the disputed questions of fact, the cases be redefined. The cases from which the appeals mentioned at serial Nos. 28 to 34 F arise could not be decided along with the other 27 cases, therefore, the learned lower Court is directed to decide the cases from which the appeals mentioned at serial Nos. 28 to 32 arise by separate order after separate trial and likewise the cases from which the appeals mentioned at serial Nos. 33 and 34 arise be decided separately. Since the appeal was ordered to be proceeded ex parte against Sufi Muhammad Sadiq, the said appeal stands accepted ex parte.
Learned counsel for the respondents was allowed many opportunities and last opportunity was allowed adjourning the appeal to 17-7-1987 but in spite of it he did not turn up, therefore, I was constrained to decide the appeals without granting further adjournment.