JUDGMENTAHMED ALI U. QURESH1, J.--This first Rent Appeal is directed against the orders of the learned IVth Sr. Civil Judge & Rent Controller, Karachi (East), dated 31-7-1985, whereby the learned Rent Controller ordered the eviction of the appellant in Rent Case No.364/1984.
2. The facts of the case in brief are, that the respondent is owner of a plot of land bearing No.125/2 P.E.C.H.S., Karachi. He constructed thereupon a house divided in two portions, which for the purpose of convinience may be describes as northern portion and southern portion. The appellant is admittedly ten- . Of the northern portion since 1972. The respondent was a government servant, serving as Deputy Secretary to the Federal Govt, of Pakistan at islamabad, and retired in the end of 1983 or in the beginning of 1984. Somewhere, in August 1982, the southern portion of the house which was in occupation of some other tenant fell vacant and son of the respondent, occupied that portion of house as he was studying at Karachi.Before his retirement, the respondent is alleged to have served notice upon the appellant, asking him to vacate the premises in his possession as he required the same for his personal bona-fide use. The appellant did not vacate the premises, and therefore, after retirement, the respondent came to live in the southern portion of the house which consists of one room and one drawing room. As it was not sufficient for his needs, therefore, he filed rent case under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance. 1979, against the appellant. Subsequently, on finding that he was disqualified from seeking relief under section 14 by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 14, on his application the rent case was converted into one under section 15 of the said Ordinance. The appellant resisted the rent case and contended, that the rent case was not maintainable on the ground, that the respondent did not require the premises in good faith for bona-fide needs and that from time to lime he had increased the rent on the assurance that after his retirement the applicant/respondent would not get the premises in possession of the appellant vacated, but would gel vacated southern portion of the house, therefore, it is contended, that the respondent was estopped from seeking eviction of the appellant on the ground of personal requirement. On the pleadings of the parties the learned Rent Controller framed the following issues.i) Whether the application as framed and filed is maintainable in law?
Ii) Whether the applicant is required the premises for his personal bona-fide, use and for use of his family?Iii) What should the decree?The learned Rent Controller decided all the issues in favour of the respondent and passed the impugned order.
3. 1 have heard Mr. Yousuf Khalri, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr.Badrudduja Khan, learned counsel for the respondent, at length and I have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
4. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is, that the respondent was estopped from seeking eviction on the ground of personal requirement on the basis of the assurances given by him, and on his behalf by other persons, who used trl collect the rent, that if the rent was increased, the respondent would not, after his retirement, seek eviction on the ground of his personal bona-fide needs. It is submitted, that because of these assurances the appellant agreed to increase the rent and therefore the respondent could not seek eviction due to the operation of doctrine of promissory estoppedl.
5. Admittedly, the rent was increased in 1974 from Rs.380/- to 430/-. The rent was further increased in year 1977,1978, 1979, 1980, 1981 and twice in year 1982, viz for seven times. The rent was increased from Rs.430/- per month in 1974 to Rs.1,000/- in July, 1982 in the space of 8 years. For these 7 times when the rent was increased, it is alleged that every time, the respondent used to assure the appellant and her son Iqbal, that in case the rent was increased, the responent would not seek eviction of the appellant on the ground of his personal requirement after his retirement. There is only oral evidence of Iqbal on the alleged assurances given by the respondent before the increase of rent every time. The burden of proof of these assurances was upon the appellant. There is only word of Iqbal, who is attorney and son of the appellant, that the respondent had given aforesaid assurances before the increase of rent every time as against the word of the respondent, denying to have given such assurances. In such a case the Court has to rely more upon the circumstances of the case rather than the oral word of the parties.
6. The rent was first time increased on the basis of alleged assurances in October, 1977, whereas, the respondent retired in 1983-84, viz after more than seven years. It does not look probable or appeal to reason that on the same ground and same assurances the appellant would have agreed to increase rent 7 times in space of 5 years. A normal person is bound to be suspicious, when he is asked to do some thing again and again for he same reason. No doubt, the appellant is a lady, but her son Iqbal, who is said to be present every time when on basis of said assurances, increase in the rent was agreed. Admittedly, this Iqbal is a business-man, and as such he would normally be shrewd and careful in money matters. He is unlikely to have agreed to increase of the rent seven times on the same assurances and on same ground. He is not such a simple an that under the said circumstances, he would not have even obtained such assurances in writing from the respondent. There is nothing in writing to show, that any such assurance was given by the respondent. Looking to the inflation prevailing in the country in general and in Karachi particular the increase of rent does not appear to be abnormal. The increase in rent every time is Rs.100/- or less than Rs.100/-. There is no evidence to show, that at the relevant time the prevailing rate of rent in that locality was less than what was agreed upon between the parties. It seems improbable that there was increase in rent due to any assurance that the respondent would not seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement after his retirement. Not only there is no documentary evidence, but there is even no other evidence corroborating the evidence of Iqbal.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the case of Anwar Baig vs. Mariam Bibi 1987 CLC 508, wherein it is held, that issue of estoppal can be proved by means of oral evidence only and it was wrong lo contend, that the estoppel can be proved only when the oral evidence is supported by documentary evidence. I am in respectful agreement with this view expressed in this case. However, the oral in proof of estoppel has to be such which can be believed and looks convincing. I have already pointed, that the oral evidence produced by the appellant is not sufficient to prove the estoppel.
7. Reliance is also placed on the case of Haji Ghulam Rasool vs. The Chief Administrator of Auqaf, West Pakistan, reported in PLD 1971 SC 376, wherein, their Lordships have defined the doctrine of estoppel in following words:- "The doctrine of estoppel is not confined to the matters dealt with under section 115 of the Evidence Act, for 'estoppels in the sense in which the term is used in the English legal Phraseology are matter of infinite variety and arc by no means confined lo the subjects dealt with in Chapter VHI of the Evidence Act, "It has been defined in halbury's Laws of England (2nd Edition), Vol.13, "as a disability whereby a party is precluded from alleging or proving in legal proceedings that a fact is otherwise then it has been made to appear by the matter giving rise to that disability." lt is in this sense that it has often been held that even as a rule of evidence or pleading a party should not be allowed to approbate and reprobte.It is true that to raise an estoppel there must be something in the nature of a representation by the party against whom it is pleaded as a result of which the party to whom it is made has been induced to take a particular course of conduct."
8. The facts of this case are distinguishable. In the reported case the appellant with full knowledge of facts requested Revenue Authorities to correct the record by entering therein the true position and since have allowed that to remain unchanged for nearly eighty years. It was therefore held, that they were now debarred from setting up a different case and should at any rate not to be believed when they said that that was not true position. Reliance is also placed on the case of Gujrat State Financial Coron. v. Lotus Hotels pvt. Limited (1984 PSC 308). In the reported case, a government undertaking had entered into a contract with a party and the party incurred expenditure and suffered liabilities, while acting upon promise. It was held, that Government undertaking was estopped from backing out from its promise.
9. In the instant case apart from oral evidence of Iqbal, there is no other evidence to show, that any such assurance was given by the respondent. As pointed earlier, even the circumstances of the case bellie such contention. The learned counsel for the appellant has also cited certain English Authorities promissory estoppel. I need not discuss these authorities as in my opinion, the evidence on record does not prove, that any assurances were given by the respondent, which could operate as promissory estoppel against him and preclude him from seeking eviction of the appellant on the ground of his personal requirement. My finding therefore on issue No.1 is in negative.
10. Next we come to the bona-fide requirement of the respondent. The burden of proof was un- doubtly upon the respondent. Admittedly, house in question consists of two portions. One portion presently in occupation of the respondent consists of one room, and one drawing room, whereas, the portion in possession of the appellant consists of two rooms and one drawing room.
Admittedly, the family of the respondent consists of himself, his wife, two grown up sons, and one daughter, who is mairicd.
Admittedly, the daughter docs visit her parents and it is not un-belicvablc that she would occasionally be visiting her parents alongwith her husband. Thus, for ail times respondent and his wife and his two grown up sons would have to sleep in one room, which is neither convinicnt nor proper. The respondent would also naturally be in a very awckward position, when his visiting daughter is also made to sleep in the same room alongwith her husband.
11. The appellant is admittedly a retired Deputy Secretary of Federal Government and belongs to start of society where he requires one room to meet visitors and guests. As such the drawing room cannot be used by him as bed room. In the above mentioned circustances, the statement on Oath of the respondent, that he requires other portion presently in the possession of the appellant, for his bona-fide personal use, neither looks to be untrue nor malafide.
12. Reliance is placed upon case of Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Muhammad Sharif 1987 SCM R 1768. In this case Their Lordships granted leave to appeal as landlord upon refusal of the tenant to increase rent, demanded vacant possession of the premises without asserting, that the premises were required for personal use. It was observed, that assertion that premises were required for the personal use was in such a close proximity in point of time with demand of increase of rent, that it militated against plea of landlord, as a strong circumstance reflecting upon his bonafides. In the instant case there is nothing on record to show, that after last increase of rent in 1982 the respondent demanded further increase in the rent and that thereafter he filed the rent ease.
13. In the ease of Noor Muhammad v. Iqbal Ahmed (1985 CLC 1007) a learned single Judge of this Court had held "No hard and fast rule could be laid down for quantum and quality of evidence to prove bona fide need of landlord for seeking eviction of a tenant on that ground. Statement of landlord alone was sufficient to prove his personal requirements, if it can satisfy a prudent mind by objective evidence, that such requirement docs exist." The learned single Judge had relied upon the case of Muhammad Shall v. Muhammad Azam 1983 CLC 2657.
14. In the instant case looking to the admitted facts and circumstances, the evidence of the respondent alone in my opinion is sufficient to prove his personal requirement, as it is obviously imprudent, for two grown up sons to sleep in the same room with their married parents.
15. In the case of Mst. Zehra Begum v. Pakistan Burmah Shell Limited (PLD 1984 SC 38). Their Lordships observed that "the bona-fide requirement of the premises by the landlord for the occupation or use of his spouse or any of the children is, to begin with, a need personal to him. He has only to place certain facts before the Controller to make objectives assessment and review in appeal of needs and good faith possible." The learned counsel for both the parties have relied upon the number of other reported cases. In all those cases it is held, that burden of proof of bona- fide requirement is upon the landlord and that he has to place material before the Rent Controller so that objective assessm ent could be made of his bona-fide requirement and needs. I need not discuss all these cases, because each case has to be decided on its particular circumstances and evidence on record. So far the principles are concerned with regard to proof of good faith there appears to be no difference of opinion amongst the superior Courts. The principle enunliated in all these cases is that burden of proof is upon the landlord but his word alone is sufficient to prove his requirement if the same could be spell out from the circumstances and facts of the case.
16. I have already pointed the admitted position of the accomodation in possession of the respondent and admitted position of the strength and number of his family members. In my opinion, a person cannot be denied the right to live comfortably in his own house in his old age after retirement. I need not go into the question of his future requirement alter marriages of his grown up sons. Even his present requirements do indicate that he needs some more accommodation. I am therefore in agreement with the finding of the learned Rent Controller, that the respondent bona-fide requires the premises in dispute for his personal requirement.
17. I find no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly, dismissed with no orders as to costs. However, llje appellant is allowed six months lime from this order to find alternate accommodation and hand over the vacant possession to the respondent, subject to the condition, that she continues to deposit rent with the Rent Controller as already ordered by the learned Rent Controller.