DECISION ' This is an appeal filed by the appellants against an impugned order dated 30-8-1987, passed by the Sind Labour Court No, VII at Sukkur, who had disposed of the application of the respondent under section 25-A, I.R.O. 1969 in terms of an application jointly submitted by both the parties before it.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the respondent claimed to have been working as Purchase Officer at the relevant time in the appellants Corporation, having been posted at Gumbat District Khairpur. The claim of the respondent was that originally he was appointed as Purchase Officer on 4-5-1978 and was performing the duties of clerical nature and in the month of May 1980 he was posted at Larkana but his wages were stopped on the plea that certain amount of PASSCO were outstanding against him. Further, the respondent claimed that in April 1984 he was transferred from Jacobabad to Gambat, District Khairpur and even for this long period, he was not paid despite his best efforts and so when he personally went to Lahore, the headquarters of the appellants Corporation he was informed that original appointment letter was missing from his personal file, therefore, he was not being paid his salary for want of information of his correct wages and even after that he was not paid his wages. The respondent claimed that even after having put a service of about 16 years in appellants Corporation, he could not bear to leave his job and expected that his dues would be paid to him in lump sum in due course and further that the appellants Corporation was inclined to deduct a heavy amount from his salaries for alleged shortage, a there was nothing outstanding against him. That, on account of his pulsation for the payment of his salaries, the Managing Director of appellants Corporation became annoyed with him and vide letter, dated 3-91986, his services were terminated with effect from 31-8-1984 without assigning any reason, therefore, and that with effect from 1-1-1981, ill 31-8-1984 he was not paid his salaries totaling to an amount of Rs,66,324 on an allegation that a sum of Rs,58,054 was outstanding against him though he was never called for to explain or was subjected to a domestic enquiry against him for this allegation. The respondent has further claimed that though his termination from service was simplicities without assigning any reason vide Order, dated 5-9-1984, yet he performed his duties till 22-9-1984 as the alleged termination order was handed over to him on 22-9-1984 and even for this period, he was not paid his salary or the notice pay etc. The last claim of the respondent was that his alleged termination of service simpliciter was void and inoperative for the reason that persons, namely, Ghulam Kadir Rahooja, Abdul Rauf Rahooja, Zafaruddin Abro, Liaquat Ali Bajkani and Gul Muhammad Umrani were junior to him and they were admittedly retained in services. Being aggrieved, the respondent claimed to have served his grievance notice upon the Senior General Manager, the Managing Director and the Senior Project Manager (f) of the appellants Corporation followed by his grievance petition under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969 for his reinstatement in service with full back benefits.
3V The appellants Corporation resisted the grievance petition of the respondent on the grounds that the respondent was not a workman for the purposes of Labour Laws, but, at the relevant time was performing the duties of managerial and supervisory in nature and that it was not maintainable for non-joinder of necessary party viz. PASSCO a limited company and also that the learned Labour Court at Sukkur had no jurisdiction in the mattertas the cause of action had accrued to the respondent at Lahore. It was further claimed by the appellants Corporation that the respondent's performance was never satisfactory and during the period ranging from 1977-78 to 1983-84, while posted at various places, he had committed misappropriation as well as shortage of huge amounts which liability was accepted by the respondent with a request that it would be adjusted against his salaries and subsequently according to the audit objection it was established that total amount of Rs,2,58,445.39 was outstanding against the respondent and in which amount, the amount of wheat crop 1984 was not included. Lastly it was claimed by the appellants Corporation that as the termination of service was with reasons and that it was not a retrenchment, therefore, the respondent was not entitled to maintain his grievance petition which was liable to be dismissed.
4. The respondent filed his affidavit-in-evidence and he was duly cross-examined by the appellants Corporation. From the perusal of the record of the learned Labour Court, it would be evident that one Syed Munawar Ali Shah, Administrative Officer of the appellants Corporation has filed his affidavit-inevidence, but, he was not put for cross-examination by the respondent.
Thereafter, by consent of both the parties an application was submitted before the learned Labour Court on 30-8-1987, which passed the impugned order, hence the present appeal.
5. I have heard, Mr. Abdul Wahid Katpar, the learned Advocate for the respondent. Mr. M.L. Shahani, the learned Advocate for the appellants Corporation called absent. Mr. Shahani, though he had himself obtained this date for hearing, but, had made an application for adjournment. As the respondent and his learned Advocate are coming from Larkana, therefore, an adjournment application is rejected. None is also present for appellants Corporation. HoWeyer, I have carefully perused the record and proceedings of the case. At the very outset, Mr. Abdul Wahid Katpar, the learned Advocate for the respondent had pointed out to me to the fact that in the memo. Of appeal, the names of the appellants shown were not the names of respondents shown in the original application under section 25-A, I.R.O. 1969, before the learned Labour Court, therefore, the present appeal was nto filed by the proper parties, hence, it was liable to be dismissed on this sole ground. After perusal of the memo. Of appeal I find that there is force in the contentions of Mr. Abdul Wahid Katpar, so, I would hold that the present appeal was not filed by the proper parties.
Secondly, it was submitted by Mr. Katpar, the learned Advocate for the respondent that after signing the compromise application on behalf of the appellants Corporation and thereby obtaining by consent impugned order from the learned Labour Court, it was not lawful and permissible for the appellants Corporation to challenge the same in an appeal before this Tribunal.
On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the appellants Corporation in the memo. Of appeal that the learned Advocate for the appellants Corporation was not authorized to compromise the matter before the learned Labour Court, hence, the impugned order was without authority. I see no force in these contentions of the appellants Corporation. Although the compromise appears to be without prior approval of the appellants Corporation but, since the learned Advocates for both the parties had signed it, therefore, it cannot be challenged and in view of this admitted position, I would maintain the compromised impugned order of the learned Labour Court. Thirdly, it was argued by Mr. Abdul Wahid Katpar, that from the facts, evidence and circumstances brought on record it is crystal clear that the termination of service of the respondent was mala fide, unjust, improper and contrary to the legal requirements so, it has to be set aside and the benefits of these illegalities be given to the respondent who had been victimised.
I see much force in these arguments of Mr. Katpar, the learned Advocate for the respondent and would set aside the so-called termination order of the respondent. In view of the above facts, circumstances brought on record and the legal aspects of the present case, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order and would maintain the same.
6. For the reasons discussed by me above, I see no reason to set aside the impugned order and would maintain the same. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed. The respondent is directed to be reinstated in service forthwith as per contents of the compromise application, dated 30-8- 1987.