DECISION ' This appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Sind Labour Court No, III at Karachi dated 28-2-1987, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant was dismissed.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant was employed as a skilled workman by the respondents and continued to work as such from 1-10-1981 to 30-9-1985, when his services were dispensed with without any notice or order. After serving grievance notice upon the respondents, he filed the grievance petition. The case of thRc respondents is that the appellant was not a permanent workman, but, had been employed on contract basis and that the period of contract was being renewed from time to time and that work assigned to him was not of a permanent nature and that he ceased to be in the service after expiry of the contract period.
3. I have heard Mr. Malik Noor Khan, Advocate for the appellant and Mrs. Salima Nasiruddin, Advocate for the respondents.
4. The letters of appointment produced by the appellant show that he was initially appointed on contract basis, vide appointment letter, dated 14-10-1981 which contained the terms and conditions of his employment from 1-10-1981. His terms of appointment were further extended from time to time vide letters, dated 7-9-1982, 4-10-1983 and 2-10-1984. By the last mentioned letter, his terms of appointment were extended upto 30-9-1985 after which his period of appointment was not extended further.
5. The question that requires consideration is whether a person engaged on contract basis can acquire status of a permanent worker. The letter of appointment shows that he was appointed as a skilled worker, therefore, the appellant would come within the definition of 'workman' as defined in West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called Ordinance), in section 2(i). Standing Order 1 classifies 5 categories of workmen.
These 5 categories do not mention any worker on contract. The respondents pleaded that the work on which the appellant was engaged was not of a permanent nature. In other words, it is also pleaded that the appellant was a temporary worker. Temporary worker has been defined under Standing Order 1(a) to be a workman who was engaged for work which is of an essentially temporary nature likely to be finished within a period not exceeding 9 months. Even in the pleadings, the respondents had not pleaded that the work was of a temporary nature which was likely to he finished within 9 months. Mr. Wali Muhammad Assistant Manager of the respondents has admitted in the cross-examination that the appellant was working continuously from October, 1981 to September, 1985, as a skilled worker.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the case reported in 1986 PLC page 795, wherein this Tribunal has held that employee having already completed more than 9 months service and probationary period of 3 months, had attained status of permanent worker. His termination of service could he made by written order mentioning reasons thereof. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon 1985 PLC page 735. In that case the post was created temporarily to streamline work. The termination was made after about 14 months service and employee in termination order was advised to collect dues including one month's salary in lieu of notice. None else was appointed in place of terminated employee. The Division Bench of Karachi High Court, therefore, held that the termination of service was not mala fide and that the requirement of Standing Order 12 of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, was fulfilled. Similar view was taken by this Tribunal in the case reported in 1980 PLC 728. In that caser also appointment was made specifically for a temporary period for job of temporary nature in first instance for 3 months. The nature of job as temporary was stated in subsequent extension orders. The termination was made stating same as due to redundancy of post and with notice pay.
7. It will be seen that in the instant case in the first appointment order, not, doubt, the appellant was appointed on contract basis of one year, but, it is not III mentioned therein that the job on which he was appointed was of a temporary nature. It has, no doubt, come on record that the project on which the appellant was working had been closed, hut, that by itself does not mean that when the appellant was appointed on the job, it was of a temporary nature likely to be finished within months but continued for more than 9 months because of unforeseen circumstances. No such evidence has come on record. It is not mentioned even in the subsequent letters for extension that the job on which the appellant was employed was of a temporary nature. His letter of appointment also shows that the appellant was initially appointed on probation for 2 months, but, nowhere it is shown that the job on which he was employed was of temporary nature or was for a particular duration. Under the circumstances, the appellant had acquired the status of a permanent worker and his services could not be terminated except in accordance with the provisions of Standing Orders B Ordinance, 1968. As the services of the appellant were not terminated by any written order and in accordance with Standing Order 12(3) of the Ordinance, the services of the appellant cannot be considered to have been validly terminated.
8. Reference may also be made to the case reported in PLD 1980 SC page 323 which is the case of P.I.A. v. Sind Labour Court No, 5 and others. In that case Employer had given a training school for construction to a contractor by a written agreement stipulating that the school had to be constructed within 15 months from the commencement of the agreement. He had also employed certain employees to supervise the said specific work. It was observed therein by their Lordships that the respondents (workmen) had not been employed on permanent basis because they had been elopement to supervise a contract which was of a limited duration.
9. As already pointed the facts of the instant case are distinguishable. The appellant was not appointed in any specific project which was to last for certain specific period. No doubt, the period of his contract was limited, but, the period of project was not shown to be limited in the appointment order. It says that he had been appointed on contract basis in the Maintenance Section on the terms and conditions mentioned therein. As the appellant had successfully completed the period of probation and also had put in 4 years' service, he would be deemed to be a permanent worker as defined in Standing Order 1 of the Ordinance. His services could not have been terminated save in accordance with the Standing Orders Ordinance. The learned Labour Court has erroneously held that because of the terms and conditions of the employment he could not attain the status of a permanent worker. Mere fact that he was not getting certain allowances under the contract of service would also not necessarily debar him from attaining the status of a permanent workman.
10. In view of the above discussion, the order of the learned Labour Court is set aside and the appellant is ordered to be reinstated in service with full back benefits from the date of termination of his service. Order to be implemented within one month.
11. However, this order would not preclude the respondents from terminating the services of the appellant if his services have become redundant in ID accordance with the provision of law after compliance of this decision.