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1989 PLC (C.S.) 419

MUZAFFAR IQBAL vs DIRECTOR-GENERAL, PAKISTAN RANGERS, LAHORE and

Citation1989 PLC (C.S.) 419
CourtFederal Service Tribunal
Judge(s)Ch. Hassan Nawaz, Kh. Abdul Jalil
ResultAppeal dismissed

' CH. HASAN NAWAZ (MEMBER).--While serving as Havaldar in Indus Rangers, the appellant was removed from service on 1-11-1983 by the competent Authority in consequence of disciplinary proceedings under the Pakistan Rangers (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1977 framed by the Government of West Pakistan under subsection (2) of section 21 of the West Pakistan Rangers Ordinance, 1959.

2. On departmental appeal, the punishment of removal from service was converted into that of compulsory retirement on 18-1-1984 by the Director-General, Pakistan Rangers (Annex. A/3). A review petition dated 30-4-1984 addressed to the Director-General was withheld on the ground of limitation and the appellant was informed of this fact by letter dated 10-6-1984 (Annex. A/4). In the present appeal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, the appellant has challenged the validity of orders dated 1-11-1983, 1R-1-1984 and 10-6-1984.

3. These are the facts in the background: There was a complaint that a civilian of the name of Sohrab Khan, resident of Goth Bambrani was beaten by Muhammad Yasin, Sepoy. On an enquiry held by Mr. Muhammad Nawaz, D.S.P. Of the Rangers, Mr. Muhammad Yasin aforesaid, Allah Bakhsh and Siraj Din, Sepoys of the Rangers were found guilty of the charge and sentenced by the competent authority to rigorous imprisonment for a day lesser than three months. In the same case, an order of censure was passed against the appellant.

4. After this conviction had taken place, the aforementioned Sepoys made an application to the concerned authority wherein it was alleged that they had been persuaded by the appellant to take the entire blame on themselves, on a promise that he would pursue the case and ensure that nothing happens against them. During the ensuing departmental enquiry it was found that the appellant was directly involved in the incident of assault on civilian Sohrab Khan. He was served with a charge-sheet under section 15(1) of the Ordinance and after having been found guilty, was removed from service on 1-11-1983.

5. The main ground on which the order of compulsory retirement has been challenged is that after once having been censured, the appellant could not have been legally punished for the same offence and that the impugned order is illegal on the principle of double jeopardy. It was further pleaded that the statements of co-accused were not worthy of any reliance and that the material on record did not justify the conclusion that the charge against him had been established.

6. The appeal was, inter alia, opposed on the ground of limitation. On merits, it was pleaded in defence that there was sufficient material on the record to warrant a finding that the appellant had been himself involved in the commission of offence and that he was guilty of the charge levelled against him.

7. Rule 17 of the Rules provides that only one appeal shall lie against the punishment awarded under these rules and no further appeal shall be made on any ground. It is further provided that revision petition ml .7, however, be submitted to the same Appellate Authority who originally head?

The appeal, on the grounds of material legal irregularities in the proceedings or un availability of fresh evidence. In the proviso to this rule, it was laid down that such an application shall by submitted within 15 days from the original decision of the appeal and no request has been made for fresh scrutiny of the evidence already produced.

8. The revision petition has not been placed on the record and it is difficult to ascertain if it did fulfil the requirements of the rule regaining the nature of prayer made in it. Nor is it possible to find whether review/revision was sought on the ground of material legal irregularities in the proceedings or on the availability of fresh evidence. We feel that it was the appellant's duty to have placed the review petition on the record to enable us to determine whether the aforementioned statutory requirements have been duly complied with. In the absence of this petition, we are justified to infer that these requirements had not been fulfilled and that it was not a competent application for review.

9. This circumstance apart, it was clearly time-barred because of having been filed on 30-4-1984, long after the expiry of fifteen days from the original decision of the appeal on 18-1-1984. There was every justification for withholding this application on the ground of limitation. The result is that we are left with the order dated 18-1-1984 dismissing his departmental appeal dated 14-11-1983, which was final because no review/revision petition having been filed within time and in accordance with the requirement of rule 17 of the Rules. The present appeal filed after the expiry of 30 days from 18- 1-1984 is, therefore, evidently time-barred under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, under which the appellant was legally obliged to have recourse to this Tribunal within 30 days of the communication of the final order made by the competent authority.

10. Before taking leave of the matter, it may be pointed out that the circumstances of the case did not attract the application of the principle of double jeopardy. It is not possible to find that the appellant was punished twice for the same offence. As the facts go, proceedings were initiated against him on the application of the Spays under him and he was charge-sheeted as a result of departmental enquiry. He was subsequently removed from service on this charge having been established. There is nothing on the record to show that he had been punished for this offence on an earlier occasion.

11. For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed as being time-barred. There IC will be no order as to costs.

12. Parties to be informed.

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