' Mushtaq Ahmad, respondent No, 3, hereinafter referred to as the respondent, was serving as Officer Grade-III in the Circular Road Gujrat Branch of the Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, the petitioner-Bank, in the year 1982. He was served with a charge-sheet on 19-1-1982 wherein it was alleged that he signed an indemnity bond as a witness in the absence of the person executing the indemnity bond and secondly the travellers' cheques were encased and credited to a saving bank account No, 5059 on the authority of forged signatures. The respondent submitted his reply denying the charges. His reply was considered as unsatisfactory and thus a domestic enquiry followed. After obtaining the report of the Enquiry Officer, the respondent was served with a second show-cause notice and ultimately he was dismissed from service vide letter dated 24-5-1982.
2. The respondent served a grievance notice on the employer and thereafter filed the grievance petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance). The petitioner-Bank filed the written statement whereby grievance petition was resisted. The learned Labour Court, viz. Punjab Labour Court No, 7, Gujranwala, after recording the parties' evidence and after hearing them, ordered the reinstatement of the respondent in service with back benefits on 16-12-1984. The petitioner-Bank then filed appeal before the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal but the same was considered as inefficacious remedy and, therefore, the appeal was withdrawn on 28-5-1985. The present Constitutional Petition has thus been filed assailing the order, dated 16-12-1984, passed by the learned Labour Court, Gujranwala.
3. It was mainly argued on behalf of the petitioner-Bank in the first instance that terms and conditions of service, including those relating to disciplinary action, of employees of nationalized banks were governed by the Award of the Wage Commission and that the said Award could only be enforced through the National Industrial Relations Commission. It was also averred that the Award of the Wage Commission did not fall within the ambit of the expression "Award" as occurring in section 2 of the Ordinance and, therefore, such an Award could not be enforced under section 25-A of the Ordinance. These contentions found favors with a learned Division Bench of this Court and consequently the writ petition was allowed on 10-4-1985. The main judgment of the Division Bench was recorded in Writ Petition No,719 of 1982. The respondent as also the other affected employees preferred appeals before the learned Supreme Court of Pakistan. The august Supreme Court accepted the appeals and set aside the judgment of the Division Bench. It has been held by the Honorable Supreme Court that the Award of the Wage Commission can lawfully be enforced, like any other Award, under section 25-A of the Ordinance and, therefore, the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal did not lack jurisdiction in the matter. The Writ Petition has been remanded to this Court for deciding other issues involved in the case.
4. In the present case, the other contentions which have been raised on behalf of the petitoner- Bank are: (a) that the respondent being an officer is not a workman and had thus no locus standi to seek remedy under section 25-A of the Ordinance; (b) that misconduct on the part of the respondent was duly proved and the learned Labour Court has erroneously recorded an otherwise finding; and (c) that being a dismissed employee, the respondent ceased to be a workman and thus could not seek redress of his grievance under section 25-A ibid.
5. Admittedly, the respondent at the relevant time was employed as Officer Grade III in the Circular Road Gujrat Branch of the petitioner-Bank. He was incharge of foreign exchange department. But, it has come on record that the respondent used to make entries in different registers with his hand.
Ishtiaq Ahmad, a witness produced by the respondent before the Labour Court, clearly disclosed that the respondent used to do clerical work and maintained different registers. He also admitted that the duties of the respondent were not exclusively supervisory and he worked under tie direction and supervision of the Manager Incharge of the Branch. In Dost Muhammad Cotton Mills Limited v. Muhammad Abdul Ghani and another 1979 SCMR 304, in case of Chief Accountant, getting monthly salary of Rs,1,050 acting under the instructions of incharge of Accounts Section of the Company and having no supervisory functions to perform it was held by the Supreme Court that he was a workman within the meaning of section 2 of the Ordinance. Similarly, in Chairman Brook Bond (Pakistan) Limited, Karachi v. General Secretary, Union Karkunane Brook Bond (Pakistan) Limited, Rawalpindi PLD 1969 Lah. 717, it was held by this Court that the true nature of duties performed by the employee is the determining factor in ascertaining if he was a workman or not within the meaning of section 2(n) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. Needless to add that the provisions of section 2(n) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, were analogous to those of section 2 (xxviii) of the Ordinance. In Habib Bank Limited v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal etc. 1988 PLC 941, with reference to section 2 (xxviii) of the Ordinance, a Grade-III Officer of the Bank drawing salary exceeding Rs,800, but not performing any managerial or supervisory function, was held to be a workman. In the light of what has been said above, it is concluded that the learned Labour Court, on the basis of evidence available on the record, was justified to find that the respondent, although designated as Grade-III Officer, was, in fact, a workman within the meaning of the Ordinance.
6. Regarding merits, it has been held by the learned Labour Court that loss was occasioned by the petitioner-Bank on account of lapses of the respondent for which he was charge-sheeted. It has further been found that the respondent was charge-sheeted by an incompetent authority. Enquiry against him was also ordered by an incompetent authority. Second show-cause notice was served on him by an incompetent authority. It has also come on record that vide letter dated 27-4-1982, the Head Office Karachi decided to dismiss the petitioner but second show-cause notice was issued on 4-5-1982. It thus becomes evident that the service of second show-cause notice was just a colorable exercise although decision to dismiss the respondent from service had already been taken. Departmental action initiated against the employee by an incompetent authority is certainly a nullity in the eye of law. The findings recorded by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction on a question of fact that if the respondent was liable for misconduct or otherwise cannot and should not ordinarily be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The circumstances of the present case do not justify such interference.
7. The half-hearted plea that the respondent after dismissal from service ceased to be a workman within the meaning of the Ordinance and thus had no locus standi to file application under section 25-A, has no substance. A minute analysis of the provisions of section 2 (xiii) and (xxviii) read with those of subsection (4) of section 25-A leads to an irresistible conclusion that a grievance arising out of dismissal of a workman taken before the Labour Court has to be decided as if it were an industrial dispute. Thus, a dismissed workman has a locus standi to file application under section 25-A of the Ordinance.
8. For the foregoing conclusions, there is no merit in the present Constitutional petition which is, therefore, dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.