' The appeal captioned above challenges the decision dated 24-10-1988 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 3, Lahore at Ferozewala whereby the grievance petition of the respondent for his reinstatement in service has been accepted with back benefit till the date of the closure of the establishment plus termination benefits as allowed to other persons, who were, terminated on account of the closing of the establishment.
2. The respondent was supervisor of production department. His services were terminated vide order dated 24-11-1986 as no longer required. The petition was opposed and it was contended in the written statement that the respondent was not a workman as he was employed in supervisory capacity and was getting wages amounting to Rs,2,665 per month. The learned lower Court has held the respondent as a 'workman'. The ground for setting aside the order of termination given by the learned lower Court is that no reasons are given in it.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant has laid much stress on the point that the learned lower Court has wrongly held that the respondent is a workman. It has been argued that as stated by RWs. The duties of the respondent were supervisory and since his emoluments were Rs,2,665 per month as admitted by him he stood ousted from the definition of 'workman'. Exh. R-4 to Exh. R-9 are the leave applications produced by the appellant in order to show that the respondent was discharging duties of a supervisory nature. The perusal of these applications shows that the respondent did not recommend these applications but only sent them to the Section In charge for recommendations.
The Section In charge recommended the applications and the Head of the Department passed orders. Exh. R-4 was rejected but Exh. R-5 to Exh.R-9 were accepted. Since the respondent did not recommend the leave but the leave was recommended by the Section In charge, therefore, these documents did not show that the respondent had supervisory powers. On the back of Exhs. R-1 to R-3 appear the signatures of the respondent but since designation is not given under signatures it does not appear in what capacity he signed the documents. RW-1 has deposed that Exhs. R-1 to R- 3 are the reports given by the respondent after every shift of eight hours. The said reports do not show if he had to supervise any person working under him and that he used to supervise him. No document written by the respondent recommending any promotion or taking of any action against any person has been brought on the record. Such a report may show that he had supervisory powers. This is idle to say that throughout the tenure of his service the respondent neither recommended the promotion of any of his subordinates nor proposed to take action against anyone. The leave applications referred to above rather show that the Incharge was another person so he may be recommending promotions or taking action against his subordinates. There is no such documentary evidence to support the statements of RW-1 and RW-
2. Where documentary evidence can be in existence, oral evidence cannot be given any weight. If in reality the respondent had been exercising supervisory powers the leave applications Exh. R-4 to Exh. R-9 would have been recommended by him. Likewise some other documents would have been in existence whereby he may have proposed taking action against any employee, or had recommended promotions. There are two conditions given in exception (b) of section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which are that powers should be supervisory and wages should be in excess of Rs,800 per month. Only one condition has been proved which is that the wages of the respondent were in excess of Rs,800 per month. But as discussed above, there is no evidence that any person was working under him and he used to supervise him. The learned lower Court, therefore, had rightly decided that the respondent was covered by the definition of workman.
4. So far as the order of termination is concerned, the same has been rightly struck down by the learned lower Court because it is in violation of the provisions of Standing Order 12(3). The said Standing Order says that explicit reasons for termination of service should be given. The reason given in the termination order is "no longer required". A reason which requires further explanation is not a sufficient reason, because question arises why the service of a person is no longer required.
So this is not a reason for termination. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the learned lower Court has allowed those benefits also to the respondent which he did not claim. The learned lower Court has said that termination benefits will also be allowed to the respondent. At the time when the services of the respondent were terminated, the establishment was working and thereafter it was closed and the persons working there were paid termination benefits and services were terminated. Since it has been held that the respondent was illegally terminated from service it would mean that he continued to be in service till the time the establishment was closed. As other persons, whose services were terminated on the closure of the establishment were paid termination benefits, in the same manner the respondent who as observed above continued to be in service till that time was entitled to the said benefits and thus the learned lower Court has rightly issued direction in this respect.
5. As a result the appeal fails and is demised.