' Abdul Majid respondent No, 3 (hereinafter referred to as the as employed as Telephone Operator in the Muslim Commercial Bank Limite , respondent) the petitioner herein. In June 1982, while the respondent was serving in Circular Road Branch, Faisalabad of the petitioner Bank, his services were terminated on 5-6-1982, through letter, copy Annex. 'A'. This be termination simplicity. The respondent was informed that purported to his no longer required, therefore, the same were dispensed with. In the mention the petitioner Bank acknowledged the commendable he respondent and assured him that further possibility of his in the organization of the petitioner bank would be explored. The however, challenged his termination before the learned Punjab t No, 4, Faisalabad through a grievance petition under section 25-A trial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the learned Labour Court dismissed the respondent's grievance 6-10- 1982. He, thereafter, preferred an appeal before the learned urn Appellate Tribunal. On 11-5-1983, the respondent's appeal was accepted and he was directed to be re-instated with back benefits.
2. The aforesaid order passed by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal on 11-5-1983, has been assailed through the present constitutional petition.
' Primarily it was urged on behalf of the petitioner-Bank that terms and conditions of service of the employees of the nationalized Banks and other financial institutions were governed by the award of the Wage Commission and that the said award by virtue of the provisions of section 38 of the Ordinance could only be enforced by the National Industrial Relations Commission. Thus it was canvassed that the Labour Court and the Labor Appellate Tribunal lacked jurisdiction in the matter.
It was also averred that the award of the Wage Commission was not covered by the definition of expression 'award' as occurring in section 2 of the Ordinance and, therefore, this award could not be enforced through an application under section 25-A of the Ordinance.
' These contentions found favor with a learned Division Bench of this Court. Consequently, the writ petition of the petitioner Bank was allowed on 104-1985. The main judgment was recorded in Writ Petition No, 719 of 1982.
' The respondent and other affected employees of the nationalized Banks went in appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. These appeals were accepted by the august Supreme Court. It has been held by the Supreme Court of Pakistan that the award of the Wage Commission like any other award is enforceable under section 25-A of the Ordinance and, therefore, the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal did not lack jurisdiction in the matter. It has further been ruled that provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance are applicable in case of dismissed workmen of the banks. The Supreme Court, however, remanded the cases after accepting the appeals for deciding other issues involved in such cases.
3. So far as the present case is concerned, the other points which have been raised by the petitioner Bank are:--
(a) This being a case of termination simplicity which was permissible under para. 234 of the First Wage Commission award, could not be questioned before the Labor Court;
(b) the learned Labor Appellate Tribunal passed the impugned judgment at the back of the petitioner without affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the bank; and
(c) that no right guaranteed under any law, award or settlement has been disregarded by ordering termination simplicity of the respondent.
4. Regarding points (a) and (c) above, it may be observed that the respondent at the time of termination of his services was admittedly a confirmed employee. Para. 234 of the Wage Commission award provides that after the expiry of the period of probation, services of an employee can be terminated by the appointing authority if such an employee tenders resignation or by giving him one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof. In the present case, the respondent had not resigned from his employment. The letter of termination was issued to him on 5-6-1982 and his termination was made effective from that very day. He was, of course, allowed the right to receive all his legal dues.
As stated earlier, it was conveyed to the respondent that his services were no longer required. The learned Labour Appellate Tribunal on the basis of evidence add conclusion the load of a tale junior-most e of the respond fact that in t powers under work by the terminated f employees in removed from Tribunal has for such cola the Wages C done mala fi State v. Zia proceedings cloak to cove been taken u act without cede by the parties before the learned Labor Court has come to the t at the time of termination of services of the respondent the work-phone operator has, in fact, increased. The respondent was not the player and that there was no justification to maintain that services end were no longer required. It has thus been found as a matter of e case of the respondent it was merely in colorable exercise of para. 234 of the Wage Commission award.
Although in fact, the time had increased but the services of the respondent were r different considerations. It has also come on record that all lading the respondent appointed by a particular Zonal Chief were service on one ground or the other. The learned Labour Appellate concluded that the services of the respondent were also terminated earl consideration and not for the reasons envisaged in Para. 234 of mission award. Such an order is certainly a mala fide one. An act e has always been held to be an act without jurisdiction. In case Rehman and others PLD 1973 SC 49, it was observed that en mala fide or cases in which the statute was merely used as a an act which, in fact, is not taken even though it purports to have der the statute. It was further ruled that an act done mala fide is an reduction.
' In the case of Abdul Rauf v. Abdul Hamid Khan PLD 1965 SC 671, it was observed "A Legit cont. On t why gran luteal fide act is by its nature an act without jurisdiction. No lature when it grants power to take action or pass an order plates a mala fide exercise of power. A mala fide order is a fraud e statute. It may be explained that a mala fide order means one is passed not for the purpose contemplated by the enactment mg the power to pass the order, but for some other collateral or purposes."
5. So f of the petition as the plea that the impugned order has been passed at the back err without affording an opportunity of hearing is concerned, it may that although at the time of hearing of respondent's appeal, none the petitioner bank, but there is nothing on the record to suggest toner was not afforded opportunity of hearing in the appeal. It the petitioner was duly served in the case of respondent's appeal rued Punjab Labor Appellate Tribunal but the petitioner bank for est. Known to it failed to put in appearance on the date fixed for appeal. It cannot, therefore, be said that opportunity of hearing has red to the petitioner.
(6)In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is concluded that there is no present writ petition, which is, therefore, dismissed. There shall, o order as to costs.