DECISION ' This is an appeal filed by the appellant Corporation against an impugned order, dated 5-1-1986, passed by the Sind Labour Court No, IV, Karachi, who had allowed the grievance petition of the respondent under section 25-A, I.R.O. 1969, directing his reinstatement in service with 50% back benefits.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the respondent claimed to be a permanent driver in the appellant Corporation and on 23-1-1984, he was served with a detailed charge-sheet that while he was on duty at the Corporation's Bus Fleet No, 1885, shift route No, SR-23, at about 0735 hours, going en route to city, due to over speeding, negligence and carelessness, he ran over bus over the passengers standing/sitting at the road side, resulting in that 7 persons had died on spot and 7 other persons received serious injuries and were taken to the Hospital. The respondent claimed that he was suspended with effect from 4-1-1984 to 23-1-1984 and was reinstated on 24-1-1984 and that a proper and lawful enquiry was not conducted against him in which he was not afforded an opportunity to defend himself and to produce his defence and as such being aggrieved he sent a grievance notice followed by his grievance petition under section 25-A, I.R.O. 1969 for his reinstatement in service with full back benefits.
3. The appellant Corporation resisted the petition on the grounds that a proper and lawful enquiry was conducted against the respondent in which he was afforded full opportunity to defend himself and then the Enquiry Officer held him guilty of the gross-misconduct, therefore, the present application of the respondent was not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed.
4. Both parties filed their respective affidavits-in-evidence and they were duly cross-examined.
Thereafter, the learned Labour Court has passed the impugned order, hence, the present appeal.
5. I have heard Mr. Kamal Mansoor Alam, the learned Advocate for the appellant Corporation and the respondent Sadda Hussain, in person, and have also carefully perused the record and proceedings of the case. It was argued by Mr. Kamal Mansoor Alam, the learned Advocate for the appellant Corporation that the learned Labour Court has erred in giving undue weight to the evidence of the witnesses who were not reliable and that the Enquiry Officer was neither judicial nor based on the perception of the natural justice rather more on sentiments and that the learned Labour Court was not justified in expressing its doubts about the enquiry proceedings and he cannot sit in appeal over it as it was an admitted position that the respondent had participated in the enquiry. Mr. Kamal Mansoor Alam, the learned Advocate for the appellant Corporation has further contended that the learned Labour Court had erred in holding that during the pendency of the criminal proceedings against the respondent before a Magistrate, the appellant Corporation was barred from taking any action against him and that the impugned order is based on surmises and conjectures. I see much force in the arguments of Mr. Kamal Mansoor Alam, the learned Advocate for the appellant Corporation. From the evidence brought on record it is an established position that only on account of negligent careless and over-speed driving of the respondent valuable lives of 7 persons were lost and others were disabled on account of serious injuries sustained by them. Further, it is an established fact that the respondent had not fulfilled the legal requirements of serving grievance notice upon the appellant Corporation before filing his grievance petition under section .25-A, I.R.O. 1969, before the learned Labour Court. From the perusal of an application, dated 21-11-1984 submitted by the respondent to the appellant Corporation vide Exh. P on the record the contents of prayer clause, would prove that the respondent had only made an appeal not to take disciplinary action against him till the decision of the criminal case. This cannot be said a grievance notice under the Law and on this point also the grievance petition under section 25-A, I.R.O. 1969 could not be maintained. In view of these facts and legal aspects of the case, I would hold that the dismissal from service of the respondent was correct and lawful and it is maintained. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. I have also heard the respondent who is present in person. He has nothing to argue in support of his case.
6. For the reasons stated by me above, I would set aside the impugned order and would allow the present appeal.